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Executive Summary
Background 
• There has, in recent years, been growing awareness and concern over cases of child sexual abuse 
(CSA) which have an international dimension or which involve the Internet. However, relatively 
little is known about these cases, as a result of which the policy and practice response may not be 
as appropriate or effective as it should be. This research project, directed by Bernard Gallagher, and 
funded by The Nuffield Foundation, was designed to further knowledge of international and 
Internet CSA, and in doing so contribute to the development of policy and practice. 
• While this research was focused upon cases known to law enforcement agencies (police and HM 
Revenue and Customs - HMRC), it has implications for the wider criminal justice system, a range 
of other statutory agencies, NGOs and industry, and governance at a national and international 
level. 
Aims 
The research had three main aims, these being to establish:  
1. The extent of cases of international and Internet child sexual abuse, which had a link to the UK, 
and which were known to law enforcement agencies (i.e. police and HMRC) 
2. The nature of these cases (victim and offender characteristics, and offender modus operandi) 
3. The implications of international and Internet CSA for policy and practice  
Methodology 
The research consisted, in the main, of the following seven stages:  
1. A national postal questionnaire (NPQS) carried out among all local police services in the UK, and 
covering the period January 1999-December 2002  
2. A NPQS with HMRC, covering the same survey period as that above 
3. Interviews with police officers concerning investigations into specific cases of international and 
Internet CSA 
4. A search of police files in relation to the above cases 
5. Practice-focused interviews with HMRC staff 
6. Policy-focused interviews with individuals drawn from local, national and international police 
organisations, NGOs, academia, HMRC, Government’ departments and industry 
7. Searches of police crime recording and reporting systems 
The above fieldwork was carried between February 2002 and March 2004. 
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Key Findings  
Typology 
The research identified six major categories of international and Internet CSA. These comprised:  
1. International CSA victim1
2. International child sex abuser2
3. International movement of child abuse images (CAIs)3
4. Internet-initiated grooming for the purposes of sexually abusing a child 
5. Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy (IIIC) to commit CSA4
6. Internet-based child abuse images (CAIs) 
• The categories international CSA victim and international child sex abuser were composed of a 
large number of different types of case. The former consisted not only of the stereotypical cases of 
children trafficked for sexual exploitation but also, for example, children who had been sexually 
abused on school exchange trips, after having been ‘fostered’ and those who were victims of 
Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks. Moreover, these cases involved not only children 
coming into the UK but also children going out of the UK  
• Similarly, international child sex abusers consisted not only of the stereotypical child sex tourists5
but also offenders who sexually abused children after having moved internationally in the context 
of, for example paid, voluntary or religious work. Again, these cases involved not only offenders 
going out of the UK but also offenders coming into the UK   
Extent 
• The number of known cases, in most categories of international and Internet CSA was relatively 
small. Most police services investigated only a few (less than five) of these cases per annum. These 
cases comprised less than 1% of all known CSA cases 
• The one exception to this was cases involving the use of Internet-based CAIs. Police services, 
throughout the UK, investigated scores, and sometimes hundreds, of these cases each year. These 
cases made up approximately one-tenth of all CSA cases known to the police 
Nature 
• International and Internet CSA cases were, in terms of victim and offender characteristics, similar 
to, and as diverse as, known CSA cases in general. Where they were distinct was in respect of the 
offenders’ modi operandi, with the international and Internet elements of these cases often being 
central to how the sexual abuse of a child was brought about 
                                                
1
 This report is believed to be the first published research which has sought to investigate all the different types 
of cases which are incorporated within this category 
2
 As above 
3
 This report is believed to be the first published research on this category of CSA 
4
 As above 
5
 It was suggested to the authors that they dispense with the term ‘child sex tourists’  (CST) - as this can be seen 
to trivialise the reality of this phenomenon - and replace it with, for example, the term ‘travelling child sex 
offender’. Whilst readily accepting the principle of this argument, the authors have decided to retain the term 
CST, on account of the fact that a) it is still the most recognised term, and b) there is not yet any wholly suitable 
alternative.  
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• CAIs varied considerably in terms of their content. They ranged from photographs of children 
taking covertly to scenes depicting rape, bestiality, physical abuse and torture.  
• The proportion of offenders who used CAIs and who were also known to have sexually abused 
children was relatively small. (One piece of work carried out within this study found that 6.5% of 
suspected CAI users had convictions for sexual offences.) 
Policy and practice 
   
International and Internet CSA 
• Governments, statutory agencies, NGOs and industry have done a considerable amount to combat 
international and Internet CSA. However, there is much more that all of these organisations can, 
and should, be doing in response to these cases. This includes prevention, detection, reporting, 
investigation, the care of victims and the management of offenders.   
• Knowledge of international and Internet CSA, including that among policy makers and 
practitioners, was limited. This contributed, in part, to the emergence of many assumptions and 
misconceptions surrounding these cases 
International CSA 
• Policy makers and practitioners tended to have a rather narrow conceptualisation of international 
and Internet CSA, especially in relation to international CSA victims and international child sex 
abusers 
• There was little recognition, especially outside of HMRC, of the continued existence of the 
international movement of CAIs    
• The Internet had not - as some authorities suggested - led to a cessation in the international 
movement of CAIs but had instead resulted in new instances of this offence 
Internet CSA 
• The police had inadequate resources for the investigation of Internet CSA cases. This was manifest 
in a number of ways, which included: 
 - long delays in examining computers and other new technology for CAIs 
  - little effort being invested in the identification of children featuring in CAIs 
 - little effort being invested in proactive police operations - even though these cases were 
    especially suited to this    
• There was, among policy makers and practitioners, very little awareness of, or response to, cases of 
Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy (IIIC) to commit CSA 
• IIIC cases included incidents where offenders sent communications to one another online, and 
sometimes offline also, which glorified or promoted CSA. These offenders appeared to be subject 
to little response on the part of the police or any other criminal justice agency  
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Key Recommendations 
1.  International police/law enforcement child protection agency 
An international police/law enforcement child protection agency should be established in order to 
provide a more concerted and coordinated response to international and Internet CSA  (see 11.1 for 
detailed discussion). 
2.  National (UK) police/law enforcement child protection agency (NPCPA) 
The Government should extend the remit of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) 
Centre such that it becomes a NPCPA, and takes a national lead for all international and national CSA 
cases. This national lead would include prime responsibility for the proactive detection and 
investigation of cases. The cases would include those that cross police service boundaries, especially 
those involving child sex abuser networks or the Internet. In addition, the NPCPA would act as a 
single point of contact in the response to international CSA cases with a link to the UK, and would 
take prime responsibility for the UK side of such investigations (see 11.2).  
3.  Prioritisation of child protection 
The (UK) Government, and more specifically the Home Office, should make child protection a 
policing priority, and following this, require local police services to do the same (see 11.3). 
4.  Resourcing police child protection work 
The Government should provide additional resources to the police to enable them to embark upon a 
more effective response to Internet CSA cases, including those that involve the use of CAIs (see 11.4). 
5.  CAI victim identification 
There needs to be a much more concerted and well resourced effort, led by the police, to identify the 
children who feature in CAIs. Incorporated within this, the police must be able to co-ordinate this 
work at international, national and local levels (see 11.5). 
6.  Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA 
Government, statutory agencies, NGOs and the new technology industries, should ensure that they are 
aware of the existence of IIIC cases, have a proper knowledge of them and understand the policy and 
practice challenges to which they give rise. All of these organisations must respond to these cases in a 
much more robust manner (see 11.6). 
7.  Prohibition of CSA-promoting communications 
The Government should give serious consideration to introducing legislation to make it a criminal 
offence to possess, create or distribute CSA communications - whether online or offline - which 
glorify or promote CSA. All of the organisations listed above must respond to these cases in a much 
more robust manner (see 11.7).  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1  Reports of cases of child sexual abuse (CSA*)6 having an international or Internet dimension have 
come to the fore of child protection concerns in the last 5-10 years. These reports relate, for example, 
to the trafficking of children for CSA (UNICEF, 2003a), child sex tourism (Seabrook, 2000), the 
grooming of children over the Internet for sexual abuse (Finkelhor et al, 2000; Cyberspace Research 
Unit, 2002) and the downloading of child abuse images (CAIs) from the Internet (Taylor and Quayle, 
2003). 
1.2  These concerns have been met with a plethora of policy and practice measures. These include the 
setting up computer examination units within local police services, and the Internet Watch Foundation 
(IWF) - the national ‘hotline’ for receiving reports of illegal Internet content. This period has also seen 
the creation of the Home Secretary’s (also referred to as the Home Office) Task Force on Child 
Protection on the Internet, which has brought together all the major organisations in this field, 
including police, industry and NGOs. Discussions within the ‘Task Force’ have led to the grooming 
offence (see below), awareness-raising campaigns and the production of good practice models. Advice 
has been produced for parents on keeping their children safe whilst online (for example, NCH, 2005), 
and legislation has been enacted to combat child sex tourism (for instance, the Sex Offenders Act 
1997), and the trafficking, and grooming (both online and offline), of children for sexual abuse  
(Sexual Offences Act 2003). 
1.3  There is also a growing body of research in this area, such as that by UNICEF on the extent of 
child trafficking (UNICEF, 2003a), David Finkelhor and colleagues on grooming (Wolak et al, 2003) 
and the sending of CAIs to children (Mitchell et al, 2003), and COPINE’s work on offenders who 
access CAIs over the Internet (Taylor and Quayle, 2003). 
1.4  Despite this concern, policy and practice response, and research on international and Internet 
CSA, there is still relatively little reliable knowledge of these phenomena. Indeed, for some categories 
of international and Internet CSA identified in this research - in particular, the international movement 
of CAIs, and Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA - this report is believed to be 
the first published research anywhere in the world. Thus, not only is the understanding of these 
phenomena inadequate, attempts to respond to them, through policy and practice, may, as a result, be 
ineffective, if not counter-productive. With the seemingly inexorable growth and development in the 
international movement of people and goods, and use of the Internet, this situation is becoming ever 
more acute. 
  
1.5  It is was against this background that the director of this research project (Bernard Gallagher) 
approached The Nuffield Foundation for a grant to conduct the first comprehensive study in the UK 
into international and Internet CSA. (The Nuffield Foundation is an independent charity which funds 
research in a number of different areas, one of which is ‘Child Protection, Family Law and Justice’ - 
the programme under which the grant for this study was awarded.) The formal aims of the research are 
set out in detail in the following chapter but they were, in essence, two-fold: firstly, to further 
knowledge and understanding of international and Internet CSA; and secondly, to identify ways in 
which the policy and practice response to these cases - primarily within the criminal justice sphere, but 
also, to some extent, the wider child protection system - could be improved. 
                                                
6
 A full list of the abbreviations and explanation of the terms used in this report is contained in Appendix A.
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1.6  The original research proposal was submitted to The Nuffield Foundation in May 2001. Once the 
proposal had been sent out for review, and then amended in accordance with the advice of the 
reviewers, the official start date of the research was set as 1st February 2002. Data collection began in 
August 2002, and the research officially concluded on 31st March 2004, with the final report being 
sent to The Nuffield Foundation on 30th July 2004. As can be seen, then, the research was carried out 
over a quite extensive period and one which incorporated many of the key developments in terms of 
awareness of, and policy and practice response towards, international and Internet CSA. 
1.7  Further information concerning the background to this research and its remit, can be found in 
Appendix B 
The content and structure of this report 
1.8  The focus of this research was upon cases of international and Internet CSA known to law 
enforcement agencies, chiefly the police and HMRC. However, it was recognised that this subject area 
is of considerable relevance and interest to a wide variety of policy makers, practitioners and 
academics in the statutory, voluntary and private sectors. With this in mind, the authors have 
attempted to include as much, and as wide an array of information, in this report, as was considered 
reasonable. It is hoped that, in this way, the benefit and value of the research, and this subsequent 
report, will be maximised. 
1.9  At the same time, the authors appreciate that this strategy has led to the report being quite lengthy. 
Moreover, they realise that people have different concerns and responsibilities, and some may wish to 
focus upon some parts of the report more than others. Consequently, the authors have made the report 
highly structured in order that the reader might find their way through it quite easily. This structure is 
as follows:  
1.10  Chapters 1, 2 and 3, describe the background to the research, providing the Introduction, Aims 
and Methodology, respectively. 
1.11  The report then moves on to the findings from the research. This begins, in Chapters 4, with an 
outline of the six main categories of international and Internet CSA identified in the course of the 
fieldwork - and around which this report is largely based. 
1.12  Each of the chapters 5-10 take one category of international and Internet CSA and presents 
findings in a standardised format, comprising typology, vignettes, extent and nature of cases (i.e. 
victims, offenders and their modus operandi).  
1.13  Chapters 11-13 deal with the findings from the research in respect of policy and practice. 
Chapter 11 contains the key policy and practice recommendations from the research. These are judged 
as being ‘key’ in that they are believed to be the most pressing or fundamental recommendations, or 
those having the most extensive ramifications.  
1.14  Chapter 12 incorporates further recommendations from the research, dividing these up according 
to different political levels (international and national), sectors (statutory, private and NGO) and 
agencies to which they relate.  
1.15  Chapter 13 is also concerned with ‘recommendations’ but at a much more general level. The 
points raised in this chapter are intended to serve one of two functions. The first of these is to set out 
the broad context in which policy and practice should be developed and/or implemented. The second is 
to raise awareness of particular policy and practice issues.  
1.16  While chapters 5-10 deal with individual categories of international or Internet CSA, the ‘policy 
and practice chapters’, 11-13, tend to cover these categories as a whole. The reasoning behind this is 
that the authors wanted, in chapters 5-10, to provide readers with a clear knowledge and understanding 
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of the characteristics of each category of international and Internet CSA. By contrast, it was felt that 
there was so much overlap between the policy and practice implications of the different types of 
international and Internet CSA, that these should be discussed together. 
1.17  While some of the chief concerns of this study were the Internet and children, the researchers 
also encountered issues in respect of other ‘new technologies’, and the sexual abuse of women. While 
the amount of information obtained on these cases was very modest, it was felt to be relevant and 
important to include them in this report, and these are presented in Chapter 14. 
1.18  Finally, the report concludes, in Chapter 15, with a discussion of the needs and challenges which 
exist in relation to research on international and Internet CSA, and puts forward some suggestions as 
to how these should be addressed. 
1.19  As lengthy as this report is, though, there is much information which has not been included. This 
report, however, is intended to be only the first publication from the research. A series of papers will 
be written, for submission to academic journals, each focusing upon a specific category of 
international or Internet CSA. These papers will contain further data from the research and will also 
place the individual categories in a wider context, including that of relevant literature. 
1.20  There are, within this report, a small number of graphic descriptions of child sexual abuse. 
The authors felt it was important to include these to convey an accurate sense of what cases 
could comprise. That said, they would like readers to be aware that they may find these 
descriptions disturbing. 
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Research aims 
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Chapter 2 
Research aims 
The aims of this research project were as follows: 
2.1  Main study 
To determine the extent of known cases of international and Internet CSA 
2.1.1  This measurement was to be based upon cases known to law enforcement agencies i.e. the 52 
UK police services and HM Revenue and Customs, over a four year period from January 1999-
December 2002. 
To establish the nature of known cases of international and Internet CSA  
2.1.2  This  phase of the research was based upon cases known to the above law enforcement agencies. 
However, it also drew upon cases known to other agencies, principally national and international 
policing organisations; namely, the National Crime Squad (NCS), National High Tech Crime Unit 
(NHTCU), National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and Interpol. (NCS, NCIS and the NHTCU 
have now been amalgamated within the Serious and Organised Crime Agency - SOCA.) 
2.1.3  The key areas the research sought to describe were the characteristics and background of victims 
and offenders, and the modus operandi of offenders, including the nature of their offences. 
To identify the ways in which the policy and practice response to international and Internet CSA 
could be improved  
2.1.4  While this aspect of the research was concerned primarily with policy and practice as it related 
to law enforcement and criminal justice, it did seek to highlight, where possible, the implications of 
these cases in other relevant spheres, such as children’s rights, education, health and welfare. 
2.2  Supplementary study 
2.2.1  The Nuffield Foundation granted a small extension to this project to enable a study to be carried 
out into the experience of international and Internet CSA among a wider set of agencies; namely, 
social services departments, probation departments, Trading Standards and the military. The aims of 
this supplementary study were the same as those of the main one; namely, to establish the extent and 
nature of known cases, and the issues they raised for practice and policy. 
2.2.2  This component of the research proved more demanding, and consequently less successful, than 
had been anticipated, and is not discussed in detail in this report. (These problems were chiefly caused 
by the authors underestimating the scale of the work they planned to undertake, and then not having 
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sufficient resources with which to set it up and execute it.) Despite this, it did provide some insights 
into the implications of these cases beyond law enforcement and criminal justice - insights that have 
been incorporated within this report.
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7 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1  Main study 
The main study consisted of the following seven stages: 
Police National Postal Questionnaire Survey (NPQS) 
                                                                                                  
3.1.1  A NPQS was carried out with the 52 (local) police services in the UK. The survey utilised two 
questionnaires:  
Case Specific Questionnaire 
                                                  
3.1.2  The police were asked to complete questionnaires for (suspected) cases of international and 
Internet CSA which had been reported to them between January 1999 and the time the questionnaire 
was administered in August 2002. (This latter date became, in effect, December 2002, owing to delays 
in questionnaire completion and return.) The survey was intended to measure the extent of cases 
known to the police, and provide outline information concerning the nature and investigation of these 
cases. (Appendix C provides a full breakdown of the areas covered by this questionnaire.)  
3.1.3  24 (46.2%) of the 52 police services in the UK responded to the survey, reporting a total of 113 
cases (see Table 17). (The reasons for this relatively low response rate, its implications and the way in 
which it was responded to, are discussed Appendix C.) 
General Policing Questionnaire (GPQ) 
                                                                
3.1.4  Each police service was asked to nominate one officer, in an appropriately senior position, to 
complete a single questionnaire, commenting upon the managerial and strategic issues raised by 
international and Internet CSA in general.                                           
3.1.5  16 (30.8%) of the 52 police services in the UK returned a completed questionnaire for this part 
of the survey. While this was not a very good response, this exercise did provide some useful 
additional information at relatively little extra cost in terms of resources expended. One further GPQ 
was returned by an officer employed in a national policing unit.   
HMRC NPQS  
                               
3.1.6  A copy of the Case Specific Questionnaire used in the police NPQS was sent to HMRC. While 
the purpose of this NPQS was essentially the same as it had been for police, there was - given the role 
of HMRC (in relation to child protection) - an almost exclusive focus upon cases involving the 
international movement of CAIs. 
                                                
7
 Further details concerning the research methodology, plus all the tables referred to in this section of the report, 
are contained in Appendix C. 
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3.1.7  Questionnaires were completed for a random sample of 35 of the approximately 150 cases 
which were on the HMRC database.  
Police case studies 
Interviews 
                       
3.1.8  Police officers were interviewed in respect of specific international and Internet CSA cases 
which they had investigated. The primary purpose of the interviews was to identify the investigative 
and management issues which these cases raised, and practice surrounding international and Internet 
CSA more generally. A secondary purpose of the interviews was to obtain information concerning the 
nature of cases, especially the modus operandi of the offenders. Interviews were carried out with 51 
police officers in respect of 56 separate investigations. Table 2 (Appendix C) shows that these officers 
were drawn from a quite wide range of departments. Appendix C also lists the main topics covered in 
these interviews. 
File searches 
                          
3.1.9  Searches were made of police files in relation to investigations into 40 separate cases of 
international and Internet CSA. The primary purpose of the file searches was to obtain more detailed 
information concerning the nature of cases. The file searches were, though, also useful sometimes in 
highlighting policy and practice issues raised by these cases. Information was recorded on a data 
extraction form. The areas covered by this form are shown in Appendix C.  
3.1.10  The intention of the researchers had been to interview the investigating officer and search the 
file for every case identified in this stage of the research. In some instances, though, this was not 
possible owing either to the police officer or the file not being available. Overall, (some) information 
was obtained on a total of 72 different cases. A breakdown of the sources of information for these 72 
cases, and the categories of international and Internet CSA they featured, are given in Table 3 and 4 
respectively (Appendix C). 
HMRC interviews 
                                                                       
3.1.11  Interviews were carried out with 17 HMRC officers. These were drawn from all HMRC’ 
sections (policy, intelligence, detection and investigation) and settings (airports, docks and postal 
depots). 
3.1.12  The main purpose of these interviews was to identify the policy and practice issues raised by 
international CSA and in particular the international movement of CAIs. Given the researcher’s 
unfamiliarity with the work of HMRC, an exploratory approach was taken to these interviews, 
utilising an unstructured interview schedule. This schedule covered three main areas: the interviewee’s 
general role within HMRC, his or her knowledge and experience of international CSA, and the policy 
and practice issues raised by these cases. 
Policy-focused interviews 
Police interviews 
                                
3.1.13  Policy-focused interviews were carried out with 39 police officers, ranging in rank from 
Constable to Superintendent, and one civilian member of staff. The police units and organisations 
from which they were drawn are shown in Table 5 (Appendix C). 
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Specialist organisations 
                                          
3.1.14  A total of 16 interviews were carried out with individuals from organisations which were 
responsible for, or concerned with, policy (broadly defined) in respect of international and Internet 
CSA. As Table 6 (Appendix C) shows, these comprised individuals from NGOs (7), academia (4), 
Government’ departments (3) and industry (2). 
Searches of police crime recording and reporting systems  
                                                 
Recorded CSA offences 
                                         
3.1.15  Searches were carried out within the crime recording systems of two police services - one 
metropolitan8 and one shire county. The aim of these searches was to obtain a measure of the number 
of CSA cases, involving international CSA victims or international child sex abusers, which had been 
recorded by each of these police services in the period covered by the NPQS (January 1999-December 
2002). 4,709 CSA records were searched in the metropolitan police area and 984 in the shire county 
police service. 
Reported Internet-related offences 
                                                        
3.1.16  Searches were made of crime reports to Computer Examination Units in three police services - 
one metropolitan9 and two shire counties. The aim of these searches was to measure the number of
Internet CSA cases that had been reported to each of these police services for the period covered by the 
NPQS (January 1999-December 2002). 311 reports (CSA-related offences only) were searched in the 
metropolitan police service, 253 (all crimes) in shire county 1 and 294 (all crimes) in shire county 2. 
3.2  Supplementary study 
3.2.1  Details of the methodology used in the supplementary study (with social services departments, 
probation and Trading Standards) are contained in Appendix C. 
3.3  Ethical approval 
3.3.1  The proposed research was submitted to the School Research Ethics Panel (School of Human 
and Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield) and was then referred up to the University Ethics 
Committee. The research was formally granted ethical approval in March 2002. Further details 
concerning the ethical procedures adopted in this research are provided in Appendix C. 
3.3.2  In addition to this approval process, the conduct of this research project was overseen by an 
advisory committee (whose membership is detailed above) which provided advice on issues such as 
aims, methodology, access, analysis and writing up.  
                                                
8
 It should be noted that the term ‘metropolitan’ refers to the type of area covered by the police service, and not 
the Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service. 
9
 As in no. 8 
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3.4  Limitations 
3.4.1  There were a number of limitations in the research which the reader should bear in mind when 
reading this report. These are as follows:  
The scale and scope of this research 
3.4.2  When the idea for this research was first conceived, around about the year 2000, international 
and Internet CSA, had a fairly modest profile. As a result, the research director (Gallagher) felt that the 
proposed research project should, perhaps, be equally modest in scale, and a grant was applied for 
which was commensurate with this assessment. However, over the subsequent five years or so, 
awareness of, and concern over, international and Internet CSA rose dramatically. 
3.4.3  Of more immediate relevance to these authors, was that as the research progressed, it became 
increasingly evident that international and Internet CSA was more extensive and serious than they had 
anticipated. In particular, it was found that there were more categories of international and Internet 
CSA than were indicated in the existing literature, with most of these capable of being sub-divided 
into a number of different types of case. Thus, while the resources for this research project were quite 
modest, the scope of the subject matter proved to be quite considerable.  
3.4.4  Notwithstanding this, the researchers endeavoured to obtain as much information, and on as 
many different types of case, as was practicable. In the event, though, for each specific type of 
international or Internet CSA case, it was usually possible to carry out only a very small number of 
case studies (i.e. of the order of one, two or three) or to gather only rather general information. This is 
especially true of cases within the categories international CSA victim and international child sex 
abuser. 
Specific limitations of this research 
3.4.5  The limitations in the scale of this research were manifest in a number of more specific ways. 
These were as follows: 
• The research was based in the UK, and in the main studied only cases that had a link to this 
country. Had fieldwork been carried out in other countries, and/or on cases other than those with a 
link to the UK, then the findings may have been different. In particular, it is possible that, in certain 
developing countries, international CSA cases would have been more extensive (perhaps much 
more so - as suggested by the literature (UNICEF, 2003b) - with Internet CSA cases being less 
extensive 
• The research was based only upon known cases i.e. cases of CSA that had been reported to 
agencies. As numerous prevalence surveys - such as Cawson et al, 2000 - have shown, a large 
majority of CSA cases are never reported to any agency10
• The research was largely based only upon cases that were known to law enforcement agencies 
(police and HMRC) in the UK. It may be that some cases, ‘which had a link to the UK’, were not 
known to (UK) police and/or HMRC but were known only to agencies outside the UK or non-law 
enforcement agencies within the UK11
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 It may be that the police and HMRC, in the UK, are even less likely to know of CSA cases that involve 
international or Internet dimensions. In respect of international cases, for example, it may be that victims are less 
able and/or willing to disclose their abuse. Similarly, agencies in one country may be less able and/or willing to 
inform their counterparts in another country of CSA cases in which they have (or should have) a mutual 
responsibility.
11
 As in no.10 
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• The figures given in subsequent chapters of this report, on the extent of known cases of 
international and Internet CSA, were based upon a search of records in only a small number of 
police services - two and three respectively. 
3.4.6  Taking into account all of the above, it should be recognised that the findings from this research 
are not as reliable nor generalizable as they would have been, had they been based upon a large, 
representative, quantitative study. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to think of the research, not as 
having produced findings, but rather as having identified themes - themes that would be important to 
validate in future research focused upon specific categories and types, of international and Internet 
CSA. 
Changes in the extent, nature and response, to international and Internet CSA 
3.4.7  Change appears to be a conspicuous feature of international, and even more so Internet, CSA. 
This applies both to cases themselves (including offender behaviour), and subsequent policy and 
practice responses. This research found, for example, that offenders have, in the last few years, 
changed the way in which they smuggle CAIs into the country, and the protocols they used to 
perpetrate Internet CSA. In addition, there are a series of factors that could be leading to an increase in 
the incidence of international and Internet CSA. These include, greater foreign travel by children and 
would-be offenders, a strengthening of penalties for child sex offenders in the UK - which encourages 
would-be offenders to go abroad in the hope of encountering children who have fewer protections in 
law - increased access to computers and the Internet, on-going developments in new technology (for 
example, Internet-enabled mobile phones) and an increased awareness (among offenders) of the 
opportunities to commit CSA on an international or Internet basis. In terms of the official response, the 
Government, for instance, has introduced new legislation, such as the Sexual Offences Act 2003. This 
incorporates, among much else, a new grooming offence (section 15), broadens the definition of 
sexual exploitation-related trafficking (section 57) and brings in new powers to prevent convicted sex 
offenders from travelling abroad (section 114). 
3.4.8  As to the precise impact which these, and other, developments are having, and will have, this is 
not known. However, it is likely that the agency experience of these cases is at least somewhat 
different now to what it was when the fieldwork for this research was carried out. Agency workers 
should, for example, be generally more aware of, and prepared to respond to, international and Internet 
CSA. This, in turn, may have led to an increase in the number of reports they have received. 
3.4.9  In summary, then, this research does have a number of limitations and the authors have sought 
to take these into account in writing this report. The reader is asked to take into consideration the 
points made above when reading this report. 
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Chapter 4 
A typology of international and Internet 
child sexual abuse 
4.1  The research identified, and subsequently studied, six major categories of international and 
Internet CSA. These comprised three categories of international CSA: international CSA victim, 
international child sex abuser and the international movement (physically rather than electronically) of 
CAIs; and three categories of Internet CSA: Internet-initiated grooming of a child for the purposes of 
sexually abusing him or her, Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA and the use of 
Internet-based CAIs. The resultant typology is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also provides the working 
definitions of each of these categories, which were developed, and utilised, in the course of the 
research.  
4.2  As Figure 1 shows, there existed at least one other major category of international/Internet CSA, 
this being the unsolicited receipt by children of CAIs over the Internet. While this category of case has 
been subject of study elsewhere (see Mitchell, Finkelhor and Wolak, 2003), it did not feature in the 
current research, primarily because it was beyond the resources of the project. In addition, though, it 
was the researchers’ experience that the police received very few reports concerning this category of 
case. 
Figure 1  A typology international and Internet CSA
Category Definition 
1. International CSA victim  • A child who has travelled from one country to 
another - for whatever purpose - and has then been 
sexually abused 
2. International child sex abuser • An individual who has travelled from one country 
to another - for whatever purpose - and has then 
sexually abused a child 
3. International movement of CAIs12 • The movement through ports and airports, either 
‘on the person’ or via the international post, of 
CAIs  - in whatever form - (for example 
photographs, films, magazines, floppy disks and 
CDs, and laptops) from one country to another 
4. Internet-initiated grooming of a child for purposes 
    of sexually abusing him or her  
• Where an individual has used the Internet to 
initiate contact with a child for the purposes of 
grooming and then sexually abusing that child  
5. Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to 
    commit CSA 
• Where an individual has used or has tried to use the 
Internet to initiate contact with another person to 
incite, or conspire with them, to commit CSA 
6. Internet-based CAIs • Where an individual has taken, made, distributed, 
showed or possessed CAIs via the Internet  
    Internet-based receipt by children of CAIs • Where a child has received unsolicited CAIs over 
the Internet  
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 This category does not refer to cases where CAIs were sent between countries electronically i.e. over the 
Internet. These are incorporated in category 6.
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4.3  Although at least some of what is incorporated within Figure 1 may be familiar to those involved 
in child protection, it is felt that this schema (and the research which underpins it) encapsulates a 
number of substantial and innovative features. These are as follows:  
• The bringing together of categories of CSA which, while distinct, overlap with one another in 
important ways   
• The identification of a category of case - Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA 
- which has received little or no policy, practice or research attention  
• The highlighting of a category of case - international movement of CAIs - which has been 
relatively neglected in terms of policy, practice and research, and which might as a result of the 
Internet - and contrary to expectation - be increasing  
• The definition and conceptualisation of certain categories of case - in particular, international CSA 
victim and international child sex abuser - in much broader terms than have been implied 
previously  
4.4  Moreover, and as will be shown in the following discussion, all of these categories comprise a 
number of separate types of case. Overall, then, and as Figure 1 suggests, international and Internet 
CSA is a much more extensive, complex and challenging problem than has been thought hitherto, and 
one in need of a much wider-ranging, co-ordinated, and concerted policy and practice response. 
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Chapter 5 
   
International child sexual abuse victims 
  
5.1  Typology 
  
5.1.1  Figure 2 shows the typology (in alphabetical order) of international CSA victim cases that was 
developed from information gathered during the course of the research. The typology is based upon 
the specific context in which victims moved from one country to another.13 As the figure makes clear, 
there were many different types of international CSA victim case. Two particular points are worth 
highlighting: firstly, while cases comprising the trafficking14 of children for the purposes of sexual 
abuse or exploitation were identified, this was only one of many types of international CSA victim 
case that were uncovered during the course of the research (which, itself, is unlikely to have been 
exhaustive); secondly, these cases involved not only children who came into the country, but also 
children who went out of the country (again, in a variety of contexts).   
Figure 2 A typology of international CSA victim cases 
Types Sub-types 
1.   Club (e.g. sports) trip 
2.   Exchange trip 
3.   Forced marriage 
4.   Fostering15  
5.   Holiday 
6.   Internet-initiated child sex abuser network 
7.   Internet-initiated grooming 
8.   Medical treatment 
9.   Migration 
10. School trip 
11. Trafficking 
• Child enters the country and 
is subsequently sexually 
abused 
• Child goes abroad and is 
subsequently sexually abused 
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 This research is restricted to victims who recently entered the country - where the offences took place - and/or 
had come in on what was, or was initially, a temporary basis i.e. it excludes victims who were long-term 
residents or naturalised citizens of the country where the offences took place. 
14
 The definition of the term trafficking - in relation to both sexual offences and offending more generally - has, 
in recent years, and including the period covered by this study, changed, and become much broader. However, 
and in the interests of consistency, this report retains the study’s original, more narrow, conception of trafficking, 
as being concerned with individuals - in this instance, children - who are moved - in this instance, internationally 
- for the purposes of exploiting their prostitution. It should be stressed that the authors do support the broadening 
out of the definition of trafficking, and will endeavour to reflect this in their future work. 
15
 The term ‘fostering’ is used here in a loose sense to refer to those situations where an offender became the 
parent/carer of the child in question (excluding adoption). The legal basis of these arrangements were not always 
clear - whether this was to the agencies involved in the investigation and/or the researchers. It appeared, though, 
that these arrangements were quite diverse, ranging from those where some formal (i.e. legal) agreement had 
been entered into, through situations where the offender had entered into informal arrangements with whosoever 
was the appropriate ‘authority’, onto circumstances where children may, in effect, have been abducted. A few of 
these cases involved legal foster parents in the UK who took their foster child abroad, but most comprised UK 
citizens who went abroad and brought a child back to this country, acting as their putative parent/carer.
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5.2  Vignettes 
5.2.1  The following vignettes are based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They 
are intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense of the nature of international CSA victim 
cases, and the policy and practice issues to which they gave rise. The details of these cases have been 
changed or generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
Case 1: child brought into the UK having been ‘fostered’ by a British missionary 
5.2.2  The following is the description, quoted verbatim, of a case submitted on the police 
NPQS: 
5.2.3  ‘Saeed is an Ethiopian refugee currently living in this country. He provided police with 
his background. He was ten years old when he met the suspect John Smith. Smith was a British 
missionary living in Mogadishu who ran a house for street boys. He housed approximately 40 
boys.  
5.2.4  ‘Saeed alleged that from the age of 10, he was forced to have anal intercourse with Smith. 
In 1996, when Saeed was 13 years old, Smith brought him to England for three weeks. The 
abuse continued during this period, Saeed was forced to masturbate the subject. The abuse 
continued on their return back to Mogadishu. In October 1997, Smith brought Saeed back to this 
country to live and applied for permanent asylum for him. The abuse continued until, in 1999, 
Saeed requested a[n] [official] foster place and was given one. Smith was arrested in March 
2001 ………Smith was suspected of abusing another boy in Mogadishu and also of bringing 
him to this country for a holiday. Interpol were instructed to trace this boy but were 
unsuccessful.’ 
Case 2: children taken abroad, from the UK, on work-related trips by a family friend 
5.2.5  Initially, this case involved a 11 year old boy who was occasionally taken around the UK 
and abroad by an uncle who was a long-distance lorry driver from south-west England.  In the 
run-up to one of these trips, he informed his mother than he no longer wanted to accompany his 
uncle. When asked why, he replied that ‘he does naughty things to me’. His mother reported the 
matter to the police who then interviewed the boy. The boy disclosed that he had been sexually 
abused in the sleeper cab of his uncle’s lorry but only whilst abroad. However, it transpired that 
all of these offences had taken place before the enactment of the Sex Offenders Act 1997, with 
its provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction. As the investigating police officer explained, the 
case could well have been closed there but for the fact that he felt bound to try and do 
something for this young victim: 
5.2.6  ‘I felt an obligation to the 11 year old boy who disclosed and was disappointed that there 
was nothing I could do. I could have filed it and left it but I dug and did more investigations and 
saw family members in Bristol. We shouldn’t really be doing ‘fishing expeditions’ but I wanted 
to see who else had been abroad with him [as children].’   
    
5.2.7  What the officer was looking for was other victims whose abuse might have been 
perpetrated in the UK. It appeared that none of the numerous other male members of the 
extended family, who had been abroad with the uncle, and who were approached by this police 
officer, wished to make a disclosure. Two of the last family members to be seen were 16 and 20 
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year old brothers. The police officer went to see their mother about the investigation and she 
asked her sons whether anything had happened to them. They denied this, and as the police 
officer remarked in his interview, ‘So, my enquiry was coming to a juddering halt.’ 
5.2.8  However, shortly after this, the boys’ mother came to visit the police officer and, in tears, 
told him that both her sons had come to her, also in tears, and said that they had been sexually 
abused by the uncle. This development appears to have encouraged other males within the 
family to disclose their abuse. As the police officer stated, ‘then one, then another came 
forward.’ In total, five adults reported being sexually abused (when they were children) both in 
the UK and abroad. One additional adult disclosed abuse but did not wish to make an official 
statement and two more were strongly suspected, by the police, of having been abused. The 
police decided against pursuing this last element of the case owing to the psychological 
difficulties these two, possible victims, were experiencing. 
5.2.9  The offender’s pattern was that as a victim got older, and moved out of his preferred age 
range, he would target and groom another (younger) boy. Trips in his lorry, within the UK and 
abroad, were one of the main inducements upon which his grooming of the boys was based. His 
abuse of boys extended over a 15-year period. 
5.2.10 Although the suspect was tried only for offences committed in the UK, the police 
investigation revealed that all of the children had first been abused when they were abroad and 
that this was also where the large majority of the abuse had taken place. The police investigation 
led to the offender’s computer being searched and it was found to contain CAIs that he had 
downloaded from the Internet. The offender eventually received a nine-year prison sentence for 
his sexual abuse of the children and possession of indecent photographs of children. 
5.2.11  Some years after the case had been closed, the mother of the original 11 year old victim 
approached the police to inform them that her son had recently disclosed that he too had been 
abused in the UK, and not just abroad as he first indicated. 
5.2.12  Like the trafficking case below, this was another instance in which the very considerable 
support the police provided to victims and their families seemed to prove invaluable in their 
ability to take part in the criminal justice process - with its eventual successful outcome. Even 
this, though, was not sufficient to offset all the adverse consequences of the disclosures. The 
police officer interviewed about this case described one such situation where one of the men’s 
partners did not seem able to understand or sympathise with her husband over the abuse he had 
experienced as a child: 
5.2.13  ‘There was a really good family that was badly affected by it. One guy split up with his 
wife. She couldn’t handle it. She said why did you let him do it. She told him “You can’t see the 
kids. You might do it to our kids”.’ 
Case 3: child trafficking into the UK 
5.2.14  Maria was from Moldova where she lived with her father - her mother having died some 
years before. Her father was abusive towards her, so when a relative offered her a ‘way out’ she 
ran away from home with him, aged 12. However, the relative’s intention was to sell her to a 
gang of pimps from Romania, which he did, for $500. Following this, she was trafficked 
through Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, being sold on to,  and  raped  by,  a  series  of  pimps, who 
forced her to work as a prostitute and perform in strip clubs. Finally, she was taken to Germany,  
being forced, by yet another pimp, to work as a prostitute.  
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5.2.15  However, this pimp was in control of a girl who had been ‘loaned’ to him by a second 
pimp, but he had ‘never returned her’. Consequently, the second pimp ‘stole’ Maria and made 
arrangements for her to travel to England, via France, using forged documents, meeting up with 
him there.  
5.2.16  Once in England, Maria, now 15 years of age, was forced to resume work as a prostitute 
in different brothels in north-west England. Her new pimp would take her to, and from, the 
brothels each day, and then, when she returned home, he would force her to have sex with him, 
beating her and threatening her with knives and guns if she tried to resist. 
5.2.17  Eventually Maria ran away and sought the help of a ‘maid’ at one of the brothels where 
she worked, showing her the injuries she had incurred at the hands of the pimp. This maid then 
contacted a specialist police vice unit that she knew of and which appears to be very highly 
regarded in this area of work. 
5.2.18  What happened next seems to have been a text book example of how the police, and 
other agencies, should respond to cases involving the trafficking of children (into the UK) for 
sexual exploitation. The police invested huge resources into investigating the case (at an 
estimated cost of £100,000) which included surveillance, search teams, close liaison with the 
local social services department (SSD), the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) and 
the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), and travel to, and work in, Eastern Europe. What appears 
to have been crucial in all of this was the very considerable expertise and commitment with 
which the police handled the case, and the level of support they provided to Maria who had 
suffered appalling abuse and was, as a result of all of her experiences, extremely vulnerable. 
This applied not only to the investigation stage, but also the pre-trial, and indeed even the post-
trial, period.  
5.2.19 Also of critical importance in this case, was that the social services department (SSD) 
involved in the case had a specialist unit - which has since been threatened with closure - for 
dealing with asylum seekers, which enabled them to provide Maria with some of the specialist 
and dedicated on-going support she required. The police officer interviewee commented very 
favourably upon the work the SSD has undertaken:  
5.2.20  ‘She received excellent care from social services, especially one social 
worker……Because of the sheer skill of the social services department, they got her to college et 
cetera. She wouldn’t have got a quarter of the way there without social services. But not all 
social services are like that. Now I know them, they do me favours. I’ve never known any other 
social services department give me that support. I couldn’t have pursued the criminal offences 
without them.’
5.2.21  Eventually, the case came to trial and the main offender was convicted of a number 
sexual offences, and was given a considerable prison sentence.  
5.2.22  Not surprisingly, this case raised a large number and wide range of issues. One of these 
was the not infrequently mentioned concern, on the part of the police, towards the abuse of the 
asylum system by (foreign) criminals: 
5.2.23  ‘He [the main offender] said [on requesting asylum to remain in the UK] that he was a 
freedom fighter from the Macedonian National Liberation Army and that his relatives were in 
prison as a result of his activities. So he was granted indefinite leave to remain……What upsets 
me is that he was given indefinite leave to remain. What upsets me is that this was a person we  
let stay - this was an ‘asylum seeker’.’ 
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5.2.24  The police officer also drew attention to the fact that though this, and many other cases 
his specialist vice unit dealt with, were extremely serious, there was a shortage of resources. 
When asked what aspects of practice ‘worked less well or badly at the moment’, he replied: 
5.2.25  ‘It’s all to do with resources……We have to cherry pick cases. There is stuff which is 
serious which we have to put to one side.’  
5.3  Extent 
5.3.1  Table 7 shows the results of the search, in two police services, of all CSA offences recorded in 
the four year survey period, January 1999 - December 2002. As the table makes clear, international 
CSA victim cases made up a small proportion of all CSA offences recorded by the police in these two 
services. There were 5 such cases in the metropolitan area and 2 in the shire county area, accounting 
for 0.1% and 0.2% of all recorded CSA offences respectively. 
5.3.2  As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology), some care has to be exercised in interpreting the 
figures from this research, based as they are upon only those cases known to the police in the UK. That 
said they do provide some important evidence regarding the extent of known international CSA victim 
cases ‘with a link to the UK’; namely, that the number of cases recorded by UK police services is 
small; these cases constitute an small proportion of known CSA cases; and the number of child 
trafficking cases into the UK - which have, to date, been the focus of much concern - is especially 
small.  
5.3.3 This research was insufficient in scale to produce figures as to the extent of different types of 
international CSA victim case. However, it did appear that child sexual exploitation trafficking cases 
may have been outnumbered by at least some, if not many, of the other types of international CSA 
victim case, probably individually and almost certainly collectively. All of these conclusions - both 
here and in the previous paragraph - were supported by data gathered in other stages of the research, 
and in particular the case study interviews with police officers. 
  
Table 7   International CSA victim cases identified through searches of CSA offences recorded by two 
    UK police services in period January 1999 - December 2002  
Police service CSA case  
International CSA 
victim 
Other ALL 
 N  %   N    %   N    % 
Metropolitan16 517 0.1 4704  99.9 4709 100.0 
Shire county 218 0.2   982  99.8   984 100.0 
TOTAL 7 0.1 5686  99.1 5693 100.0 
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 The term ‘metropolitan’ refers to an (anonymised) police service covering a large urban area - and not the 
Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service. 
17
 The five metropolitan police service cases comprised three cases where a UK child was sexually abused whilst 
on holiday abroad, and two cases where a child was in the UK, as a recent migrant, and was sexually abused. 
18
 The two shire county cases comprised one child who was ‘fostered’ by the offender, brought to the UK and 
then sexually abused, and one child taken abroad by a teacher and abused. Thus, four of the cases identified 
through the record searches took place abroad, as against three cases that took place in the UK.
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Estimated national extent 
5.3.4  The two police services in which the searches were undertaken covered areas with a total 
combined population of approximately three million people (Office for National Statistics, 2003). If
these two police services were representative of the UK population of a whole, then nationally there 
would have been 134 international CSA victim cases, known to the police, in the UK, from 1999-
2002, or 33 cases per annum. This equates to 0.6 cases per police service per annum.  
5.3.5  It should be stressed that the above figures are not necessarily a very reliable measure of the 
national extent of these cases. They are based upon only two of the 52 police services in the UK, it is 
not known how representative these services were (of all police services and the populations they 
covered) and no statistical weighting exercises have been undertaken. However, it is felt that these 
figures are useful ‘ball park’ estimates as to the national extent of known international CSA victim 
cases.   
5.3.6  The figures presented here should not be taken as an indicator of the extent of international CSA 
victim cases which may exist in other countries, especially developing ones. The rate of trafficking of 
children, for sexual exploitation, into certain countries in South and South East Asia, for example, is 
claimed to be extremely high. UNICEF (2003b), for instance, has reported that ‘300,000 Bangladeshi 
minors work in the red light areas of India’. 
5.4  Nature19
Victims 
5.4.1  Several types of international CSA victim case can be grouped together in terms of victim 
characteristics. These comprise children on organised trips  (clubs, exchange and school) or holiday, 
migrant children, and those involved in Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks or receiving 
medical treatment. In some respects at least, the children involved in these cases appeared to be similar 
to those in known CSA cases in general (Creighton, 1992; Gibbons, Conroy and Bell, 1995), their 
being quite diverse in terms of their age, gender, family background, socio-economic classification 
(SEC)20 and ethnicity.  
  
5.4.2  By contrast, trafficking and ‘fostering’ cases tended to involve a much narrower group of 
victims. The former were largely comprised of older girls (secondary school age i.e. 11-17 years), 
whereas ‘fostering’ cases consisted principally of older boys. These two particular types of case were 
also similar in that both groups of victim were drawn primarily from developing countries (especially 
Africa, Eastern Europe, South and South-East Asia) and/or family backgrounds that were acutely 
disadvantaged. It was this latter feature which enabled abusers, who were invariably from outside the 
family, to exert such control over the children’s lives whereby they could, not only sexually abuse 
them, but also abduct them, in effect, and then move them across international borders, and 
permanently so, if they wished. 
5.4.3  Virtually all the children abused through international, Internet-initiated grooming were older 
girls. Other than this, these victims appeared to be unremarkable in terms of family background, SEC 
and ethnicity. That said, these cases did appear to include a higher proportion of children from more 
                                                
19
 To reiterate the point made at the end of Chapter 3 (Methodology), the following findings were based upon a 
relatively small number of cases and it might, therefore, be more appropriate to think of them in terms of themes.
20
 This is the single classificatory scheme, produced by the Office for National Statistics, which has replaced 
socio-economic groups (SEGs) and social class based upon occupation (SC) (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 
2000). 
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middle class and stable family backgrounds than might usually be seen in police and children’s 
services child protection caseloads.  
5.4.4  The victims of forced marriages, likewise, tended to be over-represented by older girls. 
However, in terms of ethnicity they were distinct in terms of being of South Asian heritage. 
Offenders
5.4.5  The different types of international CSA victim case shared one major feature in that virtually 
all the offenders were male. A very small proportion of cases involved female offenders but they 
always acted in concert with males. Other than this, though, there was considerable diversity, even 
within case types, in the SEC, sexual orientation and ethnicity of offenders, and their cohabiting, 
relationship and parenting status. 
5.4.6  Where there were differences between cases was in terms of the victim-offender relationship. As 
indicated above, one group of cases - children on organised trips and holidays, migrant children, and 
those involved in Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks or receiving medical treatment - were 
akin to known CSA cases in general (Cawson et al, 2000). Thus, offenders tended to be the children’s 
parents/carers, other close family members or neighbours/‘friends’, or persons who worked with the 
children.  
  
5.4.7  Offenders in ‘fostering’ and trafficking cases, and those in Internet grooming cases, were, 
initially at least, complete strangers, to the children, and had set out to secure a child for sexual abuse. 
That said, immediate and extended family members, and their ‘acquaintances’, did sometimes have a 
role at the start of a child being trafficked. One difference within this sub-group of cases, though, was 
that while in each of the last two of these cases - trafficking and grooming - offenders and victims 
tended to come from broadly similar ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds, the ‘fostering’ cases 
were characterised by abusers from developed countries who went to developing countries where they 
targeted especially disadvantaged children.   
5.4.8  As before, forced marriages were somewhat unusual - by dint of their specificity - with virtually 
all cases being characterised by immediate and/or extended family members engaging in quite 
elaborate plans to force the marriage of - invariably - their daughters to adolescent or adult men in 
South Asia. 
Modus operandi 
5.4.9  The first group of cases cited above - children on organised trips and holidays, migrant children, 
and those involved in Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks or receiving medical treatment - 
were, in terms of modus operandi, similar to known CSA cases in general. Many of these children 
were abused in the context of what were, or could be thought of as, domestic settings, for example, 
family holidays, and trips organised by persons working with children. As with known CSA in 
general, some of the offenders used coercion to bring about the abuse, while others used grooming.  
5.4.10  What was particularly distinct about these cases was that they tended to exist along a 
continuum, at one end of which the international dimension to the case was incidental, while at the 
other it was instrumental. Thus, for some victims, international CSA was an extension of the CSA 
they experienced in their own country. In other cases, though, taking the child abroad appeared to be 
central to the offenders’ efforts both to abuse the child and prevent the abuse from being detected. 
5.4.11  Trafficking cases appeared to be rather diverse in terms of the modus operandi used by 
offenders. In some cases, quite specific arrangements were made to bring a child from a developing 
country to the UK to be abused in the context of ‘sex work’. In other instances, a child ended up in the 
UK only after having been passed between several different pimps and abused (again in the context of 
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‘sex work’) in a number of different countries. In yet other cases, the UK was used as a transit point 
for children en route to be abused through ‘sex work’ in another European country.  
5.4.12  All these cases, though, seemed to share a number of marked features, including the degree of 
sexual abuse the child suffered, the perpetration of other forms, and serious levels, of abuse against the 
child (especially physical abuse) and the complete absence of any form of support in the child’s life. 
As these features should indicate, offenders in trafficking cases had great control over their victims.  
5.4.13  Whilst there are allegations of the involvement of organised crime in child trafficking (for 
sexual abuse), the impression gained from this research is that it is orchestrated by small groups of 
individuals who are linked only informally, if at all. 
5.4.14  ‘Fostering’ cases typically arose as a result of an offender travelling to a developing country 
(from the UK), ostensibly to carry out voluntary or religious work with disadvantaged children, but 
subsequently sexually abusing children in that setting and then ‘fostering’ one particular child with 
whom he returned to the UK and who was then the focus of further sexual abuse. The research 
identified one case of an offender, who officially fostered a child in the UK, whom he then took 
abroad to live and abused over a number of years. Like trafficking cases, fostering (whether official or 
unofficial) afforded offenders - who were, in essence, strangers - a great deal of control over the 
children concerned. This control was used to remove children from their native country, facilitate CSA 
and prevent detection of that abuse. 
5.4.15  The modus operandi of offenders in international Internet-initiated grooming cases was, 
likewise, relatively straightforward. Offenders utilised Internet-based chatrooms, or other Internet 
protocols, to communicate with adolescent girls, invariably, who they then proceeded to groom to the 
point where they were able to meet and sexually abuse them. Although international grooming cases 
were rare, they were by no means unique, and were indicative of the lengths to which offenders would, 
and could, go to sexually abuse a child. Most of these cases involved the offender travelling 
internationally, to meet the child, but a few featured the child travelling internationally, either with the 
offender or on her own, and going either to the abuser’s country of residence or on to a third country.  
5.4.16  In cases of forced marriage, the offenders’ modus operandi, again, appeared to be quite 
straightforward in that immediate or family members, and sometimes their friends or associates, 
pressured or forced a child to travel to South Asia where she was married to an adolescent or adult 
male. They then either remained in the country in question or returned to the UK, to be joined, 
eventually, by their partner. It seemed to be a characteristic of some of these cases, that extreme 
physical measures were used either to get the children abroad and/or keep them abroad, or to punish 
children who managed to thwart these plans. 
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Chapter 6 
International child sex abusers 
6.1  Typology 
6.1.1  Figure 3 shows the typology of international child sex abuser cases (in alphabetical order) 
developed through the course of this research. The typology is based upon the context in which the 
offender moved from one country to another.21 Figure 3 makes clear that there were a relatively large 
number of different types of international child sex abuser case. This research alone has identified 
eleven types of case. In doing so, it challenges two stereotypes surrounding cases comprising 
international child sex abusers: firstly, it shows that these cases are not restricted to child sex tourism; 
and secondly, that they involve abusers who come into the country as well as those who go out of the 
country. Thus, the problem of international child sex abusers would appear to be far more diverse, and 
on this basis, much more challenging, than was thought previously. 
Figure 3  A typology of international child sex abuser cases 
Type Sub-types 
1.   Children’s worker  
2.   Child sex tourist22
3.   Holidaymaker23
4.   Internet-initiated ‘groomer’ 
5.   Internet-initiated child sex abuser network 
6.   Migrant 
7.   Military worker 
8.   Paid worker 
9.   Religious worker 
10. Student 
11. Voluntary worker 
• Abuser comes into the country and 
subsequently sexually abuses a child 
• Abuser goes to another country and 
subsequently sexually abuses a child 
6.2  Vignettes 
6.2.1  The following vignettes are based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They 
are intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense as to the nature of international child sex 
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 This research was restricted to offenders who had recently entered the country - where the offences took place 
- and/or had come in on what was, or was initially, a temporary basis i.e. it excludes offenders who were long-
term residents or naturalised citizens of the country where the offences took place.
22
 The distinction between a child sex tourist and a holidaymaker, in this report at least, is that the former refers 
to a person who has travelled internationally for the purpose of sexually abusing a child unknown to him, where 
the latter refers to more ‘domestic’ situations where an individual has travelled internationally, often with the 
victim and in a family situation, and has then perpetrated CSA. Having made this somewhat simplified 
distinction, the authors acknowledge that there are various gradations within, and between, these two types of 
case. There is not, though, space to discuss these gradations here.
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abuser cases, and the policy and practice issues to which they gave rise. The details of these cases have 
been changed or generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
Case 1: Migrant worker coming into the UK 
6.2.2  The following is the description, quoted verbatim, of a case submitted on the police 
NPQS: 
6.2.3  ‘Mother of victim (14 year old girl) had connections with Zambia through charity work. 
As a result of many visits, she agrees for the suspect to reside with them, in the UK, as a 
temporary lodger whilst he did auxiliary work in a hospital. During the few weeks he stayed, he 
had sexual intercourse with the victim on 3 occasions. It was reported as rape……Victim video 
interviewed and suspect arrested….and charged. Suspect appeared at …….Crown Court…and 
found not guilty of reduced charges of USI.’ 
Case 2: Charity worker going out of the UK 
6.2.4  The offender in this case travelled throughout the UK visiting churches to raise funds for 
orphanages, for girls (only), which he had set up in two countries, one in Eastern Europe  and 
one in South East Asia. Concerns regarding the offender arose after representatives of these 
churches visited Albania, to meet and work with these children, and check their donations were 
being used appropriately. 
6.2.5  Whilst at the orphanage, the church representatives witnessed a variety of incidents which 
caused them to be anxious. These included the offender sexually harassing a woman who 
worked in the home, along with a teenage girl who lived there, kissing younger girls on the lips 
and sharing a bed with an eight-year old girl. Some of the girls were also overheard complaining 
that they could not sleep in the same bed as the offender (overnight) when the home had visitors 
[i.e. the church members]. The offender was also seen to arrive home in a drunken state, at 
night, and become very aggressive - something which the children were said to find very 
frightening. He had, in addition, brought some of the girls back to his home in the UK for 
temporary stays. 
6.2.6  The investigation involved several police services in the UK, and national and foreign 
organisations, but there was never any specific allegation against the offender. That said, the 
police interviewee did state that the local police, in the East European country in question, did 
not take the concerns seriously and were, in all likelihood, being bribed by the suspect. Once the 
suspect became aware of the concern and the subsequent police investigation, he relinquished 
control of the orphanage in the East European country, and it was later closed down by welfare 
authorities in that country. 
Case 3: Child sex tourist going out of the UK 
6.2.7  A foreign organisation, monitoring CSA-related activity on the Internet, identified CAIs 
which they believed might have originated in the UK. They informed a police service in the 
UK, which was known to have a specialist unit working in this area of offending, of these 
images. The officer assigned to investigate this report, then began to undertake certain Internet-
based enquiries that revealed that one offender (based in the UK) had taken these images and 
was    distributing    them,    to    other   offenders,   over   the  Internet.  In  the  course  of  these 
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communications, the offender would invite people to state the poses they wished the victim to 
adopt when being photographed. Through further investigative work, the police were able to 
identify the offender and passed his details to the police service covering the area of the UK in 
which he normally lived. 
6.2.8  Enquiries by this police service, revealed that the offender was, currently, in Cambodia. It 
later transpired that he had subsequently returned to the UK on two occasions, but had not been 
apprehended, and had then returned to Cambodia, seemingly on a permanent basis. 
6.2.9  In his interview, the officer who started the police investigation, in the UK, explained that 
extradition of the offender, which would generally have been difficult, was, in this case, even 
more problematic, owing to an insufficiency of evidence against him, and the fact that the 
offences were, relatively-speaking, not very serious. 
6.2.10  However, following separate police investigations, and further searches on the Internet, 
this officer identified additional images being posted (on the Internet), by the offender, which 
featured children in the UK and now also children in Cambodia. (These latter enquiries also 
uncovered Internet communications in which the offender encouraged people to come to 
Cambodia, to sexually abuse children, and where he was, in turn, given advice about avoiding 
being detected, by the police, on the Internet. 
6.2.11  The CAIs featuring Cambodian children were then passed to the police in that country. 
The police were able to trace the offender and arrest him within a matter of days. Their 
investigation revealed that he had sexually abused and photographed twelve children. The 
offender used a variety of means to obtain victims, but many were ‘street children’ who were 
earning money by, for example, selling flowers or cleaning cars, but who were offered, and 
accepted, much more money for engaging in sex with the offender.   
6.2.12  Eventually, the offender was tried, in Cambodia, for indecent assault and publishing 
indecent photographs of children for which he received a lengthy prison sentence. 
6.2.13  The Internet-based investigations also revealed that the offender had received a message 
from an individual thanking him for the ‘experiences’ he had had whilst in Cambodia. This 
individual was traced (to the UK) and the subsequent investigation showed that he had sexually 
abused children both in the UK and Cambodia. He was eventually jailed for his offences in the 
UK. 
6.2.14  The main offender is known to have sexually abused four children in the UK who were 
related to him. These were the four children who featured in his original CAIs. As well as 
abusing and photographing these children, he had made them available to his friend to abuse. 
Investigations across the UK, and internationally, revealed that he was a member of what was a 
quite extensive network of child sex abusers. Moreover, this network, primarily though him, 
overlapped with two other quite extensive child sex abuser networks. 
6.3  Extent 
6.3.1  Table 8 shows the number of international child sex abuser cases that were identified through 
the search of CSA offences recorded in two police services in the four year period from January 1999 
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- December 2002. These figures are based upon both offenders coming into, and those going out of, 
the UK. As the table indicates, the number of cases known to the police in the metropolitan and shire 
county police services was small - at 19 and four cases respectively.  
Table 8 International child sex abuser cases identified through searches of CSA offences recorded by 
    two UK police services period January 1999 - December 2002  
Police service Case type 
International child sex 
abuser 
Other ALL 
  N  %    N  %   N   % 
Metropolitan24 1925 0.4 4690 99.6 4709 100.0 
Shire county   426 0.4   980 99.6   984 100.0 
TOTAL 23 0.4 5670 99.6 5693 100.0 
6.3.2  Moreover, these cases comprised a small proportion of all recorded CSA offences - 0.4% in 
each police service. Notwithstanding the methodological caveats which surround these figures - and 
which were outlined in Chapter 3 - these findings, which were supported by information from other 
stages of the research, provide important evidence that international child sex abusers cases are not - at 
least in terms of known UK cases - very common, and especially not when compared to all known 
CSA cases.  
6.3.3  While the research was not on a sufficiently large enough scale to produce reliable figures as to 
the extent of different types of international child sex abuser case, overall it did appear that child sex 
tourist cases may have been outnumbered by other types of international child sex abuser case, 
probably individually and almost certainly collectively. 
Estimated national extent 
6.3.4  The two police services in which the searches were undertaken covered areas with a total 
combined population of approximately three million people (Office for National Statistics, 2003). If
these two police services were representative of the UK population of a whole, then nationally there 
would have been 442 international child sex abuser cases, known to the police, in the UK, from 1999-
2002, or 110 cases per annum. This equates to 2.1 cases per police service per annum. 
6.3.5  It should be stressed that the above figures are not necessarily a very reliable measure as to the 
national extent of these cases. They are based upon only two of the 52 police services in the UK, it is 
not known how representative these services were (of all police services and the populations they 
covered) and no statistical weighting exercises have been undertaken. However, it is felt that these 
figures are useful ‘ball park’ estimates as to the national extent of known international child sex abuser 
cases.   
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 The term ‘metropolitan’ refers to an (anonymised) police service covering a large urban area - and not the 
Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service. 
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 The 19 metropolitan cases comprised 16 where the offender came into the UK and sexually abused a child; 
eight of these were migrants, one a student and one a holidaymaker, and in six cases the offender’s purpose in 
entering the UK was not recorded. The three remaining cases all consisted of offenders who went abroad, from 
the UK, on holiday, and sexually abused a child.
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 The four shire county cases comprised two cases where the offender came into the UK and sexually abused a 
child - one of these came into the country as a student and abused a child in the family he was staying with, and 
the other abused his relative whilst he was visiting her and her family on holiday. The two other cases consisted 
of offenders in the UK who went abroad and sexually abused a child - one of these was a missionary and the 
other a teacher who took a child abroad whom he subsequently abused.
Thus, 18 of the cases identified through the record searches involved offenders who travelled to the UK, as 
against five where a UK offender went abroad. 
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6.3.6  These points, made in regards to the numbers of international child sex abusers, should not in 
any way be taken to minimise the seriousness of individual cases. Rather, they are put forward to 
show that these cases, at least as they impact upon the UK police, are not as common as has 
sometimes been suggested.  
6.3.7  What is more, these figures are not put forward as a reliable indicator as to the extent of such 
cases - whether known or unknown - which may exist in other (especially certain developing) 
countries. Marks (2003), for example, states that the Cambodian government has estimated that ‘a 
quarter of Cambodia’s annual 400,000 visitors – who include 18,000 Britons - are sex tourists’. 
6.4  Nature 
6.4.1  Virtually all the international child sex abusers studied in the course of this research were male. 
There was a small number of females involved in these cases but all of these were acting in concert 
with males. Outside of gender, there was a quite considerable amount of diversity between offenders 
in terms of their SEC, sexual orientation, ethnicity and their relationship to victims, and their 
cohabiting, relationship and parenting status. 
6.4.2  That said, there were some differences between case types in respect of some of these 
characteristics. In fact, international child sex abuser cases could, in terms of their nature - or more 
specifically, the offender’s modus operandi - be divided into three broad groups of case. The first 
group comprised individuals who worked, either on a paid, religious or voluntary basis, with children 
in the UK but who had the opportunity to take them abroad, along with holidaymakers, members of 
Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks, migrants and military workers. What linked these 
offenders was one, or more, of the following: the abuse they committed abroad was often an extension 
of their offending in their country of origin; the abuse was more opportunistic than planned - abusers 
appeared to be more the situational or regressed child sex offender, as opposed to the fixated or 
preferential child sex abuser (Groth, 1979); and victims tended to be in the offender’s more immediate 
‘circle’ i.e. family members, extended family members, ‘friends’ and neighbours. In some respects, 
these cases could be said to resemble known CSA cases in general. Indeed, the international 
dimension of the sexual abuse was, for many of these offenders, more incidental than instrumental. 
6.4.3  The second group comprised child sex tourists and individuals from the UK who had gone 
abroad to work, with children, either on a paid, religious or voluntary basis. What most marked out 
these cases was the fact that it appeared the offenders had a specific purpose in going abroad and that 
was to sexually abuse children. It is very likely that they felt that being abroad, especially in 
developing countries, such as those in Africa, Eastern Europe, and South and South East Asia, made it 
easier to commit abuse, avoid detection and thwart investigations. These offenders, almost without 
exception, appeared to be fixated or preferential child sex offenders, who abused mostly boys and 
especially those who were disadvantaged. 
6.4.4  The third group of cases consisted of international, Internet ‘groomers’. This type of case has 
been separated out largely on account of the special means, i.e. the Internet, offenders employed to 
target and groom victims prior to abusing them. In addition, though, these cases were unique in that 
virtually all of the victims were female and adolescent. While this research identified only a small 
number of international Internet grooming cases, it was notable that most comprised offenders/victims 
in the UK who linked up with offenders/victims in the United States of America. 
6.4.5  The research did, to some extent, confirm a stereotype in that some offenders went from 
developed countries, to developing countries - particularly those in Africa, Eastern Europe, and South 
and South East Asia - in order to sexually abuse children. However, the research also identified cases - 
which may be increasing in number - where offenders in developed countries went to other developed 
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countries and regions, particularly Western Europe and North America, and possibly to a lesser extent, 
the English speaking-countries of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, to sexually abuse children. 
(There may be some bias in this aspect of the research in that it was based in, and focused upon, 
agencies in the English-speaking UK.)     
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Chapter 7 
  
International movement of child abuse 
images 
7.1  Typology 
7.1.1  Figure 4 shows the typology of cases involving the international movement of child abuse 
images (CAIs) that was developed in the course of the research.27 The typology is primarily based 
upon the means by which CAIs were moved. Although this particular typology is relatively 
straightforward, it does serve to highlight what are probably two less familiar, but important, aspects 
of the international movement of CAIs. The first of these is that CAIs were not moved through 
international ports and airports only ‘on the person’ but were also sent through the post. Indeed, 
interviews with HMRC officers indicated that this was the main method by which known CAIs were 
moved internationally. The second is that these cases consist not only of CAIs sent into the country but 
also ones sent out of the country.28
Figure 4 A typology of cases comprising the international movement of child abuse images (CAIs) 
Types Sub-types 
1. CAIs carried on the person through ports and airports 
2. CAIs sent through the post 
• CAIs moved into the country 
• CAIs moved out of the 
country 
                                                
27
 The primary responsibility for responding to the international movement of CAIs, including their detection, 
rests with HMRC. However, the police did sometimes detect CAIs, independently of HMRC. Unless specified 
otherwise, this chapter is based upon a consideration of these two sets of CAIs as a whole.       
28
 The prohibition on the import of indecent and obscene material, including CAIs, is contained within the 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (section 42). (Section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 
1979 sets a maximum sentence of 7 years for this offence.) Interestingly, there is no specific offence of 
exporting CAIs, or indeed any offensive or obscene material. That said, individuals engaged in this behaviour 
could be acted against on the basis that they were distributing CAIs (contrary to the Protection of Children 
Act 1978) or were in possession of CAIs (contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988). Also, if such material is 
found at export, it may be seized, under section 19 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as 
evidence of a domestic offence. Moreover, if CAIs are detected at export then they are immediately referred 
to the police by HMRC.  
This issue is raised here, though, not to argue that there should necessarily be a specific export offence but 
rather to suggest that this distinction, between importation and exportation, underlines the sense that the 
international movement of CAIs has been something of a neglected area in terms of policy and practice. 
Interestingly, there is specific legislation in regards to the exportation of drugs and cash.
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7.2  Vignettes  
7.2.1  The vignettes below are based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They are 
intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense of the nature of cases involving the 
international movement of CAIs, and the policy and practice issues to which they gave rise. The 
details of these cases have been changed or generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
7.2.2  The following are a series of summaries, quoted verbatim, where possible, concerning a 
sample of CAI importation cases (n=12) detected, and reported (though the NPQS), by HMRC: 
Case 1 
7.2.3  ‘Postal detection of material indicating a sexual interest in children - “infantilist” text 
material describing sexual activity involving children - led to search of premises revealing 
indecent photographs and evidence of indecent assaults on children, committed in concert with 
three other men. Suspect and two accomplices convicted, sentenced to 3 years imprisonment 
and required to register under the Sex Offenders Act for life. One other suspect 
acquitted…..Abuse was facilitated through persuading children in 5-6 year age group to dress as 
babies - wearing nappies etc - after which they would be photographed. The children were 
subject to indecent assault whilst this activity occurred, sometimes with other adult males 
involved.’ 
Case 2
7.2.4  ‘Postal detection of CD-ROM containing child pornography. House search revealed 
further indecent material on CD and computer. Suspect sentenced to 9 months imprisonment 
……Required to register under the Sex Offenders Act for 10 years….Material found at import, 
sourced in Taiwan.’ 
Case 3 
7.2.5  ‘Postal detection of a CD-ROM indicating a possible sexual interest in children led to a 
search of premises. Evidence of a sexual assault against a girl of 13 [years] uncovered as well as 
indecent images on computer. Suspected convicted ….. on 2 counts of underage intercourse, 2 
counts of indecent assault and possession of indecent photographs. Sentenced to 2 years and 6 
months, and required to register under the Sex Offenders Act for 10 years.’ 
Case 4 
7.2.6  ‘Postal detection of sado-masochistic material led to search of premises uncovering 
indecent material featuring children on computer. Suspect convicted of making indecent 
photographs of children. Committed suicide prior to sentencing.’ 
Case 5 
7.2.7  ‘Postal detection of videos featuring sado-masochistic activity led to a search of premises 
uncovering indecent photographs of children stored on CD. Suspect convicted of making and 
possessing indecent photographs …… sentenced to 2 years conditional discharge and required 
to register under the Sex Offenders Act for 5 years.’ 
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Case 6 
7.2.8  ‘Postal detection of CD-ROMs featuring rape led to a search of premises - indecent 
material featuring children found on computer. Suspect convicted of making and possessing 
photographs….sentenced to 8 months imprisonment and required to register under the Sex 
Offenders Act for 7 years….Suspect found to have been covertly filming schoolgirls. Also 
found in possession of sado-masochistic paraphernalia.’ 
Case 7
7.2.9  ‘Detection of material indicating possible sexual interest in children …… passed to police 
for investigation - uncovered evidence of sexual offences against boys. Suspect convicted and 
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment……Required to register under the Sex Offenders Act for 
life…..Suspect had abused 9 boys between the ages of 8 and 14.’ 
Case 8 
7.2.10  ‘Intelligence report received from German customs - an interception of child 
pornography had uncovered evidence of consignments of similar goods being sent to the UK. 
Search of premises in UK revealed imported indecent material and further images on PC and 
CD-ROM. Convicted of importing and possessing indecent photographs……Material sourced 
from Russia. Russian supplier later imprisoned by Russian authorities.’ 
Case 9 
7.2.11  ‘Detection of indecent material in the post from the USA led to a search of premises 
which uncovered further indecent material in magazines and videos. Importer convicted of 
importation offence……Sentenced to £400 fine and required to register under the Sex 
Offenders Act for 5 years.’ 
Case 10 
7.2.12  ‘Postal detection of indecent books led to search of premises - nothing prohibited found. 
Individual convicted of importing indecent material featuring children…Sentenced to 9 months 
probation and required to register under the Sex Offenders Act for 5 years…….. Suspect had 
leaflets [on premises] from NSPCC relating to their ‘Stop’ campaign against child abuse. Also 
had a catalogue from a known supplier of paedophile material.’ 
Case 11 
7.2.13  ‘Postal detection of a video indicating a sexual interest in children. Search of premises 
revealed indecent photographs of children including depictions of children engaged in sexual 
activity. Later convicted of possessing indecent photographs of children and sentenced to 6 
months imprisonment plus 21 month Supervision Order. Required to register under the Sex 
Offenders Act for 7 years…..Importer [male] had written to various embassies in the guise of a 
mother seeking pen pals for ‘her’ children [he had none] and requesting details of the schools in 
their countries…..Photographs found on premises showing young female relative tied up and 
gagged. Insufficient evidence to pursue abuse offences.’ 
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Case 12 
7.2.14  ‘Suspect detected [i.e. detained] at Coquelles Channel Tunnel terminal on return to the 
UK from Holland carrying obscene videos depicting girls in 16-17 age group. Background 
check revealed previous for indecent assault and possession of indecent photographs. Case 
referred to New Scotland Yard police Paedophile Unit. House search revealed covertly taken 
photographs of girls in local area. Suspect convicted of making and possessing indecent 
photographs. Sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and lifetime registration under the Sex 
Offenders Act.’
Case 13: export of CAIs reported to police 
7.2.15  This case was detected quite inadvertently when the offender accidentally left his bag on 
a bus (in the UK). When the bag was subsequently opened, by the bus driver, it was found to 
contain an envelope which was addressed (and stamped) to a company in Denmark which 
published pornographic magazines. Inside the envelope were photographs of a young girl, aged 
about 5 years, being indecently assaulted. The bus company reported the matter to the police. 
7.2.16  The owner of the envelope was traced, by the police, and he admitted that he had taken 
the images of the girl  - to whom he was related. On being interviewed, he explained that the 
address on the envelope was of a company from which he had obtained adult pornographic 
magazines previously.  
7.2.17  This case had only just been detected at the time the fieldwork was being carried out and 
its eventual outcome was not known. However, the UK police officer did point out that further 
enquiries were being carried out by Danish police. He added that he would not be approaching 
Interpol ‘because that would take ages’. 
7.2.18  The police officer suggested that the offender may have been using the postal system, 
either because he did not have Internet access or because he was worried about being detected  
transmitting such material over the Internet. 
7.3  Extent 
7.3.1  The primary responsibility for responding to the international movement of CAIs rests with 
HMRC which keeps a central record of cases which are known to the organisation. Table 9 shows the 
number of cases where HMRC’ detection’s of CAIs resulted, ultimately, in a suspect’s name being 
placed on the Sex Offender Register.29 As this table shows, the number of such cases was small. In 
2003, the most recent complete year for which figures were, there were 31 such cases.   
7.3.2  These figures indicate that the incidence of the international movement of CAIs - at least where 
it relates to known, UK, importation cases -  is low. However, the following caveats have to be 
attached to these figures:  
• HMRC detected other cases but, for some reason, had not proceeded with these. A prime example 
of this would be where the suspect was alleged to have sexually abused a child, in which case the 
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 Following detection, the police would have assumed responsibility for some of these cases. In these cases, it 
would have been police action which led, finally, to a suspect’s name being placed on the Sex Offender’s 
Register. 
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police would take the main responsibility for the investigation. Alternatively, it might have been 
that material, but no suspect, was detected 
• The police detected cases involving the international movement of CAIs but often did not inform 
HMRC of these 
• Most importantly - and as discussed more fully in 12.4.4 - 12.4.8 - HMRC search only a tiny 
proportion of people (and their luggage), and the parcels and letters, coming into or going out of 
the UK 
Table 9 ‘Prosecution’ of suspects, detected by HMRC, for the importation of indicative, indecent or 
    indecent and obscene images featuring children30
Year* Nature of material - HMRC categorisation 
Indicative31 Indecent32 Indecent & 
obscene33
All 
 N % N % N % N % 
2001 2 20 8 80 - - 10 100 
2002 19 76 2 8 4 16 25 100 
2003 25 80.6 4 12.9 2 6.4 31 99.9** 
2004*** 4 66.7 2 33.3 - - 6 100 
*  These are not calendar years but the previous 12 months up to 31st March of the year in question 
** Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding
*** Part of year only 
7.3.3  In short, it is argued that the incidence of all known cases involving the international movement 
of CAIs may be higher, and the incidence of unknown cases possibly much higher, than these official 
figures suggest and many agencies appreciate. That said, it is likely that these cases, like all the other 
international and Internet CSA cases featuring in this research - with the exception of Internet CAIs - 
will only ever constitute a very small proportion of all CSA cases.  
7.3.4  While HMRC made only a small number of CAI detection’s, it did achieve a relatively large 
number of adult pornography seizures. For example, in the period 1st April 2003 - 31st March 2004, it 
recorded 2,306 seizures of ‘adult pornographic material’, as against 14 detections of ‘paedophile 
material’ (HMRC, 2004). This suggests that the modest number of CAI seizures was more a function 
of the relatively low incidence of this type of offence, rather than any inability or unwillingness of 
HMRC to detect it. (These figures for seizures of adult pornography also serve to underline some of 
the of the points set out in 14.4.)  
Trends
7.3.5  It became clear during the course of this research that some, if not many, people were labouring 
under, and sometimes fuelling, the misconception that, with the rise of both digital photography and 
particularly the Internet - leading to the electronic downloading and distribution of CAIs - the problem 
of the international movement of CAIs had virtually, if not totally, disappeared. On the contrary, 
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 The manner in which HMRC presents some of its statistics in relation to CAIs is somewhat complex and 
restrictive. Thus, HMRC defines the term ‘prosecutions’ in the following way: ‘[I]ndividuals identified through 
Customs detection’s who are charged, summoned or accept a formal Police Caution for offences where, if 
convicted, they would be required to register as sex offenders’. Moreover, these statistics relate only to suspects 
who were ‘previously unknown’.
31
 ‘Indicative’ is a term used, by HMRC, to refer to material that is ‘borderline’ but which suggests a sexual 
interest in children.
32
 ‘Indecent’ refers to images of naked children.
33
  ‘Obscene’ refers to images of children being sexually abused.
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though, this research found evidence to suggest that digital photography and the Internet may have led 
to an increase in the international movement of CAIs. There are at least four reasons for believing this: 
• The Internet has greatly enhanced the ability of individuals with a sexual interest in children to, 
firstly, identify, and secondly, to communicate, with one another, not only nationally but also 
internationally. Some of this communication has, as this research discovered, subsequently 
involved the distribution of CAIs internationally  
• While much of this subsequent (international) contact may have been restricted to the Internet, 
some offenders, on occasions at least, preferred to send or receive, or otherwise move, CAIs 
internationally, often using the postal system. They chose this method either for reasons of security 
or because of technical limitations of the Internet. There may, though, have been other factors, 
behind these choices, which, as yet, remain unclear
• Following the rise in digital photography in particular, and other technologies before this, for 
example, video cameras, international child sex abusers now have more opportunity to record the 
abuse they commit, and then bring, or post, these recordings home. Also, and as stated in the 
previous chapter, the number of international child sex abusers may itself be increasing 
• Digital photography and the Internet has led to what is generally accepted as being a massive rise 
in both the numbers of CAIs in existence and people who possess them, which means an increased 
potential for these images to be moved internationally. All things being equal, it would seem 
inevitable that some of these new CAIs would be moved internationally  
7.3.6  As limited as it was, in terms of its scale, the research came across a number of instances where 
the movement of CAIs, internationally, would almost certainly not have taken place had it not been 
for the influence of the Internet.  
7.4  Nature34
Victims 
7.4.1  These authors were not able to study, in any systematic manner, the children who featured in 
internationally moved CAIs. However, from the information they were able to obtain, it appeared that 
these children were quite diverse in terms of their age, family background, SEC, ethnicity, and 
relationship to the abuser. That said, it seemed that the majority of victims were female. With the rise 
of digital photography (making it easier to produce CAIs) and the Internet (enabling more offenders to 
contact one another and exchange CAIs), it is possible that the background of victims will become 
more diverse.  
Offenders 
7.4.2  Virtually all offenders were male but they were, otherwise, quite diverse in terms of their age, 
SEC, sexual orientation and ethnicity, and their cohabiting, relationship and parenting status. Many 
CAIs appeared to be produced by those who had close care of, or control over, the children, especially 
parents/carers and other family members or relatives, neighbours and acquaintances and those who 
worked with children (in a paid or voluntary capacity). Some offenders, though, were strangers, as in 
the case of child sex tourists who met children abroad, sexually abused them and then recorded this 
abuse.  
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 This discussion, on the nature of cases, is based upon those that were known to both HMRC and the police, 
plus those that were known only to the police. 
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Modus operandi 
7.4.3  In terms of modus operandi, these cases were quite straightforward, with abusers moving CAIs 
either in a letter or package, through the international post, or transporting them on their person or in 
their luggage, as they journeyed through ports and airports.  
7.4.4  The CAIs images existed in a wide variety of formats. These included what could be thought of 
as the more traditional ‘hard copy’ formats i.e. photographs and magazines, but increasingly, it 
appeared, they were in the form of videotapes and even more so electronic media such as floppy discs, 
CDs and DVDs, and on occasions even laptop computers (carried on the person though ports). With 
these latter technological developments, CAIs were both much easier to conceal and more difficult to 
detect. 
7.4.5  It was possible to distinguish two broad categories of case in respect of the basis upon which 
these CAIs were provided or obtained. The first of these was a commercial one, where individuals or 
small companies sold their CAIs. Within the limits of this study, much of this trade appeared to consist 
of producers in the United States or Western Europe, and sometimes Russia, selling material to 
customers in the UK. The second category consisted of individuals or groups who were interested in 
supplying CAIs either free of charge or on an exchange basis. Again, within the confines of this study, 
many of these offenders appeared to come from English-speaking and developed countries. These 
latter findings may be artefacts of the research being based in an English-speaking country, and the 
relative affluence required for Internet access - as opposed to people in these countries being 
inherently more likely to commit these offences. 
7.4.6  With the inexorable spread of the Internet, growing commercialisation of CAI production 
(Taylor and Quayle, 2003) and increasing international travel, it is likely that patterns in the 
international movement of CAIs will become more diverse. So, for example, it might be that more 
images arise as the result of child sex tourists going to countries in South East Asia - and indeed 
countries in other developing regions - and abusing and photographing children there, and then 
returning with, or sending back, these images to their country of origin. 
Images 
7.4.7  A second misconception that has tended to surround internationally moved CAIs is that they are 
‘less serious’ (if not ‘borderline’) in terms of their content. Although there does not appear to be a 
great deal of evidence on the matter, this view may have had some legitimacy prior to the advent of the 
Internet. However, the CAIs which are now being moved internationally - often having been initiated 
through the Internet - cover the full range of categories of abuse as set out, for example, in the 
guidelines of the Sentencing Advisory Panel (2002) i.e. they range from images of naked children, 
through to children being indecently assaulted, onto scenes of rape and buggery, culminating in 
bestiality and torture.  
7.4.8  In at least two of the cases studies featuring in this research - one of which is described in 9.2.2 - 
9.2.9 - interviewees reported that some of the worst images they had ever seen had been recorded and 
distributed via posted videotapes - as opposed to the Internet. While it might previously have been 
difficult to obtain more extreme images, the rise of the Internet, along with digital photography, has 
meant that it is much easier for these images to be made, for people with an interest in them to identify 
and communicate with one another, and for this material to be distributed - if need be, physically and 
internationally.35
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 The researchers did not have the opportunity to compare CAIs detected by HMRC with those known only to 
the police. HMRC did indicate, though, that the CAIs it detected, tended to: feature teenagers, were ‘less serious’ 
in content, were likely to be produced on a commercial basis and sent through the letter post in the form of 
DVDs, and were possessed by individuals who were not known to have sexually abused children. Given the 
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nature of internationally moved CAIs in general, some of these distinctions raise the question as to whether the 
police - compared to HMRC - were tending to detect ‘more serious’ CAIs. 
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Chapter 8 
Internet-initiated grooming of children for 
sexual abuse 
8.1  Typology 
8.1  One of the aims of this research project has been to produce typologies of the specific types of 
case within each category of international and Internet CSA, largely based upon the offenders’ modus 
operandi. In the case of Internet-initiated grooming cases36, though, offenders tended to use a highly 
standardised modus operandi. In fact, it appeared that - in terms of the remit of this research project - 
the only major way in which cases varied was in respect of the countries in which victims and 
offenders lived in relation to one another. As Figure 5 reveals, this dimension produced a quite 
straightforward typology, comprising four types of case (with no sub-types): victim and offender live 
in the same country, offender travels to the victim’s country, victim travels to the offender’s country, 
and victim and offender travel to a third country. While the large majority of grooming cases did 
involved a victim and offender who lived in the same country, a small, but notable, minority, involved 
an international component. 
Figure 5  A typology of cases involving Internet-initiated grooming of children for sexual abuse 
Types 
1. Victim and offender live in the same country 
2. Offender travels to victim’s country 
3. Victim travels to offender’s country 
4. Victim and offender travel to a third country 
  
8.2  Vignettes 
8.2.1  The following vignettes are  based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They 
are intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense of the nature of grooming cases, and the 
policy and practice issues to which they gave rise. The details of these cases have been changed or 
generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
Case 1: lone, ‘national’ offender 
8.2.2  A 31 year old single male, from north-east England, who lived alone, made contact with a 
13 year old girl, from south-west England, in an Internet chat room. He pretended to be 15 years 
of age. Shortly after making this contact, the offender managed to get the girl to exchange 
landline telephone numbers with him. A large part of the subsequent contact then took place by 
this means. The offender’s calls to the girl soon became quite excessive, being increasingly  
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 Hereinafter, and in the interest of brevity, these cases will usually be referred to as ‘grooming cases’.
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frequent and longer in duration, and lasting up until 3am. In response, the girl’s carers banned 
her from using the telephone. The offender responded by sending the girl a mobile phone that  
he paid for, along with her bills. 
8.2.3  In the course of this contact, the offender appeared to be pursuing two strategies. On the 
one hand he manipulated the girl emotionally and psychologically - and did so very effectively. 
This involved several techniques, including making the girl feel sorry for him, wearing her 
down with his persistence and making her feel guilty over her reluctance at the ‘relationship’ 
becoming more ‘serious’.  At the same time, the offender was steadily but surely making his 
contact with the girl increasingly sexual. Initially, this involved sexualised talk between the two 
but then progressed to the exchange of sexually explicit images. (The offender had sent the girl 
a web-cam so she could photograph herself and send these images to him.) 
8.2.4  Following the receipt of another item, from the offender to the girl, via the post, her carers 
became so concerned that they examined her computer. This revealed indecent images of the 
girl. They then reported the matter to their local police service.  
8.2.5  The girl’s computer was examined by the police, who found evidence of the above 
activity. These officers then informed the police service, covering the area in which the offender 
lived, of their investigation. His accommodation was then searched, by this police service, and 
his computer seized and examined. This examination revealed that the perpetrator’s offending 
behaviour had been far more extensive than was at first realised. He had been in contact with at 
least 14 other girls, from all over the world, including Malaysia, North America, Pakistan and 
Venezuela. He had not, though, met up with any of these girls.  
8.2.6  One of these girls, who was 15 years of age, and from Canada, did, though, appear 
especially vulnerable. She had received a mobile phone, web-cam and sex aid from the 
offender, and appeared to be very willing to send sexually explicit images of herself, not only to 
this offender but also to other offenders throughout the world. The UK offender had made 
approximately 2000 telephone calls to this young person in a three-month period and appeared 
to be considering visiting her. Fearing that, through her ‘soliciting’ behaviour, she ‘would be 
dead in six months’, the local authorities in Canada placed her in a secure unit for young people. 
8.2.7  Examination of the original offender’s computer also revealed that he had been having 
conversations, over the Internet, with other offenders, about the Internet-initiated grooming of 
children for sexual abuse.    
8.2.8  Just one of the striking features of this case, was the obsessive nature of the offender. His 
grooming of the girl in the UK could be likened, in its intensity and persistence, and ultimately 
its effectiveness, to brainwashing. Indeed, even after being arrested and bailed, and warned not 
to approach the victim or her family, he still wrote, separately, both to the victim and her carers. 
This resulted in his being charged with harassment, under the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997. 
8.2.9  He was subsequently charged with, and convicted for, publishing an obscene article, and 
the possession, making and distribution of indecent photographs of children, for which he was 
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, and ordered to be placed on the Sex Offenders Register for 
life. 
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Case 2: lone, national offender 
8.2.10  A 29 year old male, from the south of England, who was married but separated from his 
partner, and two children, contacted a 14 year old girl, from Scotland, via Internet chatrooms, 
claiming to be 24 years of age. This offender also communicated with the victim via emails and 
the MSN hotmail service, and even set her up with her own AOL account. (This contact also 
enabled him, ultimately, to obtain details of her friend’s email accounts and mobile phone 
numbers.) Eventually, he obtained her mobile number and began to talk to her by phone, paying 
her bills. The offender would sometimes engage the girl in conversation for a few hours at a 
time. Soon after, the offender began to talk to the girl about sexual matters. He then started to 
send her sexually explicit stills and videos of himself. The conversation became increasingly 
sexualised and he persuaded her to take sexually explicit photographs of herself, via a digital 
camera, and send them to him. 
8.2.11  Whilst much of the grooming process was based upon his subtle ‘courting’ of the girl, as 
if they were engaged in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, the offender was not adverse, when 
he thought it was required, to use threats or coercion against the girl to ‘facilitate’ the 
relationship. Further evidence of his manipulative ability emerged, during the police 
investigation, when it was learnt that he had phoned the girl’s mother and accused her [the girl] 
of phoning and pestering him ‘a married man’. (This appeared to be a ploy, on the part of the 
offender, whereby, if detected, he would be in a position to claim that the girl was responsible 
for the ‘relationship’.) 
8.2.12  After grooming the girl for four months, he was able to arrange to meet her, near where 
she lived, in Scotland. She told her parents that she was staying with friends for a few days but 
then proceeded to spend the next three nights in a hotel with the offender. There they had 
protected and unprotected sex, and took numerous indecent photographs of one another. The 
offender also gave the girl alcohol to drink.
8.2.13  Following her abuse, the girl tried to end the offender’s contact with her. The offender 
became angry at this and began a series of threatening and disturbing text messages, and phone 
calls, to his victim. This included a threat to send indecent photographs of the girl to her parents, 
school and church. By now extremely worried, the girl confided in a friend who said she should 
call ChildLine. This she did, and they advised her to inform her parents. She then told her 
parents and they reported the matter to the police.
8.2.14  This police service then contacted their colleagues in the town in which the offender 
lived. The offender was alerted to the police investigation, though, went on the run and made a 
mock suicide attempt. He was, though, soon traced and arrested by the police, and charged with 
a variety of offences including child abduction, indecent assault, taking and possessing indecent 
photographs of children, and harassment. After he had been arrested, and then released on bail, 
and in an act of revenge, he distributed indecent photographs of the girl on the Internet - images 
which were subsequently uncovered in another, entirely separate Internet-based CAI 
investigation. The suspect was subsequently tried and convicted but had not yet been sentenced 
at the time the fieldwork was carried out. 
8.2.15  The police officer who was interviewed as part of this research, said the victim needed 
help. Her family, however, felt very ashamed and embarrassed, and wanted to ‘sweep it under 
the carpet’. There was, therefore, no contact with any welfare service. This police officer was 
also struck by the girl’s apparent ‘ordinariness’. When asked whether there was anything 
particularly unusual about the case, she replied: 
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8.2.16  ‘The fact, that she [the girl] wouldn’t be typical. She was an educated child, at a good 
school, she had a nice family and plenty of money. You wouldn’t call her in any way vulnerable. 
She had a good relationship with her mother and a good network of friends.’
8.2.17  During the course of the investigation, the offender returned to live with his wife who 
was not only very supportive of him but saw the girl as being the culprit, referring to her as a 
‘14 year old tart’. This was further evidence of the manipulative ability of the offender  - as 
well as the lack of understanding on the part of some people regarding CSA and, contained 
within this, their readiness to blame the victim. 
Case 3: two international co-offenders 
8.2.18  Police in a specialist child protection unit in the UK, received a report from authorities 
in Canada that one of its citizens, a 48 year old male, was travelling, with his female partner 
(wife), to Wales to meet an 8 year old girl he had met over the Internet. This male had been 
convicted and imprisoned for the sexual abuse of his present partner’s children approximately 
15 years previously. 
8.2.19  The current concern appears to have come to light as a result of an allegation concerning 
the sexual abuse, by this man, of a 10 year old girl in Canada. Investigation of this case, and in 
particular the suspect’s computer revealed, not only CAIs, but also the fact that he was en route 
to Wales, via northern Europe and London, to meet the 8 year old girl in question. 
8.2.20  The family of this girl did not know of the suspect’s criminal history. They were aware 
that their daughter had met this self-styled ‘grandad’ figure on the Internet, but thought the 
contact, and imminent visit, were entirely benign. Agency workers believed the suspect had 
groomed not only the child but also her family. 
8.2.21  Following liaison between the police and immigration authorities in the UK, the suspect 
and his partner were apprehended at an airport, prevented from travelling on to meet the girl and 
were returned to Canada. Once back in Canada, the suspect was arrested and eventually tried for 
the sexual abuse of the above 10 year old girl, and the possession of CAIs, and was sentenced to 
7 years imprisonment.
8.3  Extent 
8.3.1  Table 10 shows the Internet grooming cases identified through the search of CSA-related 
reports to Computer Examination Units (CEUs) in three police services. As the table makes clear, 
both the absolute and the relative numbers of known grooming cases was small. The metropolitan 
police service37, for example, had seven such cases - the largest number of the three services - over the 
four-year survey period (1999-2002). These seven cases accounted for only 2.3% of all the CSA-
related reports to the CEU. In one of these police services, shire county 1, a search had also been 
carried out of all CSA offences recorded in that area in the four-year survey period. There were 984 
such offences - of which the five grooming cases made up 0.5%.  
                                                
37
 The term ‘metropolitan’ refers to an (anonymised) police service covering a large urban area - and not the 
Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service.  
Internet-initiated grooming  
41 
Table 10 Cases of Internet-initiated grooming of children for sexual abuse, identified through searches of 
    CSA-related reports to Computer Examination Units in three police services from 1999-200238
Police Service Type of CSA Case 
Grooming Other ALL 
 N % N % N % 
Metropolitan 7 2.3 304 7.7 311 100.0 
Shire county 1 5 3.8 125 96.2 130 100.0 
Shire county 2 0 0 130 100.0 130 100.0 
Estimated national extent 
8.3.2  The three police services in which the searches were undertaken covered areas with a total 
combined population of approximately four million people (Office for National Statistics, 2003). If
these three police services were representative of the UK population of a whole, then nationally there 
would have been - rounding up to the nearest whole number - 165 Internet-initiated grooming cases, 
known to the police, in the UK, from 1999-2002, or 41 cases per annum.39 This equates to 0.8 cases 
per police service per annum. 
8.4  Nature 
  
8.4.1  Of all the categories of CSA studied in this research, grooming cases were, by far, the most 
uniform in terms of their nature. This was especially true in relation to victim’ characteristics and 
offender’ modus operandi.   
Victims 
8.4.2  Only one grooming case identified in the course of this research involved a male victim. All the 
other cases - including, for example, the 10 case studies that were carried out - involved female 
victims, and in several of these cases there were multiple (female) victims. There was also much 
similarity between victims in terms of their ages with the large majority being adolescent (specifically 
12-16 years).40 This finding is very likely be a product of lifestyles i.e. it seems that, compared to 
children, young people were more likely not only to use the Internet but also to enter into 
‘relationships’ as part of this activity. As far as the research could establish, there also appeared to be 
some homogeneity among victims in terms of their socio-economic background. This was, perhaps, 
predictable, given that they had to come from homes that could afford computers and Internet access. 
Most, if not all, victims accessed the Internet from their home-based computers. 
8.4.3  There did not, in general, appear to be anything particularly distinctive about the victims in 
terms of their family background (or ethnicity). Indeed, several police officers who had been involved 
in investigating cases, commented that they were struck by the fact that the young people were not 
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 This analysis is based upon figures for CSA-related reports only. Figures were obtained for non-CSA, 
computer/Internet-related reports, for example fraud, physical assault and hate crimes, but these are not used 
here.
39
 These estimates must be treated with a degree of caution, based as they are upon figures from only three of the 
52 police services in the UK. Moreover, it is not known how representative these services, and areas, were of all 
police services and the UK population, respectively, and no statistical weighting exercises have been undertaken. 
However, it is felt that these are useful ‘ball park’ figures as to the national extent of known Internet-initiated 
grooming cases. 
40
 In view of this finding, these victims are, for the remainder of this section of the report, referred to by the more 
specific and age-appropriate term of ‘young people’.
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vulnerable - or not at least in any very obvious way - which might have helped explain why they 
succumbed to grooming or placed themselves so much at risk by meeting people who were, in 
essence, strangers. Put another way, what seemed to be conspicuous about this group was the absence
of risk factors.    
8.4.4  In all but one case, the offender was a stranger to the young person. The one exception 
comprised an offender was the non-cohabiting boyfriend of the victim’s mother. He purchased a 
computer and arranged Internet access for his intended victim (at her home) but then proceeded to 
contact her from his own home-based computer. Whilst he presented himself as a stranger, he was able 
use his knowledge of this girl, and her background, to ensure his grooming was even more effective.
Offenders 
8.4.5  All but one of the grooming cases studied in the course of this research involved a male offender 
who acted alone. The one exception involved a male and female from Canada who groomed a child in 
the UK - see case 3 above. The research also uncovered evidence  - see case 1 (8.2.7) above, for 
example - of offenders who incited or conspired with one another, online, in the grooming of children. 
There was a suggestion, in at least one case, that two males may have conspired together, offline, in 
the grooming and abuse of a child, but this feature of the case could not be established with any 
certainty.  
8.4.6  While there was quite a wide range of ages among the offenders studied in this research, there 
did appear to be a concentration of offenders between young adulthood (20s) and early middle-age 
(40s). In terms of their sexual orientation, some offenders appeared to be especially, if not exclusively, 
attracted to children, whereas others had had relationships with women. Other than this, offenders 
appeared to be quite diverse in terms of their other characteristics; namely, their SEC and ethnicity, 
and their cohabiting, relationship and parenting status.  
8.4.7  The one other area which appeared to mark out these offenders - although this was difficult to 
establish with any reliability - concerned their personality or psychological make-up. Many of these 
individuals not only sought, but also proved, to be very manipulative - as their grooming of young 
people evidenced. Some offenders strove to take matters even further and exerted considerable control 
over their victims. Indeed, some were quite obsessive or compulsive in this behaviour. It could be that 
this behaviour points to a deep-seated character trait in these offenders that renders them a high and 
on-going risk to children - but further research is needed to test the validity of this hypothesis.  
Modus operandi 
8.4.8  In general, offenders used a quite standardised and straightforward procedure to groom young 
people. They began this process by ‘visiting’ public, Internet-based ‘chat rooms’, or other Internet 
protocols, being used by young people. They would initiate ‘conversations’ with young people, 
pretending to be considerably younger than their real age, and invariably as being reasonably close in 
age to the young person concerned. Initially, the offender would engage the young person in casual 
conversation on quite ‘routine’ topics, such as pop groups and television programmes. Following this, 
though, the offender would, in a very incremental, but also very purposeful manner, steer the 
interaction such that it became increasingly personal and emotional, and eventually, sexual. Indeed, 
prior to meeting and sexually abusing his victim, the offender may have manipulated the young person 
into sending sexually explicit images of herself via a web cam - digital cameras which can transmit 
images, between computers, over the Internet. By this point, the offender may have established 
considerable control over his victim. Ultimately, the offender would arrange to meet the young person 
- invariably without her parents/carers knowledge - and then abuse her. 
8.4.9  What was clearly key for the offender in this process was the existence of technology, such as 
private chat rooms, mobile phones and web cams, which enabled him to ensure that his interaction 
with the young person became increasingly private, intimate and controlled. Thus, an offender would 
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typically  ‘move’, with his intended victim, from a public to a private chat room and then onto the 
young person’s mobile phone (which he may have provided), and finally onto web cams (again, which 
he may have provided). Offenders either posted these to the young persons themselves, or they 
purchased them by mail order, and then had them posted directly to the young person’s address. 
Another factor that appeared important in this process was the offender’s preparedness, and ability, to 
use a variety of strategies to manipulate the young person. This included blackmailing or otherwise 
threatening the young person, wearing her down psychologically (if need be, to the point where he was 
effectively stalking her), playing on the her sympathy and making her feel guilty over, or responsible 
for, the ‘relationship’. 
8.4.10  Offenders could go to inordinate lengths and employ extremely devious methods in order to 
sexually abuse a young person. Not only did most of the offenders in the national cases travel 
considerable distances in the UK to meet young people, but some were even prepared to travel to 
different countries in order to perpetrate CSA - as case 3, above, showed. It may have been that some 
offenders preferred to travel abroad in the belief that, in such circumstances, the chances of being able 
to sexually abusing a child would increase and the chances of being detected would decrease. In 
another case (see 8.4.4), the offender purchased a computer and arranged Internet access to facilitate 
his abuse of the young person. 
8.4.11  In a small number of cases reported to the study, offenders first targeted and groomed single 
mothers, over the Internet, as a means of getting access to (their) children. This ploy has been 
identified previously, in studies of (non-Internet-based) organised CSA - see Gallagher, 1998a. 
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Chapter 9 
Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy 
to commit CSA 
9.1  Typology 
9.1.1  Figure 6 shows the typology of cases of Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy (IIIC)41 to 
commit CSA, which was developed during the course of this research.42 The typology is based upon 
the broad nature of the offenders’ behaviour43, the form of contact between them and their country of 
residence in relation to one another.  
9.1.2  As Figure 6 indicates, there were four major types of case. These comprised the following (all 
initially online): an individual offering a specific child for sexual abuse, an individual seeking a child 
for sexual abuse, one individual inciting another to sexually abuse a third party child, and individuals 
conspiring with one another to sexually abuse a child.  
9.1.3  Each of these major types of case could be sub-divided according to whether the incitement or 
conspiracy existed online only or whether it included an additional offline element, and whether the 
incitement or conspiracy involved victims and offenders in only one country, or whether it was 
international.44 Although this category of Internet CSA was not very common, it was, as shown in 
Figure 6, relatively diverse in terms of specific types and sub-types of case.  
Figure 6 A typology of cases of Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA  
  
Types Sub-types 
1. An individual offering a specific child for sexual abuse 
2. An individual seeking a child for sexual abuse 
3. One individual inciting another to sexually abuse a child 
4. Two (or more) individuals conspiring to sexually abuse child 
• Online (only)  
• Offline (additionally) 
• National 
• International 
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 These cases are, in the interests of brevity, referred to by the abbreviation IIIC in most of the remainder of this 
report.
42
 It should be noted that the offences referred to in this section are distinct from those involving incitement to 
distribute Internet-based CAIs - although these two forms of behaviour can exist within the one case. The 
discussion here is concerned primarily with the perpetration of ‘contact’ CSA offences. 
43
 It should be pointed out that the authors have not, as yet, explored the official definition of the terms 
‘incitement’ and ‘conspiracy’, so they do not claim to be using them in any strict legal sense. Rather, the terms 
are being used, somewhat loosely, as a pragmatic and convenient means of describing the offenders’ behaviour. 
That said, the authors are reasonably confident that all of the behaviours discussed in this chapter would 
constitute ‘incitement’ or ‘conspiracy’ if they were subject to a formal legal test.
44
 Following on from the previous chapter of this report - see 8.2.7 and 8.4.5 - what could have been included 
within this category is one further type of case: where offenders initiated contact over the Internet, and 
subsequently incited or conspired - or possibly, aided and abetted - one another, in the Internet-initiated 
grooming of a child for sexual abuse. This has not been done here, though, as the authors did not a) have very 
much information on this type of behaviour, and b) wanted to avoid the discussion in this section from becoming 
overly-complicated and confused with that in the previous section.  
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CSA communications
9.1.4  The typology shown in Figure 6 incorporates only those cases which, under what appeared the 
prevailing interpretation and implementation of the law, were considered, by agency workers, to be 
relatively clear instances of incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA.  
9.1.5  The researchers did, though, identify another set of cases in which offenders communicated 
their sexual interest in children, to other individuals.45 Much of this communication took the form of 
discussions between offenders about their shared sexual interest in children or, more specifically, their 
desire to sexually abuse children. These authors believe that this behaviour could have constituted a 
criminal offence. However, there appeared to be some uncertainty among the police as to how these 
behaviours could, or should, be responded to - if at all. This in turn, may reflect a lack of clarity in the 
law - especially as this form of behaviour is a relatively new phenomenon. For these reasons, these 
behaviours are discussed separately in this chapter, and chapter 11, of this report.  
9.1.6  Although it was not possible, within the confines of this research, to carry out any systematic 
study of these communications (into, for instance, their extent, nature or effects), it was clear that they 
were quite diverse and varied according to at least four main criteria: 
• The general nature or subject matter of the communications 
• The recipients of the communications  
• The forms of communication used 
• The degree to which the communication might - in terms of potentially relevant legislation - be 
thought to be obscene or to constitute incitement  
9.1.7  Much of this communication consisted of ‘conversations’ between offenders using, for example, 
email or instant messaging, in which they shared their interest in, and desire to, sexually abuse 
children. These conversations could be lengthy and graphic. It was not unusual for them to discuss 
extremely serious sexual, and sometimes physical, abuse of children. (It had been the authors’ 
intention to include an example of such a communication in this report. However, the research 
advisory committee advised that to do so, could result in a number of negative consequences. On 
reflection, the authors fully concurred with this advice and decided not to incorporate such material in 
this report.) 
9.1.8  Other offenders produced extremely elaborate accounts of the CSA they wished to perpetrate, 
including, for example, how they would gain access to a child and the specific acts they would 
perpetrate. Indeed, some of these took the form of a narrative or story, which could assume a currency 
among those with a sexual interest in children, in the same way as CAIs.  
9.1.9  Some offenders went on to communicate with one another by telephone or had face-to-face 
meetings, in order to continue and develop their discussions on CSA. Often, if not invariably, the 
communications constituted a shared interest, and behaviour, between two or more offenders. 
However, in a few instances these communications were sent to innocent parties i.e. individuals who 
did not either request, or want, them. 
9.1.10  It was the view of at least some law enforcement officers (and one shared by these 
researchers), that these communications did not only glorify CSA, but also could very much promote, 
and indeed incite it.  
9.1.11  Some interviewees felt that individuals who possessed these texts were more of a risk to 
children than those who possessed CAIs - although there does not, as yet, appear to be any evidence in 
support of this view. 
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 Offenders used a variety of methods for this contact, including the Internet, telephone and face-to-face 
meetings. For this reason, this phenomenon is referred to by somewhat general term of ‘CSA communications’. 
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9.1.12  While these communications tended to be a central feature of IIIC cases, they were not always 
present. Moreover, they could occur in the course of other Internet CSA-related activity. Offenders 
could, for example, and as with CAIs, obtain such material from newsgroups or websites, or via peer-
to-peer protocols with, effectively, no interaction with another individual.  
9.1.13  As these CSA communications constituted only a part of the wider phenomenon of IIIC, and 
an uncertain one at that, most of the remainder of this chapter, including the Vignettes and Extent, is 
restricted to a discussion of the cases outlined in Figure 6.   
9.2  Vignettes 
9.2.1  The following vignettes are based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They 
are intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense of the nature of IIIC cases, and the policy 
and practice issues to which they gave rise. The details of these cases have been changed or 
generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
Case 1: Internet-initiated, child sex offender network, inciting and conspiring to commit CSA 
9.2.2  A police unit with particular experience of investigating Internet CSA offences, were 
monitoring newsgroups used by individuals with a sexual interest in children. In the course of 
this work, they detected video images of a child being abused by an adult male. The police felt 
that the images could have been taken in the UK.  The police carried out certain analyses of the 
images, alongside other enquiries, and eventually determined that the offender might be one of 
two particular men in the UK. The unit then reported the case to the police in the area where the 
more likely of the two suspects lived. 
9.2.3  This police service executed a search warrant, seized computer and other recording 
material (for example, digital cameras, videos, photographs and CDs) and arrested the suspect. 
An examination of this material showed that this was the offender in question, and revealed that 
he had taken still and video images of himself committing sexual offences, which included the 
rape of a young child. He had also recorded himself physically abusing the child - acts which 
were carried out for his sexual gratification and that of other offenders who viewed these images 
online. 
9.2.4  It subsequently transpired that the offender had been abusing this child for the last 7 years 
- since the child was three years of age. He had also sexually abused this child’s friend, and 
filmed this abuse, having got the first child to operate the recording equipment. 
9.2.5  Further investigation revealed that the offender had been exchanging CAIs with numerous 
individuals, throughout Europe and North America, whom he had met over the Internet. In the 
course of recording the abuse, the UK would take requests, over the Internet, from these other 
offenders, as to what clothes the child should be wearing and the manner in which she should be 
abused. These other offenders were, then, not only watching the abuse of this child online, but 
also directing it. 
9.2.6  As well as sending CAIs over the Internet, the UK offender had been swapping CAI 
videos with an offender in Eastern Europe. These were imported and exported through the post.
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9.2.7  Some of these offenders had also travelled internationally in order to abuse the children to 
which each of them had access. The UK offender had travelled to a Scandinavian country and 
was believed to have sexually abused the child of one of his co-conspirators. On returning 
home, he emailed the Scandinavian perpetrator and stated that: ‘You can come here and teach 
my child some lessons.’ During the course of an internationally co-ordinated police operation 
against these offenders, a French national was arrested on his way to visit an offender in Austria 
whose child he was planning to abuse. 
9.2.8  Among the UK offender’s CAIs, were ones showing a 3-4 year old child being injected 
with a drug, presumably to sedate her, and then being raped. This child was eventually traced to 
New Zealand. 
9.2.9  The UK offender was tried in respect of a variety of sexual offences against children and 
received several life sentences. 
Case 2: lone offender attempting to conspire with another person to sexually abuse a child 
9.2.10  An adult male entered an Internet chatroom in an attempt to identify another male for the 
purposes of a three-way sexual relationship with his female partner. He identified an individual 
who appeared to be interested in his proposition and a over a period of time a number of 
Internet-based conversations take place concerning this. Eventually, however, the second male 
initiated a conversation surrounding his wishes to ‘abduct, abuse, torture and murder a 15 year 
old girl’. 
9.2.11  In subsequent exchanges, this man suggested a quite detailed plan by which this could 
be brought about. This included a method by which a girl could be tricked into entering one of 
their cars, after which she would be taken to the isolated home of the second male where she 
would be abused, tortured and finally murdered. In the end, the first man reported the matter to 
his local police service, explaining to them that, initially, he  ‘went along’ with this discussion 
but when he began to feel that the second man was serious he thought some action should be 
taken. 
9.2.12  The second male was arrested by the police in the area in which he lived, and his 
computer equipment was seized and examined. Police found CAIs on this computer along with 
search terms that indicated his interest in images of children being subject to abduction, 
bondage, torture and murder. The police charged him with ‘incitement to commit murder, rape 
and torture’ but the CPS decided not to prosecute him on these charges. He was convicted of 
making indecent photographs of a child under 16 years of age, and fined.   
9.3  Extent 
  
9.3.1  Table 11 shows the number of IIIC cases identified through the search of CSA-related cases 
reported to Computer Examination Units (CEUs) in three police services from 1999-2002. As the table 
makes clear, these cases were relatively rare, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of CSA 
allegations in general. This is illustrated by shire county 2, for example, which had the largest number 
of cases (n=5) but where even these cases accounted for only 3.8% of all the CSA-related cases 
reported to the CEU.  
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9.3.2  Shire county 1 was one of the police services in which a search had been carried out of all CSA 
offences that had been recorded by the police. The cases searched were those recorded between 
January 1999 and December 2002 - the same period as that which had been used for the CEU 
searches. In this time period, shire county 1 police service recorded 984 CSA offences. Thus, the one 
Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy case reported to this police service accounted for only 0.1% 
of all recorded CSA offences. As can be seen, then, and notwithstanding the seriousness of individual 
cases, known IIIC cases were rare. 
Table 11  Cases of Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA identified through 
    searches of CSA-related reports to Computer Examination Units (1999-2002) in three police 
    services46
Police Service Type of CSA Case 
Incitement/ 
Conspiracy 
Other ALL 
 N % N % N % 
Metropolitan47 3 1.0 308 99.0 311 100.0 
Shire county 1 1 0.8 129 99.2 130 100.0 
Shire county 2 5 3.8 125 96.2 130 100.0 
Estimated national extent 
9.3.3  The three police services in which the searches were undertaken covered areas with a total 
combined population of approximately four million people (Office for National Statistics, 2003). If
these three police services were representative of the UK population of a whole, then nationally there 
would have been - rounding up to the nearest whole figure - 124 IIIC cases, known to the police, in the 
UK, from 1999-2002, or 31 cases per annum.48 This equates to 0.6 cases per police service per annum. 
9.4  Nature 
Victims 
9.4.1  There was - as much as one could tell from the small number of cases it was possible to study in 
this research - some diversity among the victims of these cases in terms of their age, family and socio-
economic background, and ethnicity. The one exception to this was the gender of victims, a majority 
of whom were female. 
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 This analysis is based upon figures for CSA-related reports only. Figures were obtained for non-CSA, 
computer/Internet-related reports, for example fraud, physical assault and hate crimes, but these are not used 
here. 
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 The term ‘metropolitan’ refers to an (anonymised) police service covering a large urban area - and not the 
Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service.  
48
 Again, these estimates must be treated with a degree of caution, based as they are upon figures from only three 
of the 52 police services in the UK. Moreover, it is not known how representative these services, and areas, were 
of all police services and the UK population, respectively, and no statistical weighting exercises have been 
undertaken. However, it is felt that these are useful ‘ball park’ figures as to the national extent of known IIIC 
cases.  
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9.4.2  For many of these children the sexual abuse they suffered, as a result of the IIIC, was seldom the 
first time that they had been maltreated in this way. Most of these children had already been sexually 
abused by the person (or persons) who was responsible for their involvement in the IIIC case. 
Offenders 
9.4.3  Notwithstanding the caution which has to be exercised owing to the small number of cases 
studied, it appeared that there was a fair amount of diversity among offenders in terms of their age, 
SEC, sexual orientation and ethnicity, and their cohabiting, relationship and parenting status. 
9.4.4  What did make these cases notable and distinct, though, was the fact that they involved a small, 
but appreciable proportion of female offenders. This is in stark contrast to the other categories of 
international and Internet CSA, and indeed CSA cases in general, virtually all of which are perpetrated 
by male offenders (Cawson et al, 2000). In some respects, this finding could, perhaps, have been 
anticipated, as to secure the degree of control over a child whereby they could be ‘traded’ over the 
Internet, might generally be thought to require the assent of the child’s mother or female carer. An 
over-representation of female offenders has been noted previously, in comparable (though non-
Internet based) studies, of multiple perpetrator CSA (Gallagher et al, 1996). 
9.4.5  Many of the offenders who were providing children were well known to their victims, and 
included parents/carers, other relatives and acquaintances. By contrast, those offenders who were 
seeking children to sexually abuse were, without exception, strangers to their victims.   
Modus operandi  
Offence scenarios 
9.4.6  The Internet provides a means of contacting, and communicating with, people who share similar 
interests - even illegal ones - in a fast, effective and - above all - relatively private and secure manner. 
Various ‘protocols’ exist for facilitating this, including newsgroups, websites, peer-to-peer software 
and email. As this research found, some individuals used this technology to incite, or conspire with, 
others to sexually abuse children.  
9.4.7  As Figure 6, and the discussion of CSA communications in 9.1.4 - 9.1.13 suggested, IIIC could 
be manifest in numerous types and sub-types of case. However, and within the albeit narrow confines 
of this research project, there appeared to be - with the inclusion of cases comprising CSA 
communications - nine main offence scenarios. These are set out in Figure 7.  
9.4.8  In the first set of cases - which were not known to involve CSA - individuals met online and 
discussed their mutual sexual interest in children (offence scenario 1). In some instances, this then 
progressed to individuals meeting offline where they would continue and develop this exchange (2).  
9.4.9  In the second set of cases, specific attempts were made to bring about CSA and involve a third 
party in this, either by inciting a person to sexually abuse children in general (3), offering a child for 
sexual abuse (4), asking a person to provide a child for sexual abuse (5), or one person conspiring with 
another to acquire a child for sexual abuse (6). These cases represented something of an interim group, 
whereby offenders ranged from those who may have been engaged in mock attempts to 
incite/conspire, to those who were seriously intent upon sexually (and sometimes physically) abusing a 
child. For one, or more, reasons, none of these cases progressed to offline meetings or the sexual abuse 
of children. However, what appeared to be clear in many of these cases was that the offenders were 
serious in their interest in CSA, and their attempts to incite, or conspire with, other persons to bring 
this about. 
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Figure 7 Nine major offence scenarios in cases of Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to 
    commit CSA 
Degree of CSA  
Set 1: Not known to   
           involve CSA 
Set 2: Attempted CSA  Set 3: CSA committed  
(1) CSA communications 
(online offender  
contact only) 
(3) Incitement to sexually 
abuse children in general 
(online offender contact 
only) 
(7) CAIs produced in 
      order to obtain other 
      CAIs 
(online offender contact 
only) 
generally 
increasing  
contact between 
offenders, intent 
to commit CSA, 
and/or degrees of 
CSA 
(2) CSA communications 
(offline offender contact 
additionally) 
(4) Offering a child for  
      CSA  
(online offender  
contact only) 
(8) Children being shown 
      naked or being 
      sexually abused 
(via online web-cam 
contact only) 
- 
(5) Seeking a child for  
      CSA 
(online offender  
contact only) 
(9) Children sexually 
      abused 
(offline offender contact 
additionally) 
- 
(6) Conspiring to commit 
      CSA 
(online offender contact 
only) 
  
 generally increasing contact 
 between offenders, intent to 
 commit CSA,  and/or degrees 
 of CSA 
9.4.10  The third set of cases were those where a child was sexually abused as a result of the initial 
Internet contact between offenders. Some individuals became involved in this set of incitement or 
conspiracy cases as a result of their attempts to obtain CAIs online (7). On seeking out such images, 
they were told that they would first have to produce and provide their own, personal CAIs. This then 
led the individuals to take CAIs (either of a child naked or being abused), using a child to whom they 
had access but had not abused previously.   
9.4.11  Other cases were much more ‘interactive’, where the person with care of, or control over, the 
child used a camera, connected to an Internet-enabled computer, to send live, moving images of that 
child being abused to another offender (8). There was considerable variation in the nature of these 
images, ranging from pictures of naked children, to scenes of children being subject to serious sexual, 
and sometimes physical, abuse. This offending could be quite organised and elaborate, with the 
‘viewing’ perpetrator making requests as to how the child should be abused, and in some instances 
even sending clothes or other items he wished to have incorporated in the abuse scenes. 
9.4.12  Some of the cases in this set, involved offenders - who could be from different countries - 
meeting up with one another to sexually abuse children in what often amounted to child sex abuser 
networks (9).  Sometimes, at least, this would be a progression from abuse that had initially been 
depicted online. 
9.4.13  Although only this last set of cases involved the sexual abuse of children, it is the authors’ 
belief that all the behaviours incorporated within these offence scenarios represented a serious risk to 
children. 
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9.4.14  The primary purpose of the schema set out in Figure 7 is to show the eight main offence 
scenarios identified in the course of this research. Implicit within this schema is the notion that these 
scenarios are, broadly speaking, quite discrete from one another. The research did find, though, that 
perpetrators could progress through these scenarios, becoming involved in increasingly serious 
offending. Indeed, what this schema could be seen as highlighting is the existence of a continuum (or 
more precisely continuua) within IIIC cases.49
9.4.15  As Figure 7 shows, there were at least three major continuua along which IIIC cases could be 
located and offenders could move. These were as follows:   
• The degree of intent on the part of the offender(s)
• The degree of offender-offender and/or offender-child contact 
• The degree of CSA perpetrated 
9.4.16  There were two further dimensions by which cases could be distinguished from one another. 
The first of these was the nature of the communication between offenders. This was especially 
relevant in CSA communication cases. Some offenders, for example, engaged in general conversations 
about their sexual attraction to children, others spoke more specifically about the way in which they 
would like to sexually abuse children (in the future) and others again appeared to want to more 
actively engage others in their sexual ‘fantasies’ around children.  
9.4.17  The second dimension related to the form of contact between offenders. These comprised the 
Internet, telephones and face-to-face meetings. In principle, the postal system could have been used as 
a form of contact between offenders but it was not encountered very frequently in this research. 
Other key features of IIIC cases  
9.4.18  As mentioned earlier, this report, and the research upon which it is based, along with an earlier 
publication (Gallagher et al, 2003), are believed to be the first systematic attempts to study and discuss 
the phenomenon of Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA. The authors intend to 
return to this phenomenon, at greater length, in future publications. However, in view of the dearth of 
literature, they consider it appropriate and worthwhile, to describe here, a number of other key features 
of these cases.    
Physical abuse 
9.4.19  The first of these features concerns child physical abuse. It was clear that a sub-group of 
offenders was motivated by a desire to perpetrate and/or witness the physical abuse of children. 
Sometimes this was in a form which could be likened to corporal punishment and seemed, invariably, 
to be have been carried out for the offenders’ sexual gratification.  There was considerable variation in 
the severity of the physical abuse perpetrated. At the extreme end of this scale, children were left with 
permanent physical damage.  
Sadism 
9.4.20  Although it was not a feature of all IIIC cases, it was striking that in some, offenders appeared 
to be driven, not only by a sexual interest in children, but also by sadistic motives i.e. they derived 
pleasure from harming children, usually through sexual abuse but sometimes by physically abusing 
them. A prime example of this sadistic motivation is to be found in case 2, above, where the police 
                                                
49
 The authors recognise that there has been some influential work, such as that by Finkelhor (1984) and Wolf 
(1988), on the notion of offenders moving through certain stages prior to their sexually abusing a child. Indeed, 
and as acknowledged here, some offenders had moved between the stages shown in Figure 7 in advance of 
committing abuse. However, it should be stressed that the chief purpose of the schema shown in Figure 7 is to 
illustrate the existence of discrete offence scenarios, as encountered by the police during their investigations.  
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were sure that the offender had had a genuine intention to abduct, abuse, torture and murder a teenage 
girl. 
Fantasy  
9.4.21  The research found that fantasy was an important factor in some IIIC cases, and took at least 
two main forms. The first of these concerned CSA communications which, like CAIs (Quayle, Erooga, 
Wright, Taylor and Harbinson, 2006) appeared to be very important to some offenders, and to which 
they might masturbate. Again, like CAIs, these communications - where offenders shared their mutual 
sexual interest in children - may not only have fuelled offenders’ fantasies surrounding CSA, but also 
intensified their desire and drive to commit CSA.  
9.4.22  The second manifestation of fantasy was among a sub-group of offenders who appeared to be 
engaged in mock attempts to incite, or conspire with, other people to commit CSA. Some suspects 
claimed this on being interviewed by the police. Others were found not to have the access to the child 
that they claimed. It does not seem unreasonable to assume, though, that these individuals who 
professed an interest in CSA were, in fact, genuinely interested in CSA - and should, along with their 
Internet-based behaviour, be considered a risk to children.   
Child sex abuser networks 
9.4.23  Some instances of IIIC comprised only two or a small number of offenders at the most. It was 
clearly a risk in these cases, though - and one that was sometimes realised - that this contact could lead 
to the formation of child sex abuser networks. As this research found, some of these networks were 
not only large but were highly organised, secretive and - in the propagation of CSA - very effective. It 
seems likely that the number, and also possibly the extent, of child sex abusers networks is increasing 
as a result of the contact which can, and is, taking place, between offenders, over the Internet. Given 
that child sex abuser networks have not, in the pre-Internet era, always received the amount of policy 
and practice attention they merited (Gallagher, 1998a), this development is even more worrying.50
The continuum of offending - extended 
9.4.24  As indicated above IIIC cases could be thought of as existing along a continuum (or 
continuua), with at least some offenders moving progressively further along it terms of their 
behaviour. Following on from the discussion above - concerning other key features of IIIC cases - it is 
felt that the idea of the continuum could be extended. This continuum, now - in the interests of clarity 
- in a more simplified form, is shown in Figure 8. As the figure shows, then, contact between 
offenders, initiated over the Internet, may lead, in some of its most serious manifestations, to child 
physical abuse, the setting up of child sex abuser networks and sadistic acts against children.  
Figure 8  A continuum of behaviour and offences in cases of Internet-initiated incitement and conspiracy 
                to commit CSA 
         CSA                            attempted                      attempted                         CSA                    abuser networks 
 communication                    incitement                    conspiracy                        CPA                          sadism 
           _______________________________________________________________________
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 There does at times, in current professional discussions of CSA, appear to be some confusion over the degree 
to which the existence of child sex abuser networks has been substantiated in the past. It is, then, worth 
emphasising that such cases are, in fact, well documented - in, for example, both community and familial 
settings - as earlier work by one of these authors, among others, has shown (see Gallagher et al, 1996, and 
Gallagher, 1998a).   
International and Internet CSA 
54 
Internet-based CAIs  
55 
Chapter 10 
Internet-based child abuse images 
10.1  Typology 
10.1.1  Based upon their experiences in this study, the authors feel that a relevant and useful typology 
for Internet-based CAIs, is one which draws upon the relevant legislation; namely, the Protection of 
Children Act (PoCA) 1978 and the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1988. (This is a typology that has been 
used previously - see, for example, Sommer, 2002.) While this legislation is applicable to both online 
and offline offences, the following discussion is concerned only with the former. The PoCA 1978 
defines four groups of offence: ‘taking’ and ‘making’, ‘distribution’ or ‘showing’, ‘possession with a 
view to distribution’ and ‘publishing an advertisement’ (for CAIs). Under the CJA 1988, simple 
‘possession’ became an offence. This produces the typology as shown in Figure 9. 
10.1.2  In light of the fact that the Internet is one of the defining feature of these cases, and given the 
intrinsically international nature of the Internet, an appropriate sub-division of these cases seems to be 
into those which were wholly national and those which had some international component - dependent 
upon whether the offenders in a case were in the same or different countries.  
10.1.3  Notwithstanding the diversity which can exist among these cases, in practice much of the 
organisational response to the use of Internet-based CAIs, was concerned with three main forms of 
behaviour: the downloading and subsequent possession of CAIs, and the distribution and the taking of 
CAIs. A good deal of this behaviour took place on an international basis.  
Figure 9 A typology of Internet-based CAI cases 
Type Sub-type 
1. Taking and making  
2. Distributing or showing 
3. Possessing with a view to distribution 
4. Publishing an advertisement  
5. Possession  
• National  
• International 
10.2  Vignettes 
10.2.1  The following vignettes are based upon cases identified during the course of the research. They 
are intended to provide the reader with a more tangible sense of the nature of Internet-based CAI 
cases, and the policy and practice issues to which they gave rise. The details of these cases have been 
changed or generalised in the interests of anonymity. 
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Case 1: lone offender downloading CAIs from the Internet 
10.2.2  UK police were informed of this case by a foreign police organisation which had been 
investigating a company in their own country in relation to the sale of CAIs over the Internet. 
One of the individuals, who had been using his credit card to purchase images, had been traced 
to an address in East Anglia. The local police service visited the offender’s accommodation, 
seized his computer and recording media, and were in the midst of carrying out a more 
extensive search, when the offender admitted downloading CAIs and making hard copies of 
these.  
10.2.3  He then led police to the place where this material - along with his adult pornography - 
was stored. This material was subsequently examined and the offender arrested. When 
interviewed by the police, the offender stated that he had been purchasing material over the 
Internet for a few years but had felt guilty about this and had destroyed much of what he had 
downloaded. Eventually, the case went to court where the offender received a Community 
Rehabilitation Order and was sent on a sex offender treatment programme.   
Case 2: lone offender downloading CAIs from the Internet 
10.2.4  This offender was identified through a major international investigation of two 
individuals, based in the USA, who were selling CAIs on a worldwide basis. Law enforcement 
agencies in the US had seized the credit card details of the persons who had purchased CAIs and 
passed these on to their counterparts around the world, including the UK. Despite this 
background, and the fact that there were several thousand such suspects in the UK, this case was 
- like many involving only the downloading of CAIs - relatively straightforward to investigate.  
10.2.5  Once the suspect’s details had been passed to the relevant local police service, various 
‘background’ checks were carried out. Then, having obtained a search warrant, officers from a 
specialist abusive images unit, along with those from the Family Support Unit and Tactical Aid 
Group, visited the suspect, arrested him and seized his computing equipment, which consisted 
of a PC and a laptop.  
10.2.6  The PC, which was believed to contain the CAIs in question, was broken and the images 
could not be accessed. However, a variety of CAIs, all of girls, were found on the newer laptop. 
Initially, the suspect intended to plead not guilty but later changed his mind.  
10.2.7  As the police interviewee suggested, this may have been because: ‘Solicitors are 
encouraging suspects to plead guilty - which is unusual compared to crime generally.’  In fact, 
and as this same officer pointed out, in relation to many of the suspects her specialist CAI unit 
had dealt with, ‘guilty pleas are very common’ and ‘many of ours have been cautioned’. Of the 
remainder, virtually all of these had been dealt with in Magistrates Courts, where they tended to 
receive terms of imprisonment of under 12 months. This police officer did not appear especially 
perturbed by these sentences, explaining that suspects would, in addition, be on the police 
computer and the Sex Offender Register.  
10.2.8  The suspect in this case lived with his partner and two teenage step-daughters. The 
social services department was involved in the case, and carried out an assessment on the 
family, but judged that the offender was not a risk to these children. 
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Case 3: an individual belonging to several networks (of offenders) each of which was 
distributing CAIs between its members 
10.2.9  This offender was detected as a result of an international police investigation into the 
distribution of CAIs between more than one hundred networks of offenders in almost 30 
countries. This particular offender was known to have distributed CAIs, over the Internet, to two 
of these groups. It appeared that he was especially interested in very young children and more 
extreme images. He was found in possession of over 3000 CAIs and 100 movie files. The police 
file recorded that the images upon which the specimen charges were based included the 
following: 
• ‘Photo (close-up): 5 year old girl’s genitals pierced by needle’ 
• ‘4 year old girl vaginal rape’ 
• ‘12 month old child with [adult’s] penis close to [her] mouth’ 
• ‘4 year old female and adult male - penis in vagina - child looking very distressed’ 
10.2.10  The investigation revealed that the offender had constructed a swimming pool in his 
garden, the purpose of which was to attract girls from the neighbourhood to his home. Once 
they were in his garden, he would invite the girls to his computer room, where he would 
photograph them in their swimwear. Although one of the photographs showed a girl with her 
swimming top raised above her chest, the police concluded that they could not prove it was 
necessarily indecent. However, they did believe that all the photographs were ‘indicative’ and 
had a malign purpose. As one of the investigating police officers wrote in the file: 
‘The photographs concerned are consistent with the initial stages of grooming.’ 
10.2.11  Another significant feature of this case, was that the offender had used the Internet to 
obtain advice and information on how to avoid detection whilst downloading and distributing 
CAIs, and on the deletion of CAIs. The offender had also visited the websites of a variety of UK 
and foreign police services, and other official bodies concerned with child protection or 
offenders. His purpose in doing this was not clear but it may have been an attempt to glean more 
information in order to better avoid being detected but also, possibly, to meet up with other 
offenders.    
10.2.12  During the course of the investigation, the offender announced that he had taken a 
‘load of pills’ which resulted in his being hospitalised. It subsequently transpired that while he 
had taken more than the recommended dose of the pills in question, it was a relatively modest 
number. It appeared that this was a mock suicide attempt, which may have been designed to 
emotionally manipulate those around him. Interestingly, the offenders in case 4 (below), and 
case 2 (chapter 8) also made mock suicide attempts. This appears to underline, still further, the 
propensity of some (Internet) child sex abusers to manipulate people - be they children, adults 
known to them, or agency workers. 
10.2.13  In the end, this offender was tried and convicted, for distributing and making indecent 
photographs of children. He was given a short term of imprisonment, placed on the Sex 
Offenders Register, made subject to a extended Supervision Order, banned from working with 
children and a forfeiture order was made against his computing equipment. 
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Case 4: highly organised, international network of CAI users 
10.2.14  This case, which was subject to an international police investigation, and considerable 
media attention, was depicted as one primarily involving the use of CAIs. However, the authors’ 
interviews with the police, and search of police files, revealed that it incorporated several other 
international and Internet components. 
10.2.15  The case was first detected as a result of an argument child 1 (a girl aged 10 years) was 
having with her mother over the amount of time she was wanting to spend with the offender 
(her friend’s father). In the midst of this argument, the girl disclosed that ‘she had been having 
sex with him’. Her mother reported the disclosure to the police. The following day the girl took 
part in a video interview in which she disclosed that she, and her friend - child 2 - also a ten- 
year old female - had been sexually abused by the offender at his home. At this point, she made 
no reference to featuring in CAIs.  
10.2.16  Later that day, and following this disclosure, the police visited and arrested the 
offender. In the course of this arrest, the offender asked to be allowed to get something from his 
bedroom but this proved to be a pretext for his going to another room, containing a computer, 
which was on, and then operating the keyboard. This aroused the police’s suspicion, and the 
computer and recording media were seized. 
10.2.17  Child 2 was subsequently interviewed but denied, quite categorically, that anything had 
happened to her, or her friend (child 1). However, days later, child 2 informed her mother that 
she had, in fact, been sexually abused by the offender. In her video interview, she disclosed 
offences of buggery, indecent assault and gross indecency, and also the ‘taking and storing of 
photographs on the computer’. She added that the offender had been visited by a number of 
men, whom he had met on the Internet, but stated that they had not abused her. 
10.2.18  In the meantime, the police Computer Examination Unit (CEU) reported that they had 
found CAIs on the offender’s computer which featured the offender, and child 2 and her brother 
(child 3). The CEU also reported that another specialist unit, within this same police service, 
had in its possession CAIs that showed these same three individuals. (These latter images had 
been received via an organisation, part of whose brief was to monitor the Internet. This 
specialist unit had had these images for some time but had been unable to identify or trace the 
children who featured in them.) By putting these sets of images (and evidence) together, it was 
clear, that the offender had not only taken CAIs but had also distributed them. 
10.2.19  The offender was then re-arrested, a more thorough search of his home conducted and 
all possibly relevant material was seized. This search led to the discovery of some CAIs in the 
form of Polaroid photographs. 
10.2.20  Initially, the offender refused to speak to the police but was in any case charged with 
rape, buggery, indecent assault and gross indecency. The offender’s refusal to speak to the 
police appeared to be part of a quite pronounced manipulative trait in his nature - a trait that has 
been noted, by these authors, among offenders in a number of other Internet CSA cases.   
10.2.21  Child 3 was interviewed and disclosed being sexually abused by the offender. 
Following this, the offender agreed to co-operate with the police and made what appeared to be 
a fairly full admission - including the sexual assault of child 4 (a relative of child 2 and 3). Child 
4 was spoken to by the police and was ‘asked if he wanted to speak to anyone’, but declined, 
and is not known to have ever spoken to anyone about his abuse. 
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10.2.22  In the course of his interviews with the police, the offender explained how he had 
started making CAIs (for his own use) with a Polaroid camera but then, with the advent of the 
Internet, had progressed to joining an online group of offenders who were sexually interested in 
children, and started sharing images with them. This included his taking and distributing images 
of the four above children. This activity led on to the offender being visited by some of the 
people he had met over the Internet. The police interviewee explained that the offender did, 
somewhat perversely, have rules about these visits: ‘He [the offender] says they [the visitors] 
would never - it was an understanding - that no one else was allowed to touch [sexually abuse] 
the kids other than him, he was very strong about that.’ 
10.2.23  It transpired, ultimately, that the offender was part of a highly organised international 
network of offenders whose chief activity comprised the exchange of CAIs. He himself had tens 
of thousands of CAIs. The network had at least one hundred members, spread over a dozen 
countries. For this reason, the investigation was eventually transferred to a national policing 
organisation. Eventually, this offender was tried, convicted and received a sentence of more 
than ten years for the abuse he had perpetrated.   
  
10.2.24  As suggested at the start, though, this case was, in the context of this research project, 
very complex, and incorporated a number of the other categories of CSA featuring in this study. 
Some years later, child 3 disclosed that a man who had come over from Canada, to visit the 
main offender, and who was, therefore, an international child sex abuser, had sexually abused 
him. A search of the quite extensive police files on this case revealed that the offender, and 
others in Europe and North America, had been sending CAIs to one another through the post, 
either in the form of CDs or videos. They had, in addition, given advice to one another as to 
how they could prevent this material being detected whilst in transit from one country to 
another. 
10.2.25  In view of the numerical predominance of Internet-based CAIs in this research, a fifth case 
study, concerning a network of offenders distributing CAIs, using file sharing software, is provided in 
Appendix D. 
10.3  Extent 
10.3.1  Table 12 shows the number of suspected CAI cases that were identified through searches of 
CSA-related reports to Computer Examination Units (CEUs) in three police services. As the table 
makes clear, investigations into alleged or suspected CAI cases were relatively numerous and certainly 
more so than those of grooming or IIIC cases. In shire county 2, for example, there were 116 such 
investigations, accounting for 89.2% of all CSA-related reports to the CEU.
10.3.2  Shire county 1 was one of the police areas in which a search had also been carried out of all 
recorded CSA offences. The offences searched were those that had been recorded between January 
1999 and December 2002 - the same period as that covered by the CEU searches. In this period, the 
police in shire county 1 had recorded 984 CSA offences. Thus, the 115 CAIs reports would have 
accounted for 11.7% of all recorded CSA offences. By contrast, grooming and IIIC cases, in this 
police service, accounted for 0.5% and 0.1%, respectively, of recorded CSA offences. 
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Estimated national extent 
10.3.3  The three police services in which the searches were undertaken, covered areas with a total 
combined population of approximately four million people (Office for National Statistics, 2003). If
these three police services were representative of the UK population as a whole, then nationally there 
would have been CAI cases, known to the police, in the UK, from 1999-2002, or 1,493 cases per 
annum.51 This equates to 28.7 cases per police service per annum. (It should be stressed - see below - 
that the number of CAI-related reports to CEU units, and the operational demands they created, were 
increasing rapidly through the survey, and subsequent fieldwork periods i.e. up until, at least, March 
2004.) 
Table 12 Cases of suspected Internet-based CAIs identified through searches of CSA-related reports to 
           computer examination units in three police services (1999-2002)52
Police Service Type of CSA Case 
CAI Other ALL 
   N     %        N          %       N        % 
Metropolitan53 203 65.3 108 34.7 311 100.0 
Shire county 1 115 88.5 15 11.5 130 100.0 
Shire county 2 116 89.2 14 10.8 130 100.0 
Internet-based CAI investigations 
10.3.4  It needs to be acknowledged that some computers were searched by the police on a routine 
basis - following a concern over CSA in general, rather than a specific allegation regarding CAIs. 
Furthermore, some computer examinations did not reveal CAIs. Thus, not all Internet CAI reports to 
CEUs were known or specifically suspected, of involving CAIs. 
10.3.5  That said, it was clear that investigations into the possible use of CAIs, but also cases where 
the police did detect the use of CAIs, were substantial in terms both of their absolute numbers, and as 
a proportion of all CSA-related allegations. While this research was not able to examine this category 
of case in any great depth, it was clear that the rise in the numbers of these cases, the increase in the 
amount and capacity of storage media which had to be examined, and the presence of multiple victims 
and suspects in cases, meant that the investigation of computer- and Internet-based CAIs was a major 
and growing problem for the police. It should also be remembered that this study was restricted to 
known cases - which constitute only a proportion of all cases.  
  
10.3.6  One police service - outside the three discussed above - provided the researchers with a 
breakdown of the number of investigations its CEU had been involved in over the four year survey 
period. (These concern all types of offence, but the majority were CSA-related.) These figures are 
presented in Table 13. As the table makes clear, there was marked rise in the both the number of 
investigations carried out and the amount of (hard drive) memory that had to be examined over the 
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 Again, these estimates must be treated with a degree of caution, based as it is upon figures from only three of 
the 52 police services in the UK. Moreover, it is not known how representative these services, and areas, were of 
all police services and the UK population, respectively, and no statistical weighting exercises have been 
undertaken. However, it is felt that the above are useful ‘ball park’ figures as to the national extent of known 
Internet-initiated grooming cases.  
52
 This analysis is based upon figures for CSA-related reports only. Figures were obtained for non-CSA, 
computer/Internet-related reports, for example fraud, physical assault and hate crimes, but these are not used 
here. 
53
 The term ‘metropolitan’ refers to an (anonymised) police service covering a large urban area - and not the 
Metropolitan (i.e. London) Police Service.  
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survey period. Between 1999 and 2002, there was a near three-fold increase in the number of 
investigations carried out, and a 120-fold increase in the hard drive memory examined. 
Table 13  Annual rises in cases reported to a police Computer Examination Unit, and hard drive memory 
                examined 
YEAR CEU Examinations Hard drive memory examined  
 N % Gigabytes % 
1999 199 15.9 200 0.8 
2000 216 17.2  1080 4.4 
2001 308 24.6 4620 18.9 
200254 531 42.3 18600 75.9 
TOTAL 1254 100.0 24500 100.0 
10.4  Nature 
10.4.1  By way of prelude to this section, it should be emphasised that while there is much information 
on offenders (owing to so many being apprehended) and images (owing to so many being seized plus 
the ability of specially sanctioned researchers to study them over the Internet), there is, by contrast, 
much less information on victims, due to the fact that the number and proportion that have been 
identified - or even more pertinently studied - is very small. 
Victims 
10.4.2  All of the information collected during the course of the research (i.e. questionnaires, 
interviews and record and file searches) indicated that the children who featured in CAIs were quite 
diverse in terms of their age, gender and ethnicity. (Much of this information originated from the 
innumerable CAIs that the police had seized or - along with COPINE - had examined on the Internet.) 
However, as these children were seldom identified, there is little knowledge as to their family or socio-
economic background. That said, there is a suggestion, from the few identified cases, that these 
children may - like those in known CSA cases in general (Gibbons, Conroy and Bell, 1995) - be over-
represented by those from disadvantaged backgrounds.   
Offenders 
10.4.3  Virtually all of the offenders in these cases were male. While there were very few female 
abusers, this may have been one of the few categories of sexual offence (albeit one not involving 
assault) where they tended not to act in concert with males. Other than this, though, offenders varied 
considerably in terms of their age, SEC, sexual orientation and ethnicity and their cohabiting, 
relationship and parenting status. There also appeared to be some variation in terms of victim-abuser 
relationship, with the full range (in terms of familiarity) from parent/carer to stranger.  
10.4.4  In terms of offenders who had ‘taken’ CAIs, they were predominantly family and extended 
family members, and other persons close to the child. This could, perhaps, have been anticipated, as to 
take CAIs would generally require some degree of care or control over the child. By contrast, the large 
majority of those who distributed CAIs, and the vast majority of those who downloaded CAI, were 
strangers to the child.  
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 Estimated annual figure based upon the information available up to the end July 2002.
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10.4.5  There were a number of other characteristics, concerning these offenders, which are worth 
highlighting. Their technical (computing) competence ranged from the novice to the expert and all 
points in between (contrary to some media reports concerning the supposed expertise of many of these 
offenders in this area). Offenders may have contained a disproportionate number of persons who had a 
professional involvement with computers - although this may be an artefact of their greater access to, 
and aptitude with, computers, rather than this group of workers having an innately greater sexual 
interest in children compared to other groups of workers. The authors were struck by the fact that 
compared to child sex abusers in general, these offenders appeared to be more likely express remorse 
over their behaviour and/or welcome being detected. They were also more likely to commit suicide 
(see 13.5.6 - 13.5.11). As to what these responses indicate, though, is unclear.    
The overlap between CAI use and child sex abuse 
10.4.6  One of the most critical issues that has arisen in concerns around the entire phenomenon of 
Internet CSA, is the degree of risk which users of CAIs pose to children. In an attempt to address this 
issue some reliance has been placed, not unreasonably, upon statistics as to the number of CAI users 
who are known to have sexually abused children.  
10.4.7  Some of the most systematic evidence in this respect, from the present research, came via the 
records of one police service which had compiled information on suspects who had been identified, 
through a major international law enforcement operation, as having possibly downloaded CAIs. This 
information is presented in Table 14. 
Table 14  The (previous) conviction status of suspected CAI users based upon the records of one police
           service and relating to a major international law enforcement operation 
Investigation outcome - by suspect Previous conviction status 
Sexual 
offence 
Other offence None ALL 
N % N % N % N % 
Charged 7 11.9 7 11.9 45 76.2 59 100.0 
Cautioned 0 0 7 15.6 38 84.4 45 100.0 
NFA (insufficient evidence)55 1 2.6 0 0 37 97.4 38 100.0 
Referred to another police service 2 6.7 2 6.7 26 86.7 30 100.1* 
NFA (adult pornography users only) 2 8.7 1 4.3 20 87.0 23 100.0 
Deceased 1 25.0 0 0 3 75.0 4 100.0 
* Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
10.4.8  The sub-group about which there could have been thought to have been the most concern, and 
strongest evidence, regarding CAI use, were those in the ‘charged’ category. Within this group, just 
under 12% of suspects had been convicted of a sexual offence previously i.e. prior to the current 
investigation regarding CAIs. Overall, only 6.5% of (all) suspects were known to have committed 
sexual offences previously. It should be pointed out that even these figures refer to a composite of 
offences, incorporating both child and adult victims, and contact and non-contact offences (for 
instance, earlier CAI use or indecent exposure.)  
10.4.9  Thus, it would be appear, from this analysis at least, that the number of CAI users who are 
known to have sexually abused children is relatively low. This finding is supported by evidence from 
the other stages of this research project, such as the police NPQS, case studies and search of reports to 
CEUs. This point, and its implications, is discussed further under 13.7.10-13.7.13. 
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 NFA refers to no further action by the police following CPS advice.
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Modus Operandi 
10.4.10  The Internet, along with digital photography, has revolutionised the creation, distribution and 
accessing of CAIs. Although there are few official figures, the incidence of CAI use, prior to the 
Internet, is generally thought to have been a very low, being restricted to a relatively small number of 
especially devious and persistent individuals, who created images in this country or imported them 
from abroad. Now, a huge number and range of CAIs are very readily available at, literally, the click 
of a mouse.    
10.4.11  It appeared that the large majority of offenders in this category, confined their activities to 
downloading CAIs from the Internet. (Offenders who engaged in this behaviour were often charged, 
by the police, under the category of ‘making’.)   A very small proportion distributed images and an 
even smaller proportion again were involved in the (original) creation of such images. There were 
various Internet protocols - for example, the World Wide Web, peer-to-peer, newsgroups and email - 
which were used to obtain and/or send CAIs. Although it did not generally seem to require much effort 
or skill to obtain CAIs, there existed, in this respect, a continuum, at one end of which there were 
some highly proficient, organised and secretive, individuals and networks that employed many 
safeguards surrounding their use of CAIs. 
10.4.12  While the large majority of offenders seemed to use CAIs chiefly for the purposes of sexual 
gratification, some were primarily motivated by financial gain, and sold images worldwide. The IWF 
has estimated that 50% of illegal Internet content - the large majority of which comprises CAIs - is 
available on pay-per-view websites, and 50% is freely swapped (IWF, 2005.)  For others, collecting 
and collections were a crucial part of their possession of CAIs. In fact, some offenders appeared to be 
so attached to their CAIs that they did not dispose of them, even in the face of possibly imminent 
police investigations. Similarly, some offenders were known to have returned to accessing CAIs after 
having been convicted in relation to these offences.  
Images 
10.4.13  Given that the chief concern within this category of Internet CSA is images, it seems 
appropriate to devote some of this chapter of the report to a discussion of their nature. Indeed, there 
are a number of reasons why this is felt to be especially important: it is the nature of these images 
which lies at the heart of their being criminalised (and subject to such concerted policy and practice 
attention), the misconception among some people that these images are, in terms of their content, of 
marginal consequence, and finally the fact that most people will never see, and therefore not be able to 
comprehend, what these images involve. 
10.4.14  The research found that CAIs varied considerably in terms of their content. Many images 
featured pictures of naked children which, themselves, ranged from the ‘non-invasive’ - where 
children did not know they were the focus of such photography (children covertly filmed on a beach, 
for example) - to shots which were clearly sexually explicit and abusive. More specifically, CAIs 
could extend from scenes of nudity (alone) onto the indecent assault of children, through to their rape 
and buggery, culminating in scenes of bestiality and torture. It did appear, though, that as the 
seriousness of images increased, the number of those images in existence declined.  
10.4.15  While the most serious images are, perhaps, the least numerous, the nature of these images 
should not be underestimated. Even with the modest amount of attention this research was able to 
direct to this category of case, it became clear that there were, in existence, many deeply disturbing 
images of the abuse of children. These included, for example, children being savagely beaten, forced 
to have sex with animals, a child whose penis was cut off and the sexual abuse of a newborn baby who 
was still attached to its mother by its umbilical cord.   
10.4.16  Some abusers achieved sexual gratification through the use of CAIs which depicted the 
physical abuse of children. Again, these images varied, ranging from those where children were 
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subject to corporal punishment (of varying degrees) to those in which they experienced such serious 
physical assault, that they were left with permanent injuries. Indeed, some agency workers remarked 
that, in a few instances, the physical abuse depicted in CAIs would have been life-threatening.  
10.4.17  There was a belief among some interviewees that, over time, victims were becoming younger 
and the images more serious. 
10.4.18  Needless to say, the impact upon children of this sexual and physical abuse, especially in its 
more extreme forms, may well have been, both physically and psychologically, very severe. There 
must also be major concerns in relation to the impact that these images have upon the offenders who 
are viewing them - especially those are who already more disposed towards abusing children. 
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Chapter 11 
Key policy and practice recommendations 
11.1  International Police/Law Enforcement Child Protection Agency 
    (IPCPA) 
Finding 
11.1.1  The international law enforcement response to international and Internet CSA could be 
described, at best, as unsatisfactory. In particular, there was no central, well-resourced, authoritative 
body to take the necessary concerted and co-ordinated international lead on these cases. Instead, the 
international response to these cases was characterised by a lack of political awareness of, and 
commitment to these cases, insufficient resources, conflicting legislation and practice, variable 
intelligence and information sharing, and agencies in different countries often contacting one another 
on ad hoc basis rather than using formal channels - in the belief that the former was much more 
efficient and effective.  
11.1.2  The inadequacy of the current response was starkly illustrated by a case, involving a large 
number of quite young children, who were being made to feature in CAIs, in what was believed to be 
a European country. These images were known to law enforcement agencies, in a number of different 
countries, over a number of years. Indeed, these agencies were able to witness the escalation in the 
children’s sexual abuse over this time. However, as the children’s country of origin was not known, no 
agency - in any country - would take responsibility for investigating the case. Finally, one agency did 
initiate an investigation, and the children and offender were eventually detected.56  
11.1.3  Some important additional effort has been directed towards tackling these cases through the 
setting up of the Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT, 2005). While the VGT is seeking to increase the 
number of law enforcement agencies around the world that are members, currently this is small, being 
restricted to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, along with 
Interpol. Moreover, this initiative is limited to Internet CSA offences.57
Recommendation 
11.1.4  The governments of the world should, between them, and using existing structures, such as the 
United Nations or Interpol, set up a central, well-resourced and authoritative international police (or 
law enforcement) child protection agency to take the lead on developing a robust and effective 
international response to international and Internet CSA. The specific tasks of this agency should 
include: 
• Leading and/or co-ordinating proactive responses towards international CSA 
                                                
56
 It should be stressed, that this was only one of a number of cases that could have been used to exemplify the 
inadequacy of the international response to international and Internet CSA. This particular case has been cited as 
it was thought to reflect this problem especially well. 
57
 That said, the VGT has had some notable success. For example, its website - set up, in January 2005, to 
facilitate the detection of alleged Internet CSA offences - has received more than 300 reports which have 
subsequently been referred to the UK National Crime Squad (Leapman, 2006). Approximately, one-half of all of 
these reports related to the online grooming of children for sexual abuse, and some of these have resulted in the 
identification and conviction of offenders. 
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• Providing a much enhanced liaison role for police services investigating international CSA cases - 
backed up by greater authority from member states  
• Developing, maintaining and promoting an intelligence and information database on the 
international movement of victims, child sex offenders and CAIs 
• Developing, maintaining, promoting and analysing a worldwide database of CAIs. This would 
enable the agency to contribute towards the identification of victims and offenders, alert law 
enforcement agencies to the successful identification of victims and the emergence of new images, 
and produce a generally more co-ordinated response to these cases 
• Alerting law enforcement, around the world, to significant developments in offender behaviour  
• Acting as a centre of excellence and advising law enforcement agencies on specific investigations, 
including inter-police service communication and more general joint working 
• Collating and disseminating best practice, and knowledge, from around the world, on the law 
enforcement response to these cases 
• Developing and promoting work around the standardisation of legislation and (law enforcement) 
practice throughout the world 
11.1.5  Consideration needs to be given as to whether this agency is within, adjoined to, or separate 
from, Interpol. A degree of separation may be beneficial in order that the proposed agency has the 
clear identity, high profile and authority that it needs, users have confidence in it, and it is not 
compromised by the competing demands which exist within the multi-role policing organisation that is 
Interpol. Account would also have to be taken of the fact that some police/law enforcement agencies 
in some countries may not be at a stage when they are ready to join such an international body. 
11.2  National Police/Law Enforcement Child Protection Agency 
         (NPCPA) 
Finding 
11.2.1  Up until the time the fieldwork for this research was completed, in March 2004, there was, in 
the UK, no single policing organisation taking the lead on international (or national) CSA. Instead, this 
responsibility was variously shared among NCIS, NCS, NHTCU and - more significantly - the UK’s 
52 local police services. In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service Paedophile Unit also sometimes 
acted, on an informal basis, as a specialist national resource in regards to these cases (for both UK and 
foreign police services). As a result, the police response to international (and national) CSA tended to 
be fragmented and less effective than it could, and should, have been. In particular, there was little or 
no effort to collate, develop and disseminate - at least on a systematic basis - the knowledge, skills, 
expertise, intelligence, information and contacts which numerous, but separate, police officers and 
services acquired during investigations. (Responding, in part, to this fragmentation of law enforcement 
effort, more generally, the Government has now amalgamated NCIS, NCS and NHTCU within the 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency - SOCA.)  
11.2.2  It is, in this respect, then, that the recently launched Child Exploitation and Online Protection  
Centre (or ‘CEOP’ for short) - designed to provide a national, multi-agency response to Internet CSA, 
primarily - is very welcome (Home Office, 2005a; The Observer, 2005). However, these authors 
believe CEOP should be used as the basis for the development of a police/law enforcement agency 
with a much broader and ambitious child protection remit. 
  
Recommendation 
  
11.2.3  CEOP should have a national lead not only for international and national Internet CSA but all
international and national offline CSA, along with supporting local police services in their work in 
these areas. The argument for an agency with this wider remit is even stronger when one considers the 
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overlap between international and Internet CSA. This broader agency would, then, assume what had 
been the child protection responsibilities of NCIS, NCS and the NHTCU. The specific remit of the 
revised CEOP (or NPCPA - National Police Child Protection Agency) would be to: 
• Take a lead role in the (proactive) prevention (including deterrence and disruption), detection and 
investigation of international and national CSA. This would include UK inter-police service 
multiple offender cases which have, at times, been the subject of tension within, and between, 
police services over the issue of responsibility 
• Collate, develop and disseminate, intelligence and information on international and national CSA 
offenders - and in doing so reduce the risk of related pieces of intelligence or information, from 
different police services or organisations, not being brought together 
• Collate knowledge and expertise on international and national CSA, and its investigation, and 
following on from this, act as a centre of excellence, providing advice and support to local police 
services in the UK which are dealing with these cases 
• Take a lead on, or be involved with, training police throughout the UK on international and 
national CSA 
• Develop genuinely effective and reliable links with other national and international policing 
organisations in order to further facilitate UK-linked international CSA investigations, as and when 
these arise 
• Act as a single point of reference for foreign and international policing organisations - including 
the proposed International Police/Law Enforcement Child Protection Agency  (see 11.1) that are 
investigating cases which have a link to the UK 
• Collate, develop and disseminate national and international expertise in the examination of 
computers and the Internet, other storage media and other new technology. This would include, for 
example, data retrieval and code-breaking 
• Maintain and develop ChildBase - the UK national database of CAIs - and from this take a national 
lead on the identification of CAI-related victims, offenders and offences 
• Generally encourage UK police services to direct greater thought and effort towards tackling 
international and national CSA 
11.2.4  Whilst known international and Internet CSA cases can be challenging to investigate, they are 
generally quite rare. This means that the police may find it difficult to build up the level of knowledge 
and skills that are necessary for the effective investigation of these cases. The proposed agency would 
enable the police, in this one location at least, to acquire this level of knowledge and skills. It would 
also enable economies of scale to be achieved, particularly in respect of more resource-intensive 
Internet-related investigations.   
11.2.5  There are two particularly important conditions under which a revised CEOP (or NPCPA) 
should operate - irrespective of its precise final remit. Firstly, it is essential that such an agency does 
not become, nor is seen as, elitist, or disconnected from the rest of police child protection work in the 
UK - the vast majority of which is, and will always be, undertaken by police at a local level (see 13.2.9 
- 13.2.10). Towards this goal, the CEOP/NPCPA should ensure that it has an effective system for 
informing ‘feeder’ agencies of the progress and outcome of reports it receives - 12.1.6 - 12.1.7). 
Secondly, this agency should actively promote itself and the work it undertakes. This would serve a 
number of functions: increase its deterrent effect upon offenders, ensure that UK and foreign police 
services were more aware, and made greater use, of the agency, and help guarantee that it is properly 
resourced.  
11.2.6  In addition, consideration needs to be given as to whether this agency should be separate from 
any other national policing body. For their part, these researchers believe this should, perhaps, be the 
case, in order that the agency has the clear, distinct and authoritative identity it requires, and avoids the 
tension that can sometimes exist between child protection and other areas of policing.  
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11.2.7  As stated above, it is recommended that the CEOP/NPCPA should have a lead responsibility 
not only for international CSA but also national CSA. As this research found, many of the cases within 
each of the three categories of Internet CSA i.e. grooming, IIIC and CAIs, existed on a national basis. 
These cases come under the remit of the CEOP automatically, owing to their Internet component. 
However, these authors suggest that non-Internet-based, inter-force, child sex abuser networks should 
also come under the remit of this agency. Although these cases were outside the specific scope of this 
research, it has been established previously, not only that these cases exist, but also that the police 
response to them has not always been sufficient (Gallagher, 1998a). The CEOP/NPCPA would seem 
to be a very appropriate location for the required national response to these cases.  
11.2.8  While this research and report have generally focused upon the UK, it has to be recognised that 
the police response to international and Internet CSA will not be fully effective unless, and until, all 
countries have a national police/law enforcement child protection agency. 
11.2.9  It is also recommended that the CEOP promotes the work it does, among the public, in order to 
maximise its deterrent effect - one which this research has found, in relation to law enforcement in 
general, to be inadequate.  
11.2.10  Given that much of the impetus of the proposed NPCPA is to overcome the challenges posed 
by both local and national borders, it clearly makes no sense for the remit of this organisation to be 
restricted to England and Wales. Rather, the NPCPA should have a UK-wide remit.   
11.3  Prioritising child protection 
             
                               
Finding 
11.3.1  Many police officers expressed the view (whether in terms of ‘performance indicators’, 
‘policing plans’, ‘targets’ or ‘priorities’), that the Government, and more specifically the Home Office, 
did not attach sufficient priority to child protection work, and that, as a direct result of this, local 
police services did not attach sufficient priority to this work. (This finding echoes that of the Victoria 
Climbie inquiry report (Laming, 2003.) Officers stated that this led to inadequate resources being 
invested in child protection by both central government and local police services, and an general 
undermining of this work. Police interviewees regularly commented that the offences that were 
prioritised by Government and the Home Office, and consequently the police, were those which 
generated greatest public concern; namely, burglary, car theft and street robbery. 
Recommendation 
11.3.2  The Government, and more specifically the Home Office, must attach more importance to 
police child protection work and - moreover - convey this message to the police. One of the ways in 
which it might do this is by introducing ‘national performance indicators for child protection and the 
investigation of child abuse’ - consideration of which has been recommended by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 2005).58
                                                
58
 It is noted that the Government has stated that it is: ‘working in partnership with the Association of Chief 
Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities to consider [authors’ italics] the development of 
meaningful child protection performance indicators for the police service’ (Department for Education and Skills, 
2006). 
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11.4  Resources 
Finding 
11.4.1  One of the most striking and recurring findings in this research concerned the police’s lack of 
resources for responding to international and Internet CSA. While this was most conspicuous in 
respect of the generally far more numerous Internet CSA cases (especially those involving CAIs) and 
reactive investigations, it also applied to international CSA cases and was evident in the general dearth 
of proactive investigations into international and Internet CSA. In some investigations, this lack of 
resources had clear operational effects. These were as follows: 
Identifying individuals
• The failure to identify all the (potential) victims in multiple victim cases. In some instances, a 
deliberate decision was taken not to try and identify all the victims in such cases. Included within 
this, was the non-identification of victims featuring in CAIs59
• The failure to identify all the (potential) suspects in multiple offender cases. In some instances, a 
deliberate decision was taken not to try and identify all the offenders in a case60
Extent of investigations 
• Decisions not to investigate - at all - certain Internet CSA cases - invariably those involving the 
downloading, but in some instances also the distribution, of CAIs61
• Decisions to examine only some of the media that had been seized during an investigation, or to 
examine given media only partly62
• Decisions to examine only some of the images or data that had been seized during an investigation, 
thereby running the risk, among others, of some victims being not being detected or identified63
Specific aspects of investigations 
• Impaired assessments as to whether a case, or elements of it, should be investigated, and unreliable 
assessments as to the extent of cases. Following on from this, questions were raised - albeit only 
very occasionally - concerning the overall quality of investigations and more specifically the 
motivation of officers 
• The police having to use inadequate hardware or software. This, in turn, led some police services to 
rely, in part at least, upon computers seized from offenders or borrowed from other organisations, 
and free or pirated software 
• CAIs not being sent to ChildBase - the police national database of CAIs. This reduced the ability, 
on the part of the police in general, to identify victims and co-ordinate investigations carried out 
within different police services 
Examination of new technology 
11.4.2  The lack of resources was, though, most evident in terms of the delay in examining computers 
and other new technology. During the course of the research, the authors had been in contact with the 
majority of police services in the UK. All of these police services were experiencing substantial delays 
in carrying out these examinations. The standard, minimum delay was approximately three months, 
although some services were encountering delays of 3-6 months and others longer still. (It should be 
stressed, that where the police had a specific concern, or information, that a child might currently be 
being, abused, then they did prioritise the case, and could usually arrange for examinations to be 
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 This failure to try and identify all the victims and/or offenders in CSA cases has been noted previously, in 
research by Gallagher (1998a) on organised CSA. 
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 See no. 59. 
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 Each of these situations carried with it the risk not only that CSA victims (and offenders) would not be 
identified but also, possibly, that children might continue to be abused.
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 See no. 61. 
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 See no. 61. 
International and Internet CSA 
70 
initiated within 24 hours or soon after.) These delays had a number of deleterious effects. These were 
as follows: 
• The risk (unknown to the police) that further abuse of children would take place 
• Offenders being given more time in which to hide or destroy any (other) evidence they possessed, 
or warn any co-offenders of the initial investigation, thereby thwarting any more extensive an 
investigation 
• Witnesses withdrawing evidence in the (mistaken) belief that the police’s delay in examining 
equipment meant they ‘did not care’ about the allegation 
• Police having to pay private companies and individuals to carry out computer examinations, 
invariably at considerable cost. In addition, this arrangement raised potential issues surrounding the 
welfare of the examiners in question and the security of material within these settings (see 12.6.11 -
12.6.17)  
• A heightened risk that defence lawyers arguing that an abuse of process had taken place  
Proactive work 
11.4.3  Although there were some proactive responses to Internet CSA - in the form of disruption, 
deterrence and detection - these tended to be ad hoc and limited in number. It was especially notable 
that there had been very little effort directed towards detection - either of offences, offenders or 
victims. Indeed, police officers reported that they were sometimes actively discouraged, and in some 
instances given explicit instructions, by their seniors, not to engage in proactive Internet CSA 
investigations. (Part of the reason for this, according to interviewees, was that any case detected 
would, in all likelihood, fall outside their police service area, and would therefore represent a ‘waste of 
resources’. Moreover, there was also a perception that other police services would not welcome 
having such cases brought to their attention.) Needless to say, it is a wholly unacceptable situation for 
the police to being discouraged or prevented from identifying suspects or, worse still, victims of CSA. 
11.4.4  Given that the police were, because of insufficient resources, already struggling to cope with 
the number of cases being reported to them - especially those involving Internet CAIs - this lack of 
investment in proactive initiatives was not surprising. This situation is, in relation to Internet CSA, 
especially regrettable, though, given that these cases do lend themselves to proactive initiatives. (This 
is on account of the modus operandi of the offenders i.e. their use of the Internet, and lower levels of 
security they employ compared to CSA offenders in general.) The result of this inactivity - as 
explained in 12.3.8 - 12.3.10 - was that offenders appeared to have little fear of detection and were 
quite emboldened in their activities. 
11.4.5  There are several other points that should be stressed: 
• It was not that the police, in general, did not want to improve their response to Internet CSA - but 
that they did not have the resources to do this 
• The lack of resources did not completely undermine Internet CSA investigations. On the contrary, 
very many such investigations were carried out and often extremely successfully. However, the fact 
remains that the above problems were significant issues both in their degree and extent   
• Work in this area - and in particular the examination of technology, monitoring of the Internet, and 
the detection of offences, offenders and victims - is highly resource-intensive 
• While the police struggled to cope with the cases that were being reported, these probably 
represented only a small proportion of all cases that existed - with most cases never being detected  
• The police were confident that they could detect a significant number of additional cases if they 
embarked upon greater proactive work 
• The demands upon the police, while already quite acute, were increasingly rapidly. Not only was 
there ever-greater access to, and use of, computers and the Internet, but the police were having to 
contend with an increasing number of cases involving mobile phones and a range of other new 
technologies, such as digital cameras. What is more, offenders were, over time, coming to possess 
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more computers, with greater capacity and additional storage devices - all of which meant that even 
greater time was required to examine media  
• While resources were a more acute problem in relation to Internet CSA, they were also manifest in 
relation to international CSA - and indeed child protection cases in general 
11.4.6  The Government has provided the police with new resources to enable them to improve their 
response to Internet CSA. In particular, they made available £25 million for the setting up of the 
NHTCU and high tech crime units/computer examination units in all 52 police services in the UK 
(Department of Health, 2001) and have recently launched the Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
(CEOP) Centre (Home Office, 2005a; The Observer, 2005). While these developments are extremely 
important and welcome, this research has clearly shown, that they are not sufficient.  
Recommendation 
11.4.7  The Government needs to provide considerably more new resources, especially to local police 
services, to bring about the much needed improvement in the investigation of Internet CSA, especially 
in respect of ensuring that more victims and offenders are identified, investigations are as extensive as 
they should be, specific aspects of investigations are carried out to a sufficient standard, delays in the 
examination of computers and other media are reduced, and more proactive work is carried out. 
  
11.4.8  In regards to CEOP, it should take a national lead on proactive responses to Internet CSA and 
undertake this work on a substantial scale. Indeed, there is a very considerable amount of work that 
CEOP could, and ideally should, undertake in relation to Internet CSA (see 11.2). However, and as the 
experience of local police services has shown, resources are, in this area of work, a very acute issue. In 
light of this, CEOP should be subject to regular scrutiny by an independent body - such as HMIC or 
the Audit Commission - a major brief of which would be to determine whether CEOP is sufficiently 
resourced. 
11.5  CAI victim identification 
Finding 
11.5.1  The research found that, in general, the police, at international, national and local levels  
(including the UK), were able to invest only a very limited amount of effort in the identification and 
tracing of children featuring in CAIs. One international policing organisation reported that, at 1st
December 2003, 234 children, who had featured in CAIs, had been identified worldwide - an average 
of only 1.2 children for each of the 192 countries in the world (World Atlas, 2005). However, it would 
appear that the numbers of children who have featured in CAIs on the Internet must run into many 
thousands.64
11.5.2  It should be stressed, though, that this situation, does not, in general, reflect an unwillingness 
on the part of the police towards the identification of victims but rather a lack of resources, on their 
part, with which to do this work. Indeed, there was a general consensus among police interviewees 
that more victims should, and could, be identified - notwithstanding the formidable practical problems 
that can arise in respect of this work. 
Recommendation 
11.5.3  There needs to be a much more concerted and systematic effort, led by the police, to identify 
and trace children who feature in CAIs. Given the (international) nature of the Internet, it is vital that 
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this is co-ordinated at an international level, by the proposed international police/law enforcement 
child protection agency, liaising with national police child protection agencies. (In the case of the UK 
this should be CEOP/NPCPA.)  
11.5.4  Through such co-ordination, the police could, in addition, reduce the following:  multiple 
police services investigating the same case (unbeknown to one another), police services investigating 
solved cases and situations where no police service is investigating a reported case.  Ideally, of course, 
all countries should have a national police child protection agency, in order that the same co-ordinated 
and concerted efforts are made to identify victims, irrespective of where they live. 
11.5.5  Until such time that these new organisations are set up, existing international (such as Interpol 
and Europol), national (for example, CEOP) and local police services - working together and 
supporting one another as much as they can - should seek to bring about a substantial increase in the 
amount of effort invested in victim identification.
11.5.6  Having said this, it is noted that the G8 group of nations is developing a CAI database. This 
database will enable the CAI databases of each of these nations to ‘talk with one another’. By 
interrogating and analysing one another’s databases, police services in these countries will be assisted 
in determining whether any detected image is (already) known or whether it is new. This should, in 
turn, help in distinguishing and identifying children who are currently being sexually abused. Needless 
to say, this initiative is to be welcomed and commended. However, and notwithstanding issues of 
security, it should be extended to as many other countries as is feasible and as quickly as possible. 
Ultimately, though, there needs, again, to be a single international police/law enforcement organisation 
carrying out such collating, analysis and feedback work. 
11.6  Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA 
Finding 
11.6.1  The police were well aware of, and able - in principle at least - to respond to, cases comprising 
Internet grooming or CAIs. They appeared much less prepared for dealing with cases involving IIIC to 
commit CSA. (Although this issue was not explored so thoroughly among policy makers i.e. the Home 
Office, and other agencies, such as ISPs and CPS, it is very likely to be equally applicable to them.65)  
11.6.2  This issue was manifest most clearly in the fact that the police, appeared, sometimes, not 
investigate cases as fully, or did not charge suspects, in relation to this behaviour, as often, as they 
should have done.  
11.6.3  Part of the reason for this may have been that the police underestimated both the degree of 
intent on the part of the offenders, and the seriousness of the acts which they might carry out. 
11.6.4  These assessments of, and the general police response to, IIIC cases, seemed to be the product 
of a series of other factors. Some of these were specific to IIIC cases but others were pertinent to 
Internet CSA cases more broadly. The former consisted of the following:   
• A lack of awareness as to the existence of these cases 
• No, or limited, experience of these cases 
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 A small but important indication of this is provided by a Home Office’s press release, concerning the then 
planned CEOP, which referred to the first two of these categories but not IIIC (Home Office, 2005). 
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• Being overly influenced by thoughts that offenders might be engaged in mock attempts to incite or 
conspire66  
• An uncertainty over what, if any, laws had been broken 
11.6.5  The factors which applied to Internet CSA cases in general, were as follows: 
• Police services were inundated with Internet CSA cases, especially those concerning CAIs (see 
10.3) 
• Closely allied to the above point, the police did not have enough resources to cope with the Internet 
CSA cases that were being reported to them 
• Although it may not have been a major determinant, the fact that some Internet CSA cases, 
including IIIC, were national or international, meant they were more difficult to assess and 
investigate    
11.6.6  Having made the above points, it should be noted that while the police response to some of 
these cases may not have been wholly appropriate, in many, it was. It is perhaps more accurate to 
think of the police reaction to these cases, as having covered a broad spectrum. This was, in part, a 
reflection of the fact that IIIC cases existed along a continuum - as shown in 9.4.24 (Figure 8). 
Broadly speaking, it appeared that as cases moved further along the continuum (from left to right), so 
the police response to the case became more robust.67 This may, in turn, have been due to increasing 
clarity over offender behaviour, along with offence seriousness and evidence. This does not alter the 
conclusion, though, that in some IIIC cases - both more and less ‘serious’ ones - police practice did not 
always appear sufficient. 
Recommendation 
11.6.7  The police, in conjunction with the Home Office, should review the current law enforcement 
response to IIIC cases. In particular, they should ensure that the investigation of cases, and the 
charging of offenders, is appropriate, and that they do not underestimate the degree of intent on the 
part of offenders or the seriousness of the acts that they could carry out. They need, moreover, to 
address the issues in 11.6.1 - 11.6.4. 
11.6.8  The Home Office should ensure that all other relevant agencies, including ISPs and CPS, are 
sufficiently aware of IIIC cases, and are able and willing to respond to them in a robust manner.  
11.6.9  Some offenders will be involved in what may be mock attempts to incite, or conspire with, 
other offenders to commit CSA. These offenders should also be subject to a robust response on the 
part of policy and practice.   
11.6.10  CEOP should take a national lead on the proactive response to IIIC cases, including their 
deterrence, detection and investigation. However, it must also be recognised that local police services 
can, and should, continue to make their vital contribution to the organisational response to these cases 
(see 13.2.9 - 13.2.10). 
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 This factor may have been especially important, as in a situation of a high workload and an insufficiency of 
resources (see 11.6.5), the police had to prioritise cases reported to them. Not unreasonably, (possibly) mock 
CSA cases (along with CSA communications) would have a lower priority than CSA cases where the risk was 
more definite.   
67
 In terms of perception, the police viewed the behaviours at the extreme right-hand side of the continuum - 
essentially the perpetration of CSA - as clearly illegal. By contrast, there appeared to be some uncertainty as to 
whether behaviours in the middle part of the continuum - attempted incitement and conspiracy - were illegal. At 
the other end of the continuum, the police rarely saw CSA communications as illegal. Following on, in part, 
from the above, there was also a continuum in terms of police action. Whereas the large majority of CSA 
allegations were pursued by police, attempted incitement and conspiracy cases were followed up only 
sometimes, and CSA communication cases very rarely.
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11.6.11  While much of the policy and practice focus within these cases will be upon CSA, the 
existence and significance of child physical abuse should not be overlooked. 
11.6.12  The Home Office should commission research to establish in a more reliable manner the 
extent and nature of (known), the special challenges to which they give rise, and whether any reforms 
are needed in terms of policy and practice, including legislation. 
11.7  CSA communications  
Finding 
11.7.1  Although not as explicit as IIIC cases, some instances of CSA communication, studied within 
this research, may, legally, have constituted incitement. In addition, most, if not all, of the points made 
in 11.6.1 - 11.6.6, in relation to IIIC cases, could be applied to CSA communications. Despite this, 
there remained important differences between CSA communication and IIIC cases, both in their 
nature, and the policy and practice issues to which they gave rise - as described below. It is for this 
reason that CSA communication cases are dealt with separately in this chapter of the report. 
11.7.2  In terms of their nature, and as explained in 9.1.4 - 9.1.13, CSA communications were quite 
diverse, and varied according to a number of criteria. Two of these criteria - the content of the 
communication68 and the form it took69 - are especially germane to the current discussion. Individuals 
could also be engaged in a range of quite specific acts.70 Thus, not all CSA communication cases could 
necessarily be thought to constitute incitement. In some of these cases, an individual’s behaviour 
might be better described either as glorifying71, or alternatively promoting or advocating, CSA72 - 
albeit in a general sense, as opposed to the more specific one implied by the term incitement.    
11.7.3  In terms of practice (and policy), CSA communication cases were distinct from IIIC ones in 
that they were especially likely to result in suspects not being fully investigated and/or charged. 
Furthermore, and probably explaining, in part, this police response, there seemed to be greater 
ambiguity surrounding the legal status of CSA communications-related behaviour. 
11.7.4  It is the authors understanding that the Home Office, in conjunction, with agencies, including 
the police, have previously examined the adequacy of the policy and practice response to CSA 
communications. The authors are unaware of the precise deliberations that have taken place in the 
past, but they would argue that the current response is not adequate. They would also contend, that the 
problem of those with a sexual interest in children, communicating with one another, has been, and is -
like the Internet upon which it is based - developing markedly, both in its extent and nature. 
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 In terms of content, CSA communications ranged from general ‘discussions’, relating to sexual interest in 
children, through exchanges that glorified or promoted CSA, and onto fairly clear attempts to incite, or conspire 
with, another person, to commit CSA. 
69
 These included the Internet, telephone and face-to-face meetings. They could easily have included the post but 
this form of communication was not encountered in this research. 
70
 Drawing upon legislation relating to CAIs, individuals could, for example, possess these, possess them with a 
view towards their distribution or distribute them - whether through the Internet or the post, or by hand. 
71
 In one case, for example, two men were having an Internet-based discussion concerning a notorious incident, 
in the UK, in which children had been sexually abused and murdered. In addition to commending the murderer, 
the two men discussed how they would masturbate whilst thinking about what had happened to the children.    
72
 This could, perhaps, be thought to be equivalent of the activities of ‘paedophile’ pressure groups - such as the 
Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE), that was active in the 1970s (Tate, 1990).   
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Recommendation 
11.7.5  Most of the recommendations put forward in respect of IIIC cases, can be made in regards to 
CSA communication cases. In summary, these are as follows: 
• The police, in conjunction with the Home Office, should review the current law enforcement 
response to cases involving CSA communications 
• The Home Office should ensure that all other relevant agencies are sufficiently aware of these 
cases, and are able and willing to respond to them in a robust manner  
• CEOP should take a national lead on the proactive response to CSA communications 
• The Home Office should commission research on these cases 
11.7.6  There are, though, a number of other, more specific issues which the Home Office needs to 
address. In particular, it needs to determine a) the extent to which the law, as it currently exists, can be 
applied to CSA communications and b) how clear this is, especially to police and CPS. Moreover, it 
must assess which additional aspects of CSA communication-related behaviour, if any, should be 
criminalised. 
11.7.7  For their part, these authors believe that the Home Office should ensure that the widest 
possible array of CSA communication-related behaviour is prohibited. This should certainly include 
the distribution, or other sharing, of such communications, whether by the Internet, telephone or in 
person, and the full range of communications in terms of content. Consideration should also be given 
to prohibiting the possession and creation of such communications in any written (including 
electronic) form.  
11.7.8  In considering the prohibition of these communications, the Government should investigate 
whether it is possible to achieve some, or all, of this legislative objective, by extending the new sexual  
offence prevention order (SOPO) or risk of sexual harm order (RSHO) (s104 and s123 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, respectively) to include communications between adults, which has a sexual 
content and relates to children. Similarly, it should examine whether these ends might be attained if 
the police, and the CPS, used, or were more ready to use, the Obscene Publications Acts 1959 and 
1964 - either in its current or an extended form.  
11.7.9  Policy makers should ensure that all legislation in this area applies equally to CSA 
communications which are moved internationally. At the same time, rigorous attempts should be made 
to make all such law as clear as possible in order to avoid any divergence in practice between the 
police and HMRC. 
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Chapter 12 
Further policy and practice 
recommendations 
12.1  International policy and practice 
Interpol  
Finding 
12.1.1  In some respects, Interpol is the ideal location for the proposed International Police/Law 
Enforcement Child Protection Agency  (11.1.1 - 11.5.5) and it does fulfil some of this role already. 
Interpol was, though, the subject of criticism from some respondents taking part in this research. 
Police officers said that after sending reports to Interpol, they often did not receive feedback on their 
progress or outcome, or did so only very belatedly. This led some (UK) police officers to bypass 
Interpol and go directly to the authorities in the country concerned - which, one presumes, would only 
undermine the efficacy of Interpol still further. 
12.1.2  Such criticism appeared, though, to be based, in part at least, upon a misunderstanding of the 
remit - and also the resources and authority - under which Interpol operates. This research found that 
much of Interpol’s role was a liaison one, receiving reports from police officers around the world and 
forwarding these on to police services elsewhere in the world. Where delays did take place, these 
appeared to be the responsibility of the police service to whom reports had been passed, and not 
Interpol. Interpol did undertake some office-based investigative or intelligence-gathering work but this 
was relatively limited. Overall, it appeared to be carrying out a high standard of work in the face of 
very finite human and material resources, authority and independence. 
Recommendation 
12.1.3  If Interpol is to assume responsibility for the proposed IPCPA, then its work in this area will 
have to be given much more authority, resources and priority. For its part, and in the interim, Interpol 
should: 
• Set up a more formal (and effective) system for informing police services as to the progress and 
outcomes of reports which they submit to the organisation 
• Embark upon an awareness-raising campaign so police services better understand its remit (and the 
constitutional and resources limitations under which it operates) 
• Arrange for an in-depth, independent research project to be carried out to ascertain, in a definitive 
and comprehensive way, what work Interpol does, could, and should, carry out in relation to child 
protection. This work would include identifying Interpol’s achievements, the challenges it faces 
and areas for improvement 
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Information and intelligence sharing  
Finding 
12.1.4  Interviewees felt that there was insufficient sharing of information and intelligence between 
police services in different countries, and that this was undermining efforts both to monitor offenders 
and prevent CSA. They said that this was particularly important in terms of countries being informed 
when convicted child sex offenders were coming into their country. This capability and practice was 
reported to be generally good on the part of UK authorities although but they did sometimes encounter 
practical issues in working with other countries. In particular, not many other countries had sex 
offender registers or lists, and there were some countries - those that took a very harsh attitude to child 
sex offenders - where to pass on information could be problematic as it might endanger the individuals 
concerned.   
Recommendation 
12.1.5  Governments, along with law enforcement agencies, should develop much more effective 
systems for sharing information and intelligence between law enforcement agencies, including that 
which relates to the international movement and monitoring of child sex offenders. The setting up of 
international (see 11.1) and national (see 11.2) police child protection agencies would seem key to 
such developments. 
Feedback 
Finding 
12.1.6  As indicated above, there were problems in communication between law enforcement 
agencies. These were not restricted to communications between local police services and Interpol. 
Interviewees from local police services, and HMRC, made similar complaints against national law 
enforcement agencies, and indeed against one another - although less commonly.73 In the absence of 
responses to reports they had made, law enforcement officers were left not knowing whether they [the 
reports] had been acted on and/or were left feeling that they [the reports] had not been treated with the 
seriousness they merited. This affected their motivation, whereby some officers subsequently either 
avoided making reports or circumvented the organisation in question. These actions ran the risk of 
undermining the effectiveness of the response to international and Internet CSA in regards to both 
specific cases and cases in general.  
Recommendation 
12.1.7  All police organisations (international, national and local), and HMRC, should ensure that 
sufficient priority is attached to providing feedback on the receipt, progress and outcome of reports 
they receive from fellow law enforcement agencies. To this end, all law enforcement organisations 
should ensure they have formal systems in place whereby such feedback is a matter of routine.  
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 It should be pointed out that this discussion refers to feedback between agencies and not debriefing within
agencies. This latter subject is dealt with in 12.5.15 - 12.5.16. 
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12.2  National (UK) policy and practice
Victims of international child sex abusers 
Finding 
12.2.1  Some, and perhaps a large majority, of the CSA by international child sex abusers from the 
UK, is carried out in developing countries. These countries are generally not very well able to meet the 
needs of these victims. 
Recommendation 
12.2.2  The UK government should instigate a restitution scheme, whereby if its citizens are found to 
have sexually abused children in other countries, restitution is made to those children and/or the 
agencies which are seeking to help them.  
Extra-territorial jurisdiction  
Finding 
12.2.3  While commending the existence of extra-territorial jurisdiction, as contained in section 72 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (re-enacting Part 2 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997), it would appear that 
there have been few prosecutions in this country for child sex offences which have been committed 
abroad.  
Recommendation 
12.2.4  Ideally, offenders should be prevented from travelling internationally (12.2.6 - 12.2.7) but 
failing this - and if they do travel abroad, and subsequently commit CSA offences - then it is 
preferable that they are prosecuted in the country in question. This underlines the need for all countries 
to be supported and encouraged (see 13.2.1 - 13.2.8) in developing effective child protection 
(including prevention) and criminal justice systems. 
12.2.5  Having said this, it also has to be recognised that there may be significant challenges in 
bringing suspects to trial in the country in which they have committed their offences. Thus, the 
Government and agencies in the UK should, where necessary, be fully committed to pursuing cases of 
CSA committed by UK citizens abroad, through the criminal justice system in this country. 
Prohibiting foreign travel 
            
Finding 
12.2.6  This research - backed up both by other studies and practice - suggest that many child sex  
offenders will always constitute a risk to children. Were these offenders to travel abroad, then the risk 
they present might be even greater, given that they may not be known and could not be monitored by 
the appropriate authorities. Moreover, in many countries (especially developing ones), there is, 
compared to the UK, less awareness of, and response to, CSA, and consequently children are generally 
more vulnerable. 
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Recommendation 
12.2.7  While the introduction of the foreign travel order (under the Sexual Offences Act 2003) is 
welcome, the Government should consider whether the remit of these should be extended to give 
courts the power to permanently ban convicted, high risk offenders from all foreign travel - 
irrespective of destination, duration or purpose, and including emigration. Moreover, they should be 
made surrender their passports to facilitate enforcement.  By the same token, convicted high-risk child 
sex offenders should be permanently prohibited from entering the UK. 
Child sex offenders travelling to the UK 
Finding 
12.2.8  In the course of the research a small number of officers stated that their police services had 
investigated cases where men who were relatively recent immigrants, or would-be immigrants, to the 
UK, were alleged to have sexually abused (local) children (often girls) in this country. Some of these 
cases were said to involve lone suspects acting opportunistically, while others were more organised, 
involving, for example, groups of suspects forcing and controlling girls involved in prostitution.   
12.2.9  This research was not able to examine this issue in any substantial manner. The only figures it 
has on this subject are from the search of recorded crimes in two police services (see 6.3.1, Table 8 
and footnotes 25 and 26).  
  
12.2.10  So, while this research was not able to comment upon the scale of the sexual abuse of 
children by offenders who have recently arrived in the UK - whether for immigration, asylum or any 
other purpose - in any very reliable manner, it did appear that there was a problem  - albeit a small one 
- in this respect. Similar concerns have been raised in the Bichard inquiry (Bichard, 2005).  
12.2.11  It is, in the light of this, that the Notification Order, introduced through the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003, is to be welcomed. This ‘new civil preventative order’ means that ‘individuals [whether UK 
citizens or foreign nationals] who have been convicted, cautioned etc. abroad for sexual offences’ can, 
on entering the UK, be made subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences 
Act (Home Office, 2004b). 
Recommendation 
12.2.12  Any case of CSA, including those perpetrated by persons who have come into the UK, must 
be a cause of concern. The Government, and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), 
should, then, ensure they establish a thorough understanding of this phenomenon. This is especially 
pertinent as, to date, the official focus has been, almost exclusively, upon offenders - typically child 
sex tourists - who go out of the UK to sexually abuse children.  
12.2.13  Moreover, Government and the IND should fully explore what policy and practice measures  
- around, for example, vetting, monitoring, criminal record checking and the granting of visas - could 
be implemented in response to this problem. Having said that, it has to be recognised that the vast 
majority of offenders are not likely to have criminal convictions (for CSA), and detecting those at risk 
of abusing will, therefore, be extremely difficult.
12.2.14  It should be stressed that, in light of quite widespread hostility, in the UK, towards 
immigrants/asylum seekers, and members of ethnic minority groups more generally, this issue needs 
to be handled with considerable sensitivity. 
12.2.15  The Government, possibly through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, IND or Home 
Office, should commission research to ascertain, on a more systematic and reliable basis, the extent 
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and nature of the problem of the sexual abuse of children in the UK by foreign nationals. This would 
enable a much more informed response to be taken to the problem.  
Government-initiated inquiry  
Finding 
12.2.16  As shown elsewhere in this report, the Internet (and other new technology) has been 
instrumental in a large number and wide range of CSA cases. These include: 
• Internet-initiated grooming, Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA, and 
Internet-based CAIs. It is probably only a matter of time until the grooming of a child is initiated
over an Internet-enabled mobile phone 
• Those with a sexual interest in children meeting on the Internet to exchange communications in 
which they glorify or promote CSA, and/or aid and abet one another in the commission of the 
above offences, or provided more general support and encouragement to one another 
12.2.17  Although they were not central to this research, the Internet and other new technology were 
found to raise other child protection concerns. These consisted of: 
• Children receiving unsolicited CAIs or adult pornography via the Internet  
• Children taking and distributing indecent images of themselves via camera-enabled mobile phones, 
sometimes for material gain 
• Indecent photographs of children being taken via covert cameras (see 14.3) 
12.2.18  In addition, the research identified: 
• CAIs and other indicative material (for example, naturist photographs, text, drawings, 
magazines/comics and ‘erotic’ pictures of children) being brought into (and sent out of) the country  
12.2.19  Finally, new technology gave rise to issues in terms of the commission of sexual and physical 
offences against women: 
  
• Abusive images of women (AIW) appearing on the Internet, or moved internationally (see 14.4) 
• Indecent images taken of women via covert cameras 
12.2.20  Although some of these behaviours, for example, the creation and distribution of abusive 
images of children (and women), and the grooming of children for sexual abuse, are not 
unprecedented, overall, new technology, supplemented by the international movement of CAIs, 
constitutes a new, serious and increasing child protection problem.  
12.2.21  The existence of this material and these behaviours, or more precisely the way in which they 
might or should be responded to, raises fundamental legal, civil liberty and social issues or dilemmas 
involving, for example, control of the Internet, and the international movement of people and ‘goods’, 
freedom of speech, and indeed thought, the (sexual) depiction of children (and women) and the 
socialisation of males.  
12.2.22  Much of the response to international and Internet CSA has, to date, consisted of 
Government, and statutory and voluntary agencies, consulting over, and then developing and 
implementing, what might thought of as technical-type measures, such as computer examination units, 
‘hotlines’ for reporting illicit images, legislation and advice to parents/carers. There has been little or 
no official and public debate as to how society should respond, at a more fundamental level, to the 
threat which new technology poses to children (and women - see 14.4). 
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Recommendation 
12.2.23  These authors recognise that to some extent, Internet CSA represents a familiar offence 
perpetrated by a new method. At the same time, though, they would argue that the Internet (and 
increasingly other new technology), has had a profound effect upon CSA, such that it should be 
viewed as a new, distinct and significant threat to children. 
12.2.24  The Government should initiate an inquiry into international and Internet CSA (and AIW). 
The purpose of this inquiry would be to collate and examine, in the first, substantive and public way, 
knowledge of, and views on, the causes and consequences of international and Internet CSA, and the 
manner in which it should be responded to, including its prevention.  
12.2.25  The authors believe that the general public, in particular, has very little appreciation of the 
nature of the material and communications, in relation to CSA, which exist on the Internet, and which 
increasingly are involving other forms of new technology. The public should, however, be one of the 
key stakeholder groups in terms of determining the response to international and Internet CSA. Thus, 
while the proposed inquiry would seek evidence from, and be of most relevance to ‘professionals’, one 
of its aims should be to ensure the public is more aware of, and informed about, the nature of 
international and Internet CSA. Were the public to be come more aware and informed - as advocated 
here - it is likely that they would make vociferous demands for much more to be done to address the 
problem of international and Internet CSA.  
Unaccompanied children entering the UK 
Finding 
                                        
12.2.26  Interviews with agency workers, supported by other published material74, indicated that the 
number of children who entered the UK, unaccompanied, was very high.  
12.2.27  Policy makers and practitioners have become much more aware of this phenomenon and 
have, as a result, begun to implement some important initiatives. These include Operation Paladin (see 
below) and the recently announced new rules on the admission of such children into the UK 
(Community Care, 2006).   
Recommendation 
12.2.28  Given the number of unaccompanied children entering the UK, it is felt that this phenomenon 
should be viewed as a significant social issue. (Concerns that some of these children may be trafficked 
into the UK for the purposes of sexual, or other forms of, exploitation, reinforce this view.) 
12.2.29  Measures should be put in place to ensure that there is wholly adequate opportunity, where 
necessary, to assess, monitor, support and protect, unaccompanied children entering the UK. (To date, 
there appears to have been only one attempt at achieving this, through Operation Paladin Child 
(Metropolitan Police Service, 2004) which, while extremely important, needs to be done on a much 
more routine and comprehensive basis.) 
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 The Refugee Council states that approximately 6000 such children entered the UK in 2002 (The Refugee 
Council, 2003), the BBC reports that approximately 15,000 unaccompanied children have entered since 2000 
(BBC, 2004) and the Metropolitan Police Service were said to have identified, through its Operation Paladin 
Child, nearly 2000 such children, arriving at Heathrow, over a three month period in 2003 (The Independent, 
2004). 
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12.2.30  Consideration may need to be given towards tightening up travel and visa procedures in the 
countries from which children are travelling in order to disrupt those who may be sending children to 
the UK for the purposes of exploitation. 
12.2.31  It is also important, though, that agencies (particularly NGOs) do not assume that most (or 
indeed any) of these children are victims of trafficking for sexual, or other forms of, exploitation. 
Indeed, and putting aside issues of legality, it is likely that some of these children are being sent to the 
UK in the legitimate hope and expectation of a better life. That this is the case, underlines still further 
the need for macro-level change in the countries from which these children originate (see 13.2.1 - 
13.2.2). 
12.3  Police
Consolidating police child protection work 
Finding 
12.3.1  Responsibility for investigating international and Internet CSA (as with child protection cases 
in general) was divided among different departments and sections within the police. These included 
Child Protection Units, Criminal Investigation Departments, and - where they existed - Paedophile 
Units and Vice Squads. As a result, experience and skills, both general and specific, concerning the 
investigation of child protection offences, rather than being consolidated, were dispersed. This 
fragmentation meant that child protection expertise within the police was not as accessible, nor 
developed, as it could, and should, have been. In some instances, this appeared to result in a situation 
where officers investigating international and Internet CSA were not always those best equipped to do 
so. In particular, they lacked the specialist skills and knowledge for dealing with child protection 
cases. While these issues applied to the investigation of child protection in general, they were 
especially relevant to international and Internet CSA, on account of the fact that, while these cases 
could be challenging, they were also relatively rare, whereby building up experience and expertise was 
a much more protracted process.  
Recommendation 
12.3.2  The police should concentrate responsibility for investigating the largest number and widest 
range of child protection cases within Child Protection Units, or otherwise named (and constituted) 
units, and these units should be staffed by (fully) detective trained officers. In this way, the police 
could maximise the consolidation of expertise, and optimise its accessibility and development - 
thereby ensuring the most effective response to child protection cases. 
Case assessment 
Finding 
12.3.3 Though generally not very common, the police did sometimes underestimate the extent of 
individual cases of international and Internet CSA and/or the strength of the evidence surrounding 
them, and simultaneously overestimate the investigative or practical challenges they posed. Allied to 
this, there were, very occasionally, question marks over the motivation of police officers and the 
overall quality of investigations. These situations seemed especially likely in regards to multiple 
victim and multiple offender cases. (This phenomenon has been identified previously in cases of 
organised child sexual abuse - see Gallagher, 1998a.) Such erroneous case assessments appeared to be 
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due, in large part, to agency workers having too few resources and facing too many demands - as 
explained in 11.4. 
Recommendation 
12.3.4  The police must ensure that their assessment as to the extent of, evidence surrounding, and 
challenges posed by, international and Internet CSA cases, are as reliable as possible, and are not 
influenced by resource considerations. It is also important - in the face of sometimes seemingly 
unending images, victims, suspects and investigations, especially those relating to Internet CAIs - that 
the police do not become overwhelmed by, complacent towards, or ‘immune’ to, these cases, with this 
leading to adverse consequences in terms of their judgement or motivation, or practice more generally. 
This is a consideration for both front-line workers and their managers. 
Response strategy 
Finding 
12.3.5  The police utilised a number of different strategic approaches in their response to Internet 
CSA. These included prevention, deterrence, disruption, detection and investigation, each of which, to 
varying degrees, could be pursued proactively or reactively. These approaches have been subject to 
some debate concerning their prioritisation. Recently, an increasing emphasis has been placed upon 
disruption with, for example, the development and use of computer packages to prevent CAIs being 
placed on, sent over, or accessed via, the Internet. 
Recommendation 
12.3.6  Whilst recognising the need for discussion over the use of different strategies for Internet CSA 
(including that of prevention), these authors believe that ultimately there is no, and never will be, a 
‘silver bullet’ option for responding to these cases. Rather, it will always be necessary, and most 
appropriate, to respond to this challenge by developing, resourcing and utilising all the strategies that 
the police (and indeed society more generally) have at their disposal.  
12.3.7  As part of this broad range of strategies, the police should publicise more the work they do 
towards detecting offenders and offences, including the number of detection’s they make. This should 
act to deter at least some abusers and prevent some abuse. The police should also continue, and 
possibly build upon, their development of dummy CAI sites which warn would-be offenders about 
their behaviour.  
Detection 
Finding 
12.3.8  Some offenders involved in Internet CSA cases took very few precautions to protect their 
identity and in doing so appeared to leave themselves extremely vulnerable to being detected. This 
included offenders who gave their credit card details when purchasing CAIs75, those who sought to 
groom children for sexual abuse, and those who engaged in incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA - 
all of whom were communicating with people who were, in essence, complete strangers. Other 
                                                
75
 This includes the 7,272 UK suspects - among many thousands of other suspects worldwide - who gave their 
credit card details to two US-based offenders, who were selling access to CAIs websites, and who were 
investigated under Operation Avalanche (Harris, 2002). The UK suspects were reported as including more than 
50 police officers - individuals who might be thought to be particularly aware of the risk of being detected 
(Wilson and Hopkins, 2003). 
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offenders exhibited equally ‘vulnerable’ behaviour, in making no attempt to disguise themselves or 
their victims when taking CAIs and then placing these on the Internet. The preparedness of these 
offenders to take such apparent risks could be taken to indicate recklessness on their part. On the 
contrary, though, what this behaviour did point to is that many offenders perceived - and often 
justifiably so - that there was little risk of their being detected by the police or any other agency.
Recommendation 
12.3.9  Clearly, this finding points to the need of the police (and ISPs), firstly, to embark upon more 
(proactive) detection, and secondly, to enhance deterrence by making would-be offenders feel there is 
a much greater likelihood of their being detected. That the police are not doing this, is not, though, 
explained by a lack of willingness on their part, but - again - by a lack of resources. This situation 
strengthens the case (see 11.4) for their being greater, dedicated resources (ideally within a national 
agency - see 11.2 for the police to tackle Internet CSA.  
12.3.10  Following on from this, the Government should be under no illusion, that currently - and as 
shown by the behaviours outlined in 12.3.8 - many offenders believe that they run very little of being 
detected, and that this is a situation the police will be unable to address without the investment of 
significant, additional, new resources. 
Searches, seizures and examinations 
  
Finding 
12.3.11  Although not common, there were instances where the police’s investigation of Internet CSA 
offences was not as effective nor efficient as it could, and should, have been. This included the failure 
to seize all computer-related media during a search, initial searches that were not sufficiently extensive 
and consequently overlooked computer-related media, delays in carrying out searches that allowed 
suspects to dispose of, or conceal, computer-related media or evidence, and/or warn co-offenders, and 
the failure to search all computer-related media thoroughly.  
Recommendation 
12.3.12  The police must ensure that searches for evidence, in respect of computer/Internet CSA 
offences, are carried out as quickly and thoroughly as possible, all media that is possibly relevant is 
seized, and all of this media is thoroughly examined.  Key to this, is ensuring that this work is properly 
resourced. The police should also, where possible and appropriate, seek to restrict - either through 
custody or court orders - the access of suspects to computers/the Internet during the course of 
investigations. 
Training  
Finding 
12.3.13  The technical (i.e. computing/Internet) expertise of police officers, particularly those working 
in computer examination units, appeared to be very high, and was vital to the success of Internet CSA 
investigations - some of which could be extremely challenging. Their work also proved valuable in 
securing intelligence on the activities of suspects. Given that policing - as opposed to computing - was 
their primary occupation, this expertise among police officers was especially impressive. It appeared 
that one of the key factors in accounting for this proficiency was the training they had been able to 
receive.   
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12.3.14  In the main, training opportunities for police officers, around computers and the Internet, 
seemed to be  sufficient and of a good quality. However, training tended to be expensive, took officers 
away from their work, was not always available in the UK (some officers, for example, had to go to 
the USA for training) and needed regular updating on account of the continuous development of 
computers and the Internet. 
Recommendation 
12.3.15  The police must recognise the centrality of their officers’ technical abilities in the 
investigation of Internet CSA offences, the additional benefits of this in terms of obtaining intelligence 
and the key role which training plays in this. Moreover, they should realise that technology is likely to 
feature in an ever-increasing proportion of CSA (and non-CSA) investigations. This technology is 
likely to become ever more numerous, diverse and complex. This will only increase the demands upon 
the police in terms of the technology-related examinations they have to conduct. 
12.3.16  In view of the need for, but also the expense of, training courses, consideration should be 
given to developing a centralised training resource for the police in the UK. The CEOP Centre (see 
11.2) or some branch of it might be an appropriate location for this.   
12.3.17  While such training-related issues are primarily of concern to specialist police officers, the 
police should ensure that the remainder of its staff are fully aware of how to respond to initial reports 
of computer/Internet CSA. 
12.3.18  These findings and recommendations further underline the need, on the part of Government, 
to ensure that the police have adequate resources for responding to Internet CSA (see 11.4). 
Computer/Internet examinations  
Finding 
12.3.19  Some offenders, who were more adept with computers, employed passwords and encryption 
to prevent or thwart investigation of their activities. On occasions, the police found it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to get beyond these passwords and encryption, but were able to request 
assistance from colleagues in other policing organisations, industry and central government 
departments (such as the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) and General Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). Sometimes this assistance proved to be extremely valuable. However, some of 
these organisations, in particular GCHQ, could assist the police only in exceptional circumstances. 
Furthermore, it did not appear that police officers were as aware, as they might of been, of what other 
expertise existed in the country, and could be drawn upon, to assist with more technically challenging 
investigations. 
Recommendation 
12.3.20  All relevant individuals - especially those in highly specialised bodies, such as NTAC and 
GCHQ - and organisations, should be fully aware of the invaluable support they can offer to the 
police, in what are extremely important investigations, and be fully committed towards providing this.  
12.3.21  The police should, in the short-term, seek to identify, collate and disseminate details of all the 
individuals and organisations in the UK, and possibly abroad, which have a specialised computing 
expertise which they can call upon in more challenging Internet CSA investigations.  
12.3.22  In the longer-term, though, it is to be hoped that one of the achievements of the CEOP Centre 
(see 11.4) will be to develop a highly proficient resource that can be used in most, if not all, of the 
most technically challenging Internet CSA cases that the police, from across the country, encounter. 
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Interviewing suspects 
Finding 
12.3.23  Police interviews with suspects in Internet CSA cases could be quite challenging in terms of 
addressing the technical issues surrounding computers/the Internet. 
Recommendation 
12.3.24  Police officers, when interviewing suspects in Internet CSA cases, should consider whether 
they need to be accompanied, in interviews, by a colleague with specialist knowledge of computers/the 
Internet. This is especially important where suspects have expertise in computers/the Internet, are 
likely to be manipulative or where the case itself is technically complex. Consideration should be 
given to de-briefing offenders for intelligence-gathering purposes. 
Children trafficked for sexual exploitation 
Finding 
12.3.25  Interviews with police officers who had dealt with the trafficking of children for sexual 
exploitation (i.e. prostitution), suggested that these cases could be especially challenging to investigate 
and manage. The police often had to contend with multiple and/or foreign offenders, offences in 
multiple locations (both in the UK and abroad) and the risk of witness intimidation. The police also 
faced considerable problems in progressing these cases through the CJS. At least some of the reason 
for this lay with the vulnerability of victims and the difficulties they encountered in acting as witnesses 
(see 13.3.1 - 13.3.2). As a result, the police had, among all their other tasks, to provide considerable 
support to victims ahead of trials. Overall, these cases were exceptionally resource-intensive for the 
police. However, the research encountered prime examples of cases where the police had, not only 
through their skill and dedication, but also the investment of the necessary resources, been able to 
bring extremely complex investigations to a very successful conclusion. 
Recommendation 
12.3.26  The police must be prepared, and able, to commit the resources to these investigations that 
are required. This includes providing support to victims ahead of trials. This reinforces the point made 
in 11.4 that the Government must ensure the police have adequate resources for responding to child 
maltreatment cases, especially those which involve the new and considerable challenges of 
international (or Internet) CSA. 
ChildBase 
Finding 
12.3.27  ChildBase is a centralised, national, computerised database of detected CAIs managed within 
CEOP. The principle of the database is that police services send copies of CAIs they have detected to 
ChildBase, which then becomes a definitive record of such images known to the police in the UK. 
This enables the police response to these images to be more co-ordinated and effective. In particular, 
the police are able to distinguish between known and ‘new’ images, and link together related images - 
which may be beneficial to investigations. In light of the workload the police face, in terms of 
examining computers (see 11.4.2), this database was - in principle at least - vital in ensuring that 
police initiated investigations into new cases but did not investigate cases which had already been 
dealt with. 
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12.3.28  This research suggested, though, that ChildBase was a quite incomplete record of detected 
CAIs. While some police officers and services sent their detected CAIs to ChildBase, many did not. 
Indeed, practice was, in this respect, extremely variable. Where images were in a hard copy form (for 
example, photographs) or were not believed to have been distributed (electronically), then they were 
especially unlikely to be sent to ChildBase. It did not appear that there was any system - formal or 
otherwise - by which HMRC could send CAIs, it seized, to ChildBase. These findings suggest that 
ChildBase was not as effective as it could, or should have, been. This situation also carried with it the 
risk of a vicious circle being set up, whereby the more often CAIs were not submitted, the more 
devalued the database became, and the even less likely police officers were in the future to submit 
images, and so on. There appeared, then, to be a lack of clarity, if not confusion, over the role and 
purpose of ChildBase. 
Recommendation 
12.3.29  CEOP should, in the light of the above findings, review the role of ChildBase. This review 
should consider: 
• The extent and manner in which ChildBase is being used, in terms both of ‘inputs’ (CAIs sent in) 
and ‘outputs’ (data analysed to assist investigations and numbers of investigations assisted) 
• Whether ChildBase should be used differently, and in particular whether it might be used in a 
better way, and if so, how this could be brought about, and the resource implications of this. 
Included within this could be consideration of the benefit which advances in facial recognition 
technology might have, in conjunction with ChildBase, in the identification of victims  
• Whether all detected CAIs should be sent to ChildBase, and if so, the optimum ways of facilitating 
this. Alternatively, if only some images should be sent to ChildBase, then which images should be 
submitted  
12.3.30  This review should be underpinned by an independent and specific piece of research on 
ChildBase to provide objective information on the above issues.   
Child sex abuser networks 
Finding 
12.3.31  Prior to the Internet, it was generally very difficult for persons with a sexual interest in 
children to identify or communicate with one another. With the advent of the Internet, and moreover 
its widespread use, this process of identification and communication has become not only very 
effective - through protocols such as dedicated newsgroups - but also relatively secure.  
12.3.32  The offences which have resulted from such contact have taken two main forms: the 
provision or exchange/sale of CAIs - accounting for by far the largest proportion of cases - and 
incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA. Some of this contact had led to the creation of child sex 
abuser networks. While all CSA is grave, irrespective of the number of offenders involved, the 
presence of multiple perpetrators could, and did, lead to cases becoming even more serious, in that 
more children were abused, by more abusers and on more occasions. It is also possible that children in 
such cases experienced more serious forms of abuse. Each of these features is likely to increase the 
psychological and physical harm of children. In addition, multiple offender cases tended to be much 
more challenging for the police, and other agencies, to investigate. These findings are born out by an 
earlier study into organised CSA (Gallagher, 1998a). 
12.3.33  Offenders also used their Internet contacts to obtain technical (i.e. computing/Internet) advice 
to facilitate their offending (usually regarding the acquisition of CAIs), avoid detection and thwart 
investigations, and procure social support in relation to their sexual interest in children.  
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12.3.34  Previous research, by one of the authors (Gallagher, 1998a), found that there was little 
concerted or co-ordinated response - certainly not on either a national or proactive basis - by the 
police, towards child sex abuser networks. Rather, the police approach to these cases was invariably an 
ad hoc one. Eight years on, this situation appears not to have changed - in spite of additional child sex 
abuser networks being created via the Internet.   
Recommendation 
12.3.35  The police need to embark upon, and develop, a much more concerted and co-ordinated 
response towards preventing, detecting and investigating child sex abuser networks, both online and 
offline. This should include improvements in the collation and analysis of, and response to, 
intelligence and information, on known and suspected members of such networks, from police 
services and HMRC, throughout the country. While some of this will be undertaken by local police 
services, it has to be recognised that many networks cross not only local police boundaries, but may be 
nationwide and in some instances international. These are further grounds as to why the Government 
should set up the national police child protection agency recommended elsewhere in this report (see 
11.2) to provide a more robust, and adequately resourced and structured, national lead on these cases.
12.3.36  While this police effort should be concentrated upon those who are intent on carrying out 
sexual assaults against children, it also needs to be directed at those who seek to use CAIs, and the 
more general contact which takes place, online, between those who are sexually interested in children, 
and which might facilitate or incite offending. 
    12.4  HM Revenue and Customs76
Victim identification 
Finding 
12.4.1  It did not appear that HMRC had any formal policy, concerning the processing of CAIs, as 
would facilitate the identification and protection of children featuring in them.   
Recommendation 
12.4.2  HMRC should draw-up a formal policy concerning the identification of children who feature in 
the CAIs it detects - both hard copy and electronic. It would seem - assuming agreement of all relevant 
parties - that the ideal policy would be for these images to be sent to ChildBase (now located within 
CEOP) which has acquired considerable experience of handling such images.77
12.4.3  After taking due account of any limiting factors78, consideration should be given to reporting, 
or sharing, internationally moved CAIs, detected in the UK, with authorities in the country from which 
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 HMRC is, in terms of child protection, primarily concerned with CAIs, and specifically their international 
movement. However, the organisation is sometimes involved in monitoring child sex offenders, and in a few 
instances, children who are potential victims of sexual abuse, at ports of entry or departure. In keeping with this 
wider remit, but also the broad theme of this research, the work of HMRC in this and the next part of the report, 
is referred to by the general term ‘child protection’. It should be noted, though, that most of the points that follow 
relate chiefly to CAIs.    
77
 This underlines the potential, and the need, for CEOP to extend its role still further than that proposed in 11.2. 
78
 These would include, for example, whether the country in question has the infrastructure, and the will and 
ability, to respond to such reports in an appropriate manner.   
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they are believed to originate, in order to enable the identification and protection of children 
concerned.  Sending these images to ChildBase, might well assist this international liaison.  
Searches 
Finding 
12.4.4  Figures for the proportion of people and goods coming into, or going out of, the country which 
HMRC searched, were very limited. However, those figures that did exist, suggest that the proportion 
of people or goods searched was extremely small. 
12.4.5  In 2003, for example, there were 61.5 million visits overseas by UK residents and 24.8 million 
visits to the UK by overseas residents (Office for National Statistics, 2004). This produces a total of 
86,300,000 initial visits into, or out of, the UK, per annum. Given that the vast majority of the persons 
undertaking these visits did, presumably, return to their country of origin, the total number of transits 
into or out of the UK or, more pertinently, through Customs posts, would have been double this, or 
172.6 million transits. 
12.4.6  In the broadly comparable 12 month period, April 2003-March 2004, HMRC conducted 
11,203 ‘searches on persons’79 (HMCE, 2004). This means that only 1 in every 15,407 transit, or 
0.006% of all transits into, or out of, the UK resulted in a search.  
12.4.7  Information on the number of postal items coming into, or going out of, the UK, appear to be 
limited (or, at least, difficult to obtain). What figures were available suggest that these volumes are, 
like passenger figures, very considerable. The National Audit Office, for example, report that ‘Royal 
Mail handles over 20 million packages each year from 180 countries outside of the EU at their postal 
sorting depot at Mount Pleasant in Central London’ and ‘In 2003-04 Parcelforce Worldwide handled 
3.8 million parcels from countries outside of the EU ’ (National Audit Office, 2005). (These figures do 
not include packages dealt with at other sorting offices, items from EU countries, items going out of 
the UK, ‘fast parcels’ dealt with by commercial operators, or freight.)  
12.4.8  HMRC does not keep a record of the number of postal items it examines. The proportion of 
international postal items examined is, though, also thought to be very small. An HMRC officer, based 
at one of the small number of postal sorting depots in the UK responsible for international post, 
estimated that his office examined only 0.001% of postal items coming into the country.80
  
Recommendation 
12.4.9  It is beyond the scope of this research project to make recommendations as to the rate at which 
HMRC should be searching people or goods coming into, or going out of, the country.  These 
researchers appreciate, moreover, that increasing the number of searches could have major 
privacy/civil liberty, logistical, commercial and resource implications. They also realise that HMRC 
uses an intelligence-based approach, whereby it seeks to focus its searches upon high-risk travellers 
and goods.81 That said, it did appear that current rates of searching were too low and should be 
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 It should be noted that this is a count of searches carried out, as opposed to people searched. One person could 
be subject to more than type of search.
80
 It is recognised that this represents a very crude estimate on the part of the HMRC officer concerned, but it 
makes the point that only a tiny minority of items are examined.  
81
 While this is a very logical approach to take, it does have to be acknowledged that this strategy is very 
dependent upon intelligence being available which, of course, in regards criminal behaviour, it often isn’t.  
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raised.82 At a minimum, there should be a debate, possibly involving both policy makers and the 
public, as to the extent to which passengers and goods can, and should, be searched. 
12.4.10  HMRC has two overarching roles: the collection of revenue, and the control of prohibited and 
restricted goods, which include CAIs. Given that searches lie at the heart of this latter role, it would 
seem to be a basic element of good practice for HMRC to compile figures - however brief these might 
be - on the number of postal items (or goods) it examines - as it currently does for the number of 
people searched. It might be that such figures are used only for internal, management purposes. There 
is a case, though, for such figures to be made public - again, as they are for people searched - in order 
that there might be a wider understanding - and again, possibly, debate - as to what HMRC does and 
how it should operate.  
Inter-agency working 
Finding 
12.4.11  While it was relatively modest in scale, HMRC did undertake important child protection 
work. The organisation was, however, very much on the periphery of the child protection system - a 
situation that may have prevented it from developing its work in this area as much as it might have 
done. Some police interviewees, including specialist child protection officers, stated that they knew 
little or nothing of the work of HMRC in the area of child protection. Given the evidence in this, and 
other, research, of an overlap - and a possibly an increasing one - between international and Internet 
CSA, and with many of these cases also possessing local dimensions (see 13.2.9 - 13.2.10) it would 
seem appropriate, for HMRC to enhance its working relationship, with police and other agencies, 
involved in child protection, in the UK. 
Recommendation                       
12.4.12  HMRC should investigate whether there are feasible and worthwhile ways in which it could, 
and should, become more involved with the broader child protection system. This might, for example, 
involve one, or more, of the following: involvement with CEOP, attendance and presentation at the 
annual ACPO national child protection conference and any London-wide LSCB committee.  
12.4.13  In addition, it is hoped that CEOP will act to strengthen links between HMRC and the police 
at the national level, which might, in turn, benefit local HMRC-police links. 
12.4.14  These initiatives, in relation to HMRC, stand to constitute a modest but important means of 
raising awareness of child protection, enhancing specific knowledge of, and skills in, this area, and 
contributing towards the development of a greater child protection culture within the organisation.  
12.4.15  This interaction could also be of benefit to those agencies which are currently involved in the 
wider child protection system, such as police, probation and children’s services, by increasing their 
knowledge and understanding of the work of HMRC and the problem of the international  movement 
of CAIs.  
                                                
82
 While increasing the number of searches might have only very modest benefits in terms of detecting (and 
deterring) CAIs, the work of HMRC does have to be seen ‘in the round’ i.e. such changes would be of benefit in 
regards to the innumerable types of item which this HMRC is seeking to prohibit or restrict, for example, 
firearms, drugs and illegal meat. 
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The profile of HMRC child protection work 
Finding 
12.4.16  One of the overall conclusions of this study, was that the child protection work of HMRC has 
a low profile, among the public and also relevant agencies, such as police. The researchers felt that this 
low profile did not help deter offenders from moving CAIs internationally (and possibly even in 
creating them), or induce the police to share reports (see 12.5.1 - 12.5.2), or encourage members of the 
public to make reports, in connection with such behaviour.    
Recommendation  
12.4.17  HMRC should examine whether there are feasible and worthwhile ways in which it could, 
and should, raise the profile of the work it undertakes in respect of child protection. 
12.4.18  Towards this end, one of the strategies HMRC could contemplate - operational considerations 
notwithstanding - is publishing more comprehensive information concerning the child protection work 
it undertakes and achieves. Similarly, it could consider dedicating a separate part of its annual report to 
its work in this area.83
Child protection within HMRC 
Finding 
  
12.4.19  Some HMRC officers believed that the organisation did not attach sufficient importance to 
child protection work, and they cited various policy changes as evidence of this.84 However, other staff 
argued that child protection was treated with the seriousness it merited, and they argued that recent 
policy changes represented a strategic shift designed to improve the organisations capabilities across 
all its regimes.85  
Recommendation 
12.4.20  Notwithstanding the points made in relation to the number of CAI detection’s, other HMRC’ 
responsibilities and the appropriateness of the organisation’s response, it does have to be 
acknowledged that some officers had concerns about the approach of HMRC to child protection work. 
It should also be noted that this is not the first time these issues have been raised.86
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 The sole figure HMRC currently publishes concerning its child protection work is the number of suspects it 
‘prosecutes’ for the international movement of CAIs (see for example HMCE, 2002). This is felt to be rather 
narrow and unambitious reflection of the work it carries out in this area.
84
 These included the removal of staff from dedicated child protection work, transfer of responsibility for 
investigating CAI cases to the police (alone), removal of national targets for the numbers of persons placed on 
the Sex Offenders Register (for the importation of CAIs), and the shortage and/or reduction in training and other 
staff development opportunities relating to child protection. 
85
 They also pointed out that the number of CAI detection’s was relatively small, and this area was only one of a 
large number of prohibitions and restrictions with which HMRC were charged - the others including, for 
example, firearms, drugs and illegal meat.  
86
 Although a little dated, it is worth noting some of the findings and recommendations of the Government-
initiated review, into safeguarding children, carried out by Sir William Utting. In relation to the child protection 
work of HMRC the review stated: ‘the resources allocated to this are relatively small’, there are ‘good grounds 
for giving much higher priority to this work and for allocating adequate resources to it’ and ‘HM Customs and 
Excise are urged to dedicate more resources to this and to build up their expertise’ (Utting, 1997, p.102). 
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12.4.21  This being the case, it is important that HMRC makes doubly sure that its policy and practice 
in relation to child protection work, is both appropriate and sufficient.87 This research suggests that 
there are a number of ways in which HMRC might be able to improve its work in this area, including 
victim identification (12.4.1 - 12.4.3), inter-agency working (12.4.11 - 12.4.15) and raising its profile 
(12.4.16 - 12.4.18). 
12.5  Police, and HMRC 
Information sharing 
Finding 
12.5.1  Although the police do not have primary law enforcement responsibility for responding to the  
international movement of CAIs - this resting with HMRC - they did detect a small number of cases 
which involved this type of offence. However, it appeared that in some, if not many, of these cases, 
they did not inform HMRC that they had detected this material. (It is also worth noting that these 
particular offences were sometimes ‘lost’ to the criminal justice system, as the police did not charge 
offenders in relation to them, on account of the fact that they [the offenders] were facing more serious 
CSA-related indictments.) 
Recommendation 
12.5.2  The police and HMRC should establish a procedure whereby the police routinely inform, and 
pass key information to, HMRC on all cases it detects involving the suspected or known international 
movement of CAIs. This would provide HMRC with a much more accurate assessment of the extent 
and nature of the international movement of CAIs, and consequently assist it in developing a more 
informed and effective response to this problem. This seems especially important in view of HMRC’s 
intelligence-led approach to this problem (see 12.4.9).  
Investigating the international movement of CAIs  
Finding 
12.5.3  Prior to 1st April 2003, detection’s of internationally moved CAIs were subject to joint 
investigation by HMRC and the police. Since then, and following on from an agreement between 
HMRC and ACPO, these cases are now investigated by the police alone (ACPO, 2003).  
12.5.4  The research found that this policy change was the source of much disquiet among many 
HMRC officers who were interviewed. At a general level, this disquiet appeared to be due to the regret 
that officers felt at having to give up an area of work - investigating the international movement of 
CAIs - to which they (i.e. HMRC front-line staff as a whole) were committed, and one in which they 
were proficient. These officers did, though, also raise a number of more specific concerns they had 
with this policy change.88 89  
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 With this in mind, it is encouraging to note that the most recent Public Service Agreement - which is drawn up 
between HMRC and Government, and sets out HMRC work for a three year period - signifies an increased 
commitment to child protection work.   
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 In terms of investigations, HMRC offices were concerned that the police simply would not investigate cases 
involving the international movement of CAIs - given the challenges they were already facing in responding to 
the Internet-based CAIs cases that were being reported to them (see 11.4). They were especially concerned in 
relation to cases involving indicative material, as they felt the police might not appreciate the potential 
significance of such seizures. Interviewees also argued that, as the police and HMRC had different remits and 
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Recommendation 
12.5.5  In light of these concerns, it is to be welcomed that HMRC plans to review the impact which 
this policy change is having. If this review finds that this policy change is having adverse 
consequences, then attempts should be made, in the first instance, perhaps, to resolving these within 
the existing policy context. However, if this is not deemed feasible then serious consideration should 
be given to reversing this policy and returning to joint (police-HMRC) investigation of internationally 
moved CAIs. 
12.5.6  Whilst this policy remains in place, it strongly underlines the need (outlined in 12.5.1 - 12.5.2) 
on the part of organisations receiving reports (i.e. the police) to provide feedback to organisations 
submitting reports (i.e. HMRC). 
HMRC-police relations 
Finding 
12.5.7  A near unanimous view among HMRC staff - and one shared by the police - was that the 
working relationship between these organisations - in respect of child protection cases - was very 
good. The quality of this relationship was all the more notable given that there were not that many 
opportunities for these two agencies to work together on child protection cases. However, with the 
change in policy from joint to sole (i.e. police only) investigation of cases involving the international 
movement of CAIs, there was a concern, among HMRC staff, that other areas of joint working, 
regards child protection, such as intelligence and information sharing, case reporting and investigative 
support, could be adversely affected.90  
Recommendation 
12.5.8  Any agencies which have to work together - in this instance, HMRC and police - should 
always be striving to maintain, and improve, their working relationships. This is, now, especially 
important in the case of these two agencies, given that a key plank of their working together (i.e. joint 
investigations) has been removed.  
Counselling  
Finding 
12.5.9  Some of the CAIs (and Abusive Images of Women - AIW) which the police and HMRC had to 
view, featured children (and women) being subject to serious, and in some instances extreme, sexual 
                                                                                                                                                        
powers, when the police investigated cases (alone), this would not be as thorough or effective as it would, or 
should, be - had inquiries been conducted jointly. Within HMRC, officers were anxious - following on from this 
anticipated police response, plus the general message that was being sent out (see later) - that this policy change 
might result in a decline in the motivation of detection staff to identify this material. Officers were also worried 
that there would be a diminution in what had been an important and improving relationship with the police in 
respect of child protection work (see 12.5.7 - 12.5.8). In terms of the general message, officers felt this change 
signalled a downgrading of child protection work within HMRC. 
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 It should be noted, that HMRC interviewees did not know that such adverse consequences had, or would arise, 
but rather were raising concerns about what might occur. It should also be acknowledged that the number of 
cases that police and HMRC jointly investigated, previously, would have been quite small. Moreover, HMRC 
interviewees may have been motivated by an admirable sense of professional pride. Having said all of this, it 
was striking as to how strongly they felt about this issue. 
90
 Whilst it must be acknowledged that these views represent an element of speculation, they did, nonetheless, 
constitute what appeared to be genuine concerns on the part of interviewees. 
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and/or physical abuse. This was, in terms of agency work, a new, unique, uncharted and very 
considerable challenge. While some workers seemed to be able to ‘cope’ with most, if not all, of the 
images they viewed, others reported adverse effects - although sometimes in respect only of particular 
images. One phrase used by a number of police officers, quite independently of one another, was  
‘There are certain images I can’t get out of my head.’   
12.5.10  There appears to be little reliable or systematic knowledge (including this research) as to the 
effects - in terms either of their nature, strength or duration - which the viewing of CAI (or AIW) has 
upon agency workers. Similarly, it is not known how effects vary between individuals or by type of 
image.  
12.5.11   There was, within the research, no systematic analysis of the counselling provision which 
either the police or HMRC provided. That said, it did appear that both organisations provided access to 
counselling services and were mindful of the need to assess the adequacy of that provision. HMRC, 
for example, were, at the time of writing, reviewing and strengthening their procedures regarding their 
counselling service. It did appear, though, that the counselling provision, particularly among the 52 
local police services in the UK, was somewhat variable, both in its availability and quality. 
Recommendation 
12.5.12  Until reliable evidence is produced to the contrary, it should be considered a distinct 
possibility that viewing CAIs (and AIW) could have adverse effects upon, at least some, agency 
workers. This is not to be alarmist but rather to encourage caution on the part of agencies. Following 
on from this, police and HMRC should ensure that they adequately monitor and supervise staff who 
view CAIs (and AIW), ensure they have access to high quality counselling, and take any other steps 
they can to avoid or minimise adverse reactions to this work.  Given that they undertake less work 
(than the police) on abusive images, and in the interests of cost effectiveness, HMRC could consider 
buying into police counselling provision.  
12.5.13  The Government should fund research to provide reliable and comprehensive information on 
the effects which viewing CAIs (and AIW) has upon agency workers, the subsequent needs of these 
workers, the extent, nature and quality of counselling (in this area), and what constitutes good practice 
in the provision of both counselling and support more generally. Included within this work, should be 
an examination of whether counselling should be on a voluntary of compulsory basis. 
12.5.14  Having said this, it should be noted that some authorities have advocated caution in the 
provision of counselling, in general, pointing out that it may not be appropriate for every individual 
and that it may have adverse consequences (see, for example, Henderson, Hotopf and Wessely, 2003; 
and Wessely, 2005). 
Expertise 
Finding 
12.5.15  There was a tendency on the part of the police and HMRC (and agencies in general) to place 
too much reliance upon the views of individuals from other statutory agencies, NGOs or academia, 
who were seen as specialists (or ‘experts’) in international or Internet CSA, or other areas of child 
protection. At the same time, they placed too little reliance upon their own individual or organisational 
expertise. This practice was, perhaps, particularly acute in the case of international and Internet CSA 
where there is, still, little reliable knowledge, but much media and public, concern over, and interest 
in, these cases. 
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Recommendation 
12.5.16  While the preparedness of the police and HMRC to draw upon specialists (or ‘experts’) on 
international or Internet CSA (or indeed any other area of child protection) is appropriate, it is also 
important that these officers (and agency workers in general) maintain something of a cautious and 
questioning approach towards this input, and also not underestimate their own knowledge and skills in 
this area. The former is especially important given the generally poor state of knowledge in the areas 
of international and Internet CSA. 
12.5.17  That said, both the police, as alluded to in Consolidation (see 12.3.1 - 12.3.2) and Tenure 
(Appendix E, point 9), and HMRC, must ensure that they invest sufficient effort in consolidating, 
developing and utilising the expertise which exists within their own organisations.91
 12.6  INDUSTRY 
Commitment 
Finding 
12.6.1  The research uncovered instances where varied commercial organisations, including ISPs, 
airline companies and the Royal Mail, were uncooperative towards the police and HMRC when they 
were seeking to detect or investigate international and Internet CSA. On a small number of occasions, 
police and HMRC were ultimately prevented from carrying out their inquiries. It appeared that the 
uncooperativeness of these organisations was due to a variety of factors, both legitimate and 
illegitimate. In terms of the former, some organisations were, for example, uncertain over the legality 
of the assistance they were being asked to provide. In regards to the latter, though, some organisations 
seemed to be driven primarily by commercial concerns, or an ignorance of, or disregard for, the 
importance of child protection. 
Recommendation 
12.6.2  All commercial organisations should be ready and willing to assist the police and HMRC in 
their detection and investigation of international and Internet CSA. Where these organisations have 
legitimate concerns over the legality of such assistance, then these should be resolved between all 
relevant agencies, and if need be Government, as a matter of urgency. That some organisations are not 
able and/or willing to understand the serious of CSA, the importance of child protection and their co-
operating with police and HMRC, in this area of work, indicates that they may be in need of 
awareness-raising and/or training in these areas. Where organisations continue to thwart investigations 
by police or HMRC, then these latter agencies should press for measures, including legislation, if need 
be, to compel such organisations to co-operate. 
ISPs 
Finding 
12.6.3  In terms of industry, the largest number of concerns were raised - primarily by the police - in 
connection with ISPs and their response to Internet CSA. In some ways, this is not surprising, given 
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 HMRC subsequently informed the researchers that they have recognised that there have been some issues in 
this area in the past, and that they are beginning to roll out a structured system of de-briefing.  
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that Internet CSA cases - and especially CAI cases - were relatively numerous, and ISPs had a pivotal 
role in the organisation response to these cases. The concerns that were raised, in respect of some ISPs, 
were as follows:  
Routine practice
• Inadequate monitoring of Internet activity, including chatrooms  
• ISPs choosing not to report (detected) CAIs to the police but simply deleting them instead92
• ISP ‘abuse teams’ being unable to cope with the volume of CSA-reports they received  
• ISPs refusing to take down illegal content when requested to do so by the police 
• ISPs not keeping any information on customers and their use of the Internet 
• The failure to retain data for a long enough period
• The failure to retain data that was sufficiently detailed  
Assisting police investigations
• ISPs refusing to release information to the police, including that which would identify suspects 
(Some of these were foreign ISPs that had headquarters abroad. These ISPs argued that they were 
subject to the laws of the country in which their headquarters was based and these forbade them 
from releasing the information in question) 
• ISPs denying they had the information which police were requesting (with the police believing that 
they did possess such information) 
• ISPs being very slow in providing the police with the information they requested 
• ISPs attempting to charge the police for providing information 
• The process of obtaining information becoming more bureaucratic - and consequently more 
difficult and slower. (This could have been due, in part, to factors outside the control of ISPs, for 
example, new legislative requirements)  
  
Constitution
• The existence of fly-by-night or rogue ISPs 
• The need among at least some foreign ISPs to obtain the permission of their head office before they 
released information 
12.6.4  Having said this, there was a sense, gained from the research, that ISPs were generally 
becoming more aware of, and involved in, child protection, in terms of their routine practice and 
constitution, and also in their attitude towards assisting the police. Indeed, some ISPs were said to be 
too eager to assist the police, and in their resultant haste, did not always check the accuracy of the 
information they provided.  
12.6.5  Overall, though, it appeared that there were some problems in the attitude and behaviour of a 
small minority, at least, of ISPs, especially in respect of the disruption, detection, reporting and 
investigation of CSA-related activity. Given that ISPs occupy a key position in the organisational 
response to Internet CSA, this situation is worrying. 
Recommendation 
12.6.6  The authors recognise that there are arguments over the relative merits of voluntary, versus 
compulsory, regulation of industry - and specifically, in the case of Internet CSA, the basis upon 
which ISPs should respond to Internet-related child protection concerns. With this in mind, the authors 
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 Further to the above findings and recommendations being drafted, it was put to the authors, that the reason 
ISPs may have been deleting, rather than storing and reporting, CAIs, was their fear that they might, otherwise, 
be charged with possessing or making CAIs - if they undertook this action. However, through Section 46 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, and the subsequent Memorandum of Understanding (CPS, 2004) those ‘who have a 
role in identifying and securing such data [including ISPs] for evidential purpose……can do so without fear of 
prosecution’ (Home Office, 2004a, p.39). It is hoped, therefore, that ISPs, now having this legal protection, will 
be less likely to delete CAIs but will, instead, preserve, and report, them to the police.
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would argue that ISPs should have the opportunity of self-regulation but that all ISPs sign up to a 
certain set of minimum (but robust) standards governing their routine practice, assistance to the police 
and their constitution.  
12.6.7  In addition, an ombudsman-type person or body should be established where police can 
complain and seek redress where they believe ISPs are not taking a responsible attitude towards child 
protection matters.  
12.6.8  Ultimately, however, and bearing in mind the key position they occupy, if all ISPs cannot 
manage to respond appropriately to child protection concerns voluntarily, then the Government should 
consider introducing measures to compel them to do so. 
12.6.9  That said, and in the interests of balance, these authors should point out that input from ISPs to 
this research was minimal. It is possible that ISPs had a wholly different perspective in regards to the 
issues outlined above, and that this is not fairly or accurately reflected in this report.  
12.6.10  Indeed, the role of ISPs is so critical in the response to Internet CSA, that these authors 
believe a substantial and dedicated piece of research should be carried out to provide a much more 
systematic and comprehensive assessment of the way in these organisations deal with these cases. This 
would include an examination of the extent, nature and impact, of the measures that ISPs are currently 
taking in relation to the prevention, monitoring, disruption, detection and reporting of CSA-related 
activity on the Internet. This would enable these organisations to give their perspective and highlight 
the issues they face in this area of work, be they, for example, legislative, logistical or resource-
related. This, in turn, should prove to be an important means of informing the development of policy 
and practice in relation to the concerns raised above.  
Private computer examiners 
Finding 
12.6.11  Some police services enlisted companies and individuals, largely in the private sector, to 
carry out examinations of computers and other new technology. This research was not able to measure 
the extent of this work but it did appear to be quite significant. The police used these companies and 
individuals to assist either with their general workload - which they were struggling to cope with, 
without leading to even greater delays (see 11.4.2) - or where more specialised technical skills were 
required.    
12.6.12  In general, this working relationship seemed to operate quite well. Despite this, it did raise a 
number of concerns. These were as follows: 
• Security: seldom in any of the communications between police and these computer examination 
services was there any reference to the measures that were taken to ensure the security of the CAIs, 
or other CSA-related evidence that might be found. Again, this is not to say that there were no such 
measures but it is of concern that they were not explicit 
• Cost: these examinations could be extremely expensive, sometimes running into thousands of 
pounds per investigation even for relatively straightforward cases. Had they the personnel or 
expertise, then the police may have been able to carry out examinations more cost effectively 
• Staff support: rarely in any of the communications between the police and these computer 
examination services was there any mention of support or counselling for staff that had to carry out 
the examinations. While this does not mean that such support/counselling did not take place, it does 
raise a concern that it did not. What is more, it is likely that these examiners were less well 
prepared, than the police, for what they had to view 
12.6.13  It is probable that private companies and individuals will, for the foreseeable future, continue 
to examine computers and other new technology on behalf of the police. Indeed, there seems every 
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likelihood that the scale of this work will grow, and appreciably so, in line with the growing number of 
cases involving new technology which the police have to investigate. This means that the above issues 
will become increasingly acute.  
Recommendation 
12.6.14  In light of the above issues, the police, in conjunction with this industry, should set about 
establishing this work on a more formal and regulated basis. To this end, the police should give 
consideration as to whether it is possible to set up a register of approved examination companies and 
individuals. Part of the requirement for these companies to be approved would be that they agree to 
certain minimum standards in terms of a) the security of CAIs and other evidence and b) the support 
and counselling for staff who carry out this work. 
12.6.15  In the longer-term, though, the Government should increase the resources made available to 
the police (see 11.4) to enable them to carry out more of these examinations in-house. Whilst there is 
always likely to be a need for the police to consult with companies or individuals who have more 
specialised computing skills, in particularly challenging cases, it would seem preferable for the police 
to carry out the vast majority of this work. Not only should this be more cost effective, it is also likely 
to reduce issues surrounding security, and support and counselling. 
Additional findings 
12.6.16  Further to the above findings and recommendations being drafted, the authors were informed 
of the following: 
• These organisations/individuals do have to complete a form/provide a written statement as to how 
the security of CAIs would be assured. (It would seem, therefore, that it is restricted to a paper 
exercise only at the moment) 
• ACPO have produced guidelines for computer examination, and these include stipulations 
regarding the involvement of industry (ACPO and NHTCU, undated) 
• There is an issue concerning the expertise of individuals undertaking computer examination work. 
In response to this, an accreditation scheme is being considered 
• If it were to be the responsibility of the police to vet these contractors, then this would represent a 
major additional workload for them - when they are already struggling to cope with the demands 
from investigating Internet CSA cases. In view of this, vetting should perhaps be undertaken by 
another authority, such as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
12.6.17  The importance of the issues mentioned above, and attempts to address them, have been 
underlined by a recent report in the media relating to the work of a private computer analyst involved 
in Internet CAI-related cases (Muir, 2006).  
Domain name registries 
Finding 
12.6.18 Some police officers expressed concern about a lack of action on the part of industry towards 
website domain names which clearly indicated that they had a nefarious interest in CSA. Some of 
these domain names were quite disturbing in terms of what they implied regarding children’s sexual, 
and sometimes physical, abuse.  
Recommendation  
12.6.19  Domain name registries, throughout the world, must act, robustly and promptly, to prevent 
the use of domain names which indicate a sexual interest in children. Where registries refuse to do 
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this, they should be compelled to do so by their respective governments. This situation underlines the 
fact that, ultimately, Internet CSA needs to be tackled on an international basis.  
Additional findings 
12.6.20  Further to the above finding and recommendations being drafted, the authors were informed 
of the following:   
• Previously, it was claimed, Nominet UK, the domain name registry for this country, had not 
responded adequately to concerns raised over domain names that indicated an interest in illegal 
activities, in this case, CSA. Now, however, it was said to be working well with both police and the 
IWF to prevent the use of such domain names 
• In some countries, though, domain names indicating a sexual interest in children were still in use, 
with the responsible registry’s making little or no attempt to identify and trace the owners, or even 
remove the domains  
• The IWF is providing ISPs and mobile phone service operators with key words to enable them to 
identify domain names which indicate a sexual interest in children and against which action should 
be taken 
• In general, the industry was said to be taking a much more responsible attitude towards domain 
names 
• The existence, and response to, inappropriate domain names is another issue which needs to be 
examined through research 
Employers 
Finding 
12.6.21  A small but significant proportion of offenders who used CAIs did so, entirely or in part, at 
their places of work. The research came across numerous instances of employers quite readily 
reporting these individuals to the police. There were some occasions, though, where employers were 
more reticent in this regard, and there may well have been instances where employers did not report 
such concerns when they arose. 
Recommendation 
12.6.22  All employers - encouraged and facilitated by their respective employer organisations - 
should have policies and practices in place for the regular checking of employee’ computers for CAIs 
and for the reporting of any subsequent concerns to the police.93 This would serve not only to deter 
workers from using computers for this purpose but would also aid detection where such use did take 
place. At the same time, employers, and employees, need to be aware of their responsibility to report 
CAIs, along with suspects, when they are detected, and not to try and conceal possible offences when 
they are uncovered. To this end, all employers should ensure that they, and their employees, are fully 
conversant with the principles underpinning, and the provisions contained within, the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998 concerning ‘whistle-blowing’. 
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 It appears that the private sector is giving an increasing amount of attention to this area, as exemplified by a 
recent IT security guide, published by the Confederation for British Industry, for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (CBI, 2006).  
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Computer repair companies 
Finding 
  
12.6.23  Some Internet CAI cases were detected by companies carrying out repairs to offenders’ 
computers. As was the case with employers, some of these organisations, at least, seemed quite ready 
and willing to report these concerns to the police.
Recommendation 
12.6.24  All computer repair companies should be aware of the possibility of detecting Internet CAI 
cases in the course of their work. Furthermore, they should be ready and willing to report these 
concerns to the police. Finally, all such employers and employees should be aware of the principles 
which underpin, and the provisions contained within, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 - in 
order to guard against any covering-up of a customer’s possible offending. 
12.6.25  Although they are likely to be detected much less frequently, the points expressed above  (see  
12.6.21 - 12.6.24) also apply to cases of Internet-initiated grooming, and Internet-initiated incitement 
or conspiracy to commit CSA.  
Children’s workers 
Finding 
12.6.26  The contexts in which UK citizens went abroad, to work with children, who they 
subsequently sexually abused, were found to be much more diverse than is generally recognised.  
Although this research was not able to examine, in any systematic or comprehensive way, the child 
protection measures that existed in relation to UK citizens going abroad to work with children, they 
did appear to be variable.  Indeed, some individuals appeared to go abroad to work with children 
having been subject to no safeguards whatsoever.  
12.6.27  That said, there are some important initiatives taking place in this area which deserve 
mention. Prominent among these is the ‘Setting the Standard’ project, instituted by a consortium of 
international NGOs (see www.settingthestandard.info/), which is seeking to promote core standards 
around child protection (Setting the Standard, 2003). In addition, the NSPCC have been working with 
the UN, UNICEF and the International Council for Voluntary Organisations, on the development of 
reporting protocols, and training of staff around the investigation of concerns, in relation to child 
protection. Similarly, ECPAT Australia have, through Child Wise, funded a child safety programme, 
called Choose with Care, and have developed an awareness programme and training in South East 
Asia on stopping child sex tourism (see www.childwise.net). 
Recommendation 
              
12.6.28  All statutory, NGO and private sector organisations which send UK citizens abroad to work, 
and whose work might bring them into contact with children, should have rigorous child protection 
measures in place, both prior to sending staff abroad and once they are abroad. This should include 
vetting, criminal record checking, training and supervision of staff. This applies to paid, religious and 
voluntary work, and the military.  
12.6.29  Given that some individuals undertake work with children abroad, on a more independent 
basis, the (UK) Government should take a lead in developing and implementing safeguards in respect 
of these workers. The Charity Commission could assume some of this responsibility for individuals or 
groups who wish to carry out charitable work with children abroad.  
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12.6.30  As recommended in 12.2.6 - 12.2.7, the Government should give courts the power to 
permanently ban high risk child sex offenders - or indeed any high risk sex offender - from travelling 
abroad.  
12.6.31  By the same token, and as recommended in the Bichard inquiry (Bichard, 2005), robust  
measures should be applied to persons who wish to come to the UK and work with children.  
Travel and tourism 
Finding 
12.6.32  The research found that the travel and tourism industry (for example, tour operators, airline 
companies and hoteliers) were becoming increasingly involved in initiatives to prevent, detect and 
report international CSA. This has taken the form of, for instance, the insertion of relevant awareness-
raising information in travel brochures, in-flight videos and hotel guides.94 NGOs, such as ECPAT and 
World Vision, along with UNICEF, appear to have had, and continue to have, a crucial role in 
bringing about these developments. Travel and tourism are, though, massive, worldwide industries, 
and work in this area is at an early stage and commitment to it is variable.  
Recommendation 
12.6.33  All those involved in the travel and tourism industry should adopt, and be fully committed to, 
initiatives designed to improve the prevention, detection and reporting, of international CSA.  
12.6.34  It is recognised that there are commercial and aesthetic issues surrounding the employment of 
such child protection measures. However, these can be conveyed, both effectively and appropriately, 
within the more general, and increasingly popular, campaigns built around the concept of sustainable -
or ‘eco’ or ‘ethical’ - tourism (see, for example, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2006). 
12.6.35  Where possible, the travel and tourism industry should be encouraged and supported in 
undertaking these measures but should this not work then pressure, and ultimately legislation, should 
be used to compel them to do so.  
Royal Mail 
                  
Finding 
12.6.36  Royal Mail has legal responsibility for, and control over, postal items. As a result, HMRC had 
to work in conjunction with Royal Mail if they wished to examine international mail items. This 
working relationship was, though, subject to a number of tensions. These were as follows: 
• During the time period covered by the research, Royal Mail refused to continue opening postal 
items for HMRC - saying that this was, in their opinion, no longer legal 
• Royal Mail staff (in one sorting office) would not give HMRC officers advance notice of the 
countries from which postal items were coming in, which undermined their desired policy of 
targeting mail from particular countries 
• The requirement that HMRC officers had to get Royal Mail’ staff to open postal items appeared to 
be an inefficient use of the resources of both of these agencies   
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 The potential - and profound - benefits of such initiatives are well-illustrated by the recent case of Alexander 
Kilpatrick, a UK citizen, deported from Ghana following reports to the authorities in that country from a French 
holidaymaker. The subsequent investigation by police, in the UK, revealed that he had abused children in Ghana 
and the UK, and had also imported CAIs from Ghana (BBC, 2006). 
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Recommendation 
12.6.37  Royal Mail and HMRC need to resolve the above problems. In particular, though, Royal Mail 
needs to be more aware of the importance of international postal items being checked for the purposes 
of law enforcement (in this case, child protection). With this in mind, it needs to urgently review its 
decision to stop opening mail items for HMRC. Furthermore, it needs to develop a more co-operative 
approach to HMRC and the work it is charged with carrying out. Finally, the Government should 
consider - in the interests of efficiency - giving responsibility for the opening of mail items to HMRC. 
12.7  Other agencies 
Awareness and training 
Finding 
12.7.1  Although the police and HMRC were at the forefront of the organisational response to 
international and Internet CSA, their understanding and expertise in regards to these cases, while 
increasing, was still relatively modest. This situation was compounded by the general dearth of 
(reliable) knowledge surrounding these cases. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that 
understanding and expertise among other statutory agency workers, particular those in the CPS, 
education, health, Probation and children’s services - which have had considerably less involvement 
with international and Internet CSA - were even less well developed.  
Recommendation 
12.7.2  All agencies which are outside law enforcement but which have a responsibility for child 
protection, should ensure that their workers have - through training - sufficient awareness, knowledge 
and skills regarding international and Internet CSA, in order that they are able to meet their 
responsibilities towards these cases, in areas, such as prevention, care of victims, investigation, 
prosecution, and the management of offenders. Such training should also help these workers avoid the 
assumptions and misconceptions that tend to prevail in these areas (see 13.1.11 - 13.1.13). 
Crown Prosecution Service  
Finding 
12.7.3  Although this research did not involve any fieldwork with the CPS, some police officers 
believed that this organisation faced a particular challenge in respect of Internet CSA. This challenge 
arose from the fact that, while these cases could be technically quite complex, they were generally not 
very numerous. This meant it could be difficult for individual CPS lawyers to build up adequate 
knowledge and skills with which to assess, and if need be prosecute, these cases in a sufficiently 
effective manner. 
Recommendation 
12.7.4  All local CPS offices should assign special responsibility for Internet CSA cases, to one, or a 
very small number of its lawyers. By concentrating responsibility in this way, local CPS offices could 
help ensure its lawyers acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to work on these cases.  
12.7.5  Although international CSA cases may not generally present the same technical complexity as 
their Internet counterparts, they too are rare, and can present unfamiliar and significant challenges to 
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the criminal justice process. The CPS should, therefore, consider appointing specialist lawyers in 
respect of these cases also. Indeed, given the overlap between them, it would be worthwhile if the 
same specialist lawyers were responsible for both international and Internet cases. 
Specialists (‘experts’) 
Finding 
12.7.6 There was a tendency among some workers, whether from statutory agencies, NGOs or 
academia, who were seen, or put themselves forward, as specialists (or ‘experts’) in the area of 
international or Internet CSA, not to discuss these phenomena in as responsible (including objective) a 
manner as they should have done. This appeared to be especially likely when they dealt with the extent 
and nature, and following on from this, to some degree, the seriousness, of cases - all of which they 
could exaggerate. This lack of objectivity contributed to the assumptions and misconceptions that, as 
explained in 13.1.11 - 13.1.13, are so prevalent around these phenomena. 
12.7.7  As evidenced in chapter 15, it is readily accepted that there is a dearth of knowledge 
surrounding international and Internet CSA. However, this does absolve specialists from discussing 
these phenomena - and in particular what is known and what is not known about them - in a 
responsible manner.
Recommendation 
12.7.8  If there is to be an appropriate and effective response to international and Internet CSA, then it 
is essential that policy and practice is based upon reliable assessments of these challenges. With this in 
mind, all those who are seen, or put themselves forward, as specialists (or ‘experts’) in these areas, 
should be as objective as possible in discussing these subjects, take care not to exaggerate the extent or 
seriousness of cases, not imply that reliable evidence exists when it does not, and distinguish clearly 
between what is fact, and what is theory or speculation. 
12.7.9  Although relating to a much more specific set of cases, and then in the confines of the judicial 
process, the recent concerns over expert evidence in infant death/shaken baby syndrome cases, 
underlines the need of  (all) ‘experts’ to act in a responsible (including competent) manner (Attorney 
General, 2004).  
12.7.10  As the workload around Internet, and other new technology-related, CSA cases increases, 
there is likely to be an even greater demand for specialist knowledge or skills. This underlines the 
importance of these issues still further. 
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Chapter 13 
Broad policy and practice findings 
13.1  International and Internet CSA 
Child and victim focus 
Finding  
  
13.1.1  In policy and practice spheres - and the media - international and Internet CSA cases tended to 
be quite high profile. This was partly on account of the ‘technical’ aspects of these cases. With regards 
to international cases, this was manifest in, for example, international arrest warrants, extradition 
proceedings, extra-territorial jurisdiction and the involvement of Interpol. In respect of Internet cases, 
this was reflected in more material terms, such as computers, photographic equipment, storage devices 
and images.  
13.1.2  The technical element of international and Internet CSA cases tended to make them 
challenging and novel, generating not only concern but also interest - an interest that was magnified by 
the media. Unfortunately, all of this could lead to an over-concentration upon the technical aspects of 
cases, at the expense of sufficient attention being directed towards children and victims. (This, is turn, 
only exacerbated the long-standing marginalisation of the child/victim that has been brought about by 
the excess focus upon offenders, Gallagher, 1998b.)
Implication 
13.1.3  All those involved in, or concerned with, child protection need to ensure that their chief 
concern is the child and his or her abuse, and preventing or responding to this. This principle should 
not be seen as a cliché  - as it sometimes is - but rather should be at the heart of the child protection 
system. Indeed, even CAIs, as disturbing and shocking as they often are, and regardless of the 
considerable ‘official’ and media attention they receive, comprise only a photographic record. They 
are not the child.  
13.1.4  Terry Jones, the former head of Greater Manchester Police Abusive Images Unit, and one of 
the foremost authorities on Internet CSA, has expressed a similar point: ‘The most important issue 
surrounding “Child Abuse and the Internet” [original author’s emphasis] is child protection, not 
computer technology’ (Jones, 2003). 
The rights and status of children and females 
Finding 
13.1.5  It was widely accepted, especially among advocacy organisations, that at least some of the 
explanation for CSA lay in two inter-related factors. The first was the low status afforded to children, 
and females in particular, and the failure to respect their rights. The second was the socialisation of 
males (responsible for virtually all CSA). These factors were also said to explain why governments 
and agencies sometimes failed to respond adequately to CSA. While these issues may be more acute in 
developing countries - rendering children more vulnerable to abuse by both international, and ‘local’, 
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child sex abusers - it should not be thought that they do not exist in developed countries. (Having said 
the above, it is recognised that the disproportionate number of girl (and female) victims is also a 
function of the large majority of offenders being male heterosexuals.) 
Implication 
13.1.6  Rather than continue the preoccupation with individual/psychological explanations of CSA, 
governments and agencies should recognise that at least some of the reason for CSA lies in social and 
cultural factors. Following on from this, these organisations need to ensure that sufficient effort and 
resources are directed towards changing society - and in particular attitudes to children and females, 
and male behaviour - at the same time as they address the challenge posed by offenders.  
Extent of cases 
Finding 
13.1.7  Apart from Internet-based CAIs, the number of international and Internet CSA cases known to 
law enforcement agencies in the UK was small, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of all CSA 
cases known to these agencies. This included child trafficking, child sex tourism and Internet-initiated 
grooming of children for sexual abuse. These three latter groups of cases have received a considerable 
- and it could be argued disproportionate - amount of ‘official’ (and media) attention. 
Implication 
13.1.8  This report does not wish to underestimate the seriousness of individual international and 
Internet CSA cases. Indeed, it argues for a much more robust response to these cases. However, the 
research does indicate that these cases do need to be kept in perspective. In particular, it is important 
that all those who are involved in, or concerned with, child protection have, and act on the basis of, an 
accurate, and realistic, assessment of the extent of international or Internet CSA, do not over-react to 
the media-initiated furore over the ‘latest’ child protection concern, and ensure that resources are not 
taken away from that very large majority of CSA cases which possess neither international nor 
Internet dimensions.  
Seriousness of international and Internet CSA 
Finding 
13.1.9  That most categories of international and Internet CSA were, both in absolute and relative 
terms, quite modest in number, should not be taken as the only measure of the seriousness of these 
phenomena. As attested throughout this report, many of these cases involved serious, and sometimes 
extremely serious, harm to children. Moreover, individual cases could place an inordinate demand 
upon agency resources. 
Implication 
13.1.10  Notwithstanding the points made in 13.1.7 - 13.1.8, policy makers and practitioners must be 
aware of the seriousness of individual international and Internet CSA cases, and be committed to 
responding to these cases in the robust manner they demand. 
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Assumptions and misconceptions 
Finding 
13.1.11  It was noticeable that some of the thinking around, and to some extent responses to, 
international and Internet CSA were influenced by misconceptions or assumptions. Included among 
these were the following: 
• The extent of child trafficking - specifically that into the UK - is relatively high 
• The extent of child sex tourism - specifically that out of the UK - is relatively high  
• International CSA victim and child sex abuser cases are largely or exclusively restricted to cases 
involving child trafficking and child sex tourism 
• The international movement of CAIs has virtually disappeared with the advent of the Internet 
• The risk to children from Internet-initiated grooming - and increasingly mobile phone-initiated 
grooming - is relatively high  
• CAIs are relatively innocuous 
• A relatively high proportion of people who use CAIs, sexually abuse children - and reliable
evidence exists to support this view 
• Viewing CAIs is part of a spiral of behaviour which increases the risk of offenders sexually 
abusing children 
• Offenders quite often use CAIs, or other pornography, to groom children, and this technique is, 
moreover, effective 
• The number, or seriousness, of CAIs an offender possesses, and their technical expertise - with 
computers or the Internet - is positively correlated with the risk they pose to children  
• Children featuring in CAIs have needs which are distinct from those of other CSA victims 
13.1.12  It may be that some or all - or none - of the above beliefs are correct. Certainly, some of these 
views are contradicted by this research. However, the critical point here is that all of these views 
tended to be put forward as facts when they were, in reality, assumptions or misconceptions. 
Implication 
13.1.13  It is important that all those who are involved in, or concerned with, child protection are 
aware that knowledge of international and Internet CSA is poorly developed (see Chapter 15) and that, 
partly as a result of this, there are many assumptions and misconceptions surrounding these cases. 
Moreover, they should endeavour to adopt something a questioning, if not sceptical, approach to some, 
if not much, of what is said or written about these cases. They should, in addition, differentiate 
between that which is supported by good evidence, and that which it theory or supposition, and also 
avoid being overly influenced by the latter in carrying out their work, as in, for example, making 
assessments of the risk which CAI users pose to children.  
Extraneous influences 
Finding 
13.1.14  The readiness and scale of the response, on the part of policy and practice, to some categories 
or types of international and Internet CSA, appeared to be driven, in part, by a number of what could 
be described as ‘extraneous influences’. Chief among these were the following:  
• The media - which itself was driven by the newsworthy, if not sensational, aspects of cases 
• ‘Experts’ and advocacy organisations, some of which exaggerated the extent of international and 
Internet CSA (see 12.7.6 - 12.7.10) 
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• The fact that many international and Internet CSA cases were thought to involve offenders who 
were strangers to their victims. (As a number of commentators, such as Silverman and Wilson 
(2002), have argued, society finds it much easier to respond to stranger, rather than intrafamilial or 
other familiar, child sex abusers.)  
Implication 
13.1.15  It is important that all those involved in policy and practice are not overly influenced by these 
extraneous factors. While some of these factors may need to be taken into account - to greater or lesser 
degrees - it is vital that policy and practice are based upon professional judgements and reliable 
evidence. It is also important that policy makers and practitioners do not reinforce the common 
misconception that children are more at risk from strangers than persons they know.  
General policies and practices 
Finding 
13.1.16  Although this research sought to identify and highlight the policy and practice measures that 
were needed in respect of specific categories and types of international and Internet CSA, it also found 
that there were measures which could be developed to respond to international and Internet CSA more 
generally. These included additional safety advice to children, parents/carers and organisations when 
children go abroad (irrespective of the particular context in which journeys took place), greater vetting 
and supervision of individuals who travel abroad and whose work brings them into contact with 
children (irrespective of the particular context in which they went abroad), enhanced border controls 
(including the postal system), and improved regulation and monitoring of the Internet. 
Implication 
13.1.17  All those involved in, or concerned with, child protection should be aware of, and seek to 
develop, general (as well as specific) measures in regards to international and Internet CSA. Besides 
providing a more effective response to a range of different types of international and Internet CSA that 
are known to exist at the moment, such general measures should also prove to be a safeguard in 
respect of new types of case which might arise.   
Existing child protection system 
Finding 
13.1.18  Some cases of international and Internet CSA were similar in their nature and the practice 
issues to which they gave rise, to CSA cases in general, and could, therefore, be dealt with largely 
within the existing child protection system. This is particularly true of cases which involved the 
following: children on holiday or on organised trips (whether club, exchange or school-based), victims 
of international, Internet-initiated child sex abuser networks, and offenders who worked with children, 
were on holiday with them or who were migrants but living with their families. 
Implication 
13.1.19  While this reports advocates the development of special measures to deal with international 
and Internet CSA, it is important to realise that at least some part of this phenomenon can, and should, 
be dealt with from within the existing - though improved - child protection system. That said, any 
‘familiarity’ that might surround these cases, should not lead to any underestimation of the challenges 
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they can present, either individually or collectively. Moreover, one area where child protection needs 
to improve, in respect of all CSA, is in relation to prevention, including public education.95
Standardising policy and practice 
Finding 
13.1.20  Law enforcement officers reported that they sometimes encountered difficulties in 
investigating international and Internet CSA, owing to policy and practice differences between 
countries. For example, some police services were not allowed to transmit CAIs to their counterparts 
abroad, while others were. The use of different (i.e. incompatible) technology meant that police 
services could face problems in working together, especially in terms of sharing information. 
Implication 
13.1.21  Law enforcement agencies around the world should work towards standardising their 
practice, where possible, in order to facilitate the investigation of international and Internet CSA. This 
is something that the proposed international (see 11.1) and national (see 11.2) police child protection 
agencies could help facilitate.  
Ratcheting-up legislation 
Finding 
13.1.22  A number of law enforcement officers stated that they encountered difficulties in pursuing 
international and Internet CSA cases owing to differences between countries in terms of legislation. 
(For example, possession of CAIs and the promotion of CSA were not illegal in some countries. In the 
USA, CAIs have to be shown to depict a real child for a person to be convicted of a criminal offence 
in relation to them.) As a result of these difficulties, many officers argued that legislation relating to 
CSA offences should be standardised between different countries.  
Implication 
13.1.23  Whilst appreciating the reasoning behind requests for a standardisation of legislation, these 
authors feel it is, in general, more appropriate to think in terms of, and work towards, a ratcheting-up 
of legislation, in order that all countries have equally robust standards, rather than consideration being 
given to a dilution of legislation in any country. 
Limits of criminal justice legislation 
Finding 
13.1.24  A considerable amount of legislation has been enacted in recent years to respond, in part, to 
international and Internet CSA. This includes: the Sex Offenders Act 1997, Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 
2000, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
13.1.25  Combined, this legislation could create the impression that much has been done, and 
achieved, in response to international and Internet CSA. However, it should be noted that detection’s 
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and convictions in CSA cases (in general) - two of the central premises upon which the legislation is 
based - remain very low (Kelly, et al, 1991; Cawson et al, 2000). Moreover, the majority of protective 
(prevention) orders, as contained within the Sexual Offences Act 2003, can be made against only 
convicted sex offenders.  
Implication 
13.1.26  While legislative measures against international and Internet CSA are very important, and 
welcome, both for practical/law enforcement and symbolic reasons, it is essential that all those who 
are involved in, or concerned with, child protection, do not have an exaggerated impression of their 
efficacy. Rather, it should be recognised that legislation is a limited - if not very limited - tool, and 
should be viewed as only one of a raft of responses that are needed to address international and 
Internet CSA. 
13.1.27  Having said this, attention should be drawn to the Risk of Sexual Harm Orders (RSHO), 
which is a new ‘civil preventative order’ introduced through section 123 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003. The RSHO ‘aims to restrict the activities of those involved in grooming children for sexual 
activity’. What is unusual, but also important, about this measure is that ‘A previous conviction, 
caution etc. for a sexual offence is not [original emphasis] a pre-requisite in applying for a RSHO’ 
(Home Office, 2004b). 
13.1.28  This research was not able to establish the impact (including sufficiency), if any, of the 
RSHO or section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (‘Meeting a child following sexual grooming 
etc’), in terms of preventing or deterring grooming - although concerns have been raised over the 
efficacy of these efforts (The Guardian, 2002). 
Working with Industry 
Finding 
13.1.29  The response to international and Internet CSA involved a much larger number and wider 
array of agencies than are traditionally involved in child protection. Many of these agencies were from 
the private sector and included travel and tourism companies, ISPs, mobile phone companies, banks, 
computer repair and examination companies, employers, and the Royal Mail.  
Implication 
13.1.30  Statutory agencies need to recognise that they may need to work with a wide array of private 
sector organisations, in responding to international and Internet CSA cases, and be aware of the 
special challenges to which this can give rise (see 12.6).96
International-Internet (CSA) overlap 
Finding 
13.1.31  Some offenders used the Internet to facilitate CSA offences that were international in nature. 
Both Internet-initiated grooming and IIIC cases, could involve victims and/or offenders moving 
internationally. Similarly, contact between offenders which was initiated over the Internet, could lead 
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 The concept that child protection is ‘everybody’s business’, especially in relation to statutory bodies and 
NGOs, and the public, is becoming increasing popular (see, for example, Department for Education and Skills, 
2006). The findings of this research, in respect of the expanding role the private sector can, and should, play in 
child protection, indicates that this concept needs to be interpreted even more broadly. 
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to CAIs being moved internationally. Similarly, international child sex abusers sometimes used the 
Internet to facilitate offences, either inciting co-offenders to travel internationally (to join them) and 
sexually abuse children, or to send photographic recordings of the abuse they perpetrated abroad to 
their ‘home’ computer. 
Implication 
13.1.32  Policy makers and practitioners need to be aware of, and develop their responses to, the links 
which exists between international and Internet cases - links which may well be increasing. 
13.2  International CSA 
Macro-level change 
Finding 
13.2.1  There was a widespread consensus, at least among NGOs and other specialists working in this 
area, that the macro-level economic, political and social challenges faced by developing countries, 
were major factors in explaining the existence of international (and ‘local’) CSA in those countries. 
These challenges were also believed to be significant in the inability of those countries to response 
adequately to international and Internet CSA. 
Implication 
13.2.2  The governments of developed countries, including that of the UK, along with international 
political, economic, welfare and advocacy organisations, must do all in their power to assist and 
encourage developing countries to address the macro-level economic, but also political and social, 
challenges which account for CSA - whether international or local. (It is in the light of this, that the 
UK Government’s professed aim of addressing poverty and debt in developing countries is to be 
welcomed (Directgov, 2005).  
  
‘Local’ support  
Finding  
13.2.3  The UK Government (through, for example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the 
Department for International Development), along with NGOs and UK police services, has provided 
assistance to governments and agencies in developing countries to help improve their response to 
CSA. This includes, for example, the training of police officers, funding projects to work with street 
children and the provision of computing equipment. 
Implication 
13.2.4  Although these initiatives tended to be quite ‘local’ and small scale, they did stand to make an 
important contribution to child protection. In view of this, these initiatives should, not only be 
continued, but also significantly expanded, by the UK Government and all other governments of 
developed countries.  
That said, the UK - despite some shortcomings - has one of the most established, sophisticated, and 
well-resourced child protection systems in the world, particularly in terms of law enforcement. This 
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being the case, the UK should be at the forefront of attempts to assist developing countries improve 
their response to child protection. 
Moral responsibility  
Finding 
13.2.5  Interviewees were generally of the opinion that far more offenders travelled from developed 
countries - including the UK - to developing ones, in order to perpetrate CSA, than the converse. This 
did not seem an unreasonable proposition, given the economic and travel advantages which residents 
of developed countries enjoy. In addition, there are economic, political and social factors, within 
developing countries, which not only render children therein especially vulnerable to CSA, but which 
also mean these countries are less able and/or willing to respond to CSA. 
Implication 
13.2.6  Given that developed countries are, in effect, ‘exporting’ CSA to developing countries - the 
countries which are the least equipped to deal with it - there is an additional, moral responsibility upon 
governments in developed countries, including that of the UK, both to prevent this phenomenon and to 
assist developing countries respond to it.    
International pressure 
Finding  
13.2.7  While some countries and statutory agencies were unable to respond adequately to CSA - 
whether international or local - others were unwilling to do so. In particular, there were reports of 
corruption, the placing of commercial interests (relating to the tourist trade) before those of child 
protection, indifference to CSA, a failure to understand the seriousness of CSA, a lack of political will 
to tackle CSA, an absence of a child- or victim-centred focus, an apportioning of responsibility to 
victims rather than offenders, and delays in, or refusals to carry out, investigations. While these 
criticisms were made largely in respect of developing countries, they were sometimes made in respect 
of developed ones as well.  
Implication 
13.2.8  In addition to macro-level and local-level support, governments, including that of the UK, 
along with international political, economic, welfare and advocacy organisations, must ensure that - 
where necessary - they pressure such countries and agencies, both to accept their responsibility to 
protect children from sexual abuse, and to respond to CSA in an appropriate and effective manner.  
Local services 
Finding 
13.2.9  While the international nature and response to these cases - whether they involved the 
movement of victims, offenders or CAIs - could be quite significant, it was notable that the large 
majority of work on these cases - and very often extremely good work - was, and had to be, carried out 
by local agencies, including police services (in particular) and local authority children’s services. 
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Implication 
13.2.10  This report has advocated that international (and many Internet) CSA cases be responded to 
with both existing, and new, international, and national, law enforcement organisations (such as 
Interpol, the Virtual Global Taskforce (VGT, 2005), CEOP, HMRC and IWF). However, it is 
important that the critical role which local agencies fulfil, in the response to these cases is, firstly, fully 
recognised, and secondly - in the increasing drive to respond to these cases - strengthened. 
Familiar offenders 
Finding 
13.2.11 Contrary to the impressions gained from the stereotypical cases of child trafficking and child 
sex tourism, in many international CSA cases offenders were not strangers but were known, and 
sometimes well known, to their victims.  
Implication 
13.2.12  All those responsible for, or concerned with, the response to international CSA, need to be 
aware that many of the offenders in these cases will - contrary to expectations - be known to their 
victims, as opposed to being strangers. This underlines the importance of utilising local services (see 
13.2.9 - 13.2.10) and the existing child protection system (see 13.1.18 - 13.1.19), in the response to 
international (and much Internet) CSA.  
13.2.13  Moreover, and whilst not neglecting the role of strangers in these cases (see 13.6.7 - 13.6.9), 
the above finding also emphasises the need, on the part of policy makers and practitioners, not to 
succumb to the more palatable, but erroneous notion, that most CSA is perpetrated by strangers (see 
13.1.14 - 13.1.15). 
International mindset 
Finding 
13.2.14  The research found that, in general, there was - on the part of policy and practice - insufficient 
awareness of, or thought given to, international CSA. This situation is probably explained, in part at 
least, by the fact that child protection has traditionally, and is still currently, organised predominantly 
on a local basis, with little investment in national initiatives, and even less in international ones. This 
has had the following effects:  
• Those who are involved in, or concerned with, child protection have a poor knowledge of 
international CSA, in terms of its typology, extent, nature, and the implications it raises for policy 
and practice  
• Assumptions and misconceptions, surrounding these cases, tend to be quite prevalent (see 13.1.11 - 
13.1.13) 
• Most significantly, the international policy and practice response to these cases is poorly 
developed, in areas such as police liaison, the monitoring and supervision of children and 
offenders, and the compatibility of legislation 
Implication 
13.2.15  Policy makers and practitioners need to develop more of an international (and for that matter 
national) mindset in relation CSA - in the same way that they have developed - and to considerable 
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effect - a Internet (CSA) mindset. The most direct and relevant way in which this can be done is by 
promoting awareness, understanding and knowledge, through, for example, training courses, 
conferences, guidance, reports and research.  
13.2.16  The specific measures recommended elsewhere in this report - such as dedicated law 
enforcement agencies and workers (see 11.1 and 11.2), and legislative reforms (see 12.2.6 - 12.2.7) - 
for improving the response to international cases, would be an additional, indirect, but important, 
means of advancing this international mindset. 
13.2.17  This objective seems even more pressing, given that increasing international interaction 
through, for instance, greater travel, trade and Internet-based communication will, almost certainly, 
lead to further international CSA cases.   
Diversity of international CSA 
Finding 
13.2.18  Where there has been any policy or practice response to international CSA, then this has been 
concerned, largely, with just two sub-types of case: child trafficking into the UK and child sex tourism 
out of the UK. However, this research found that both international CSA victim, and international 
child sex abuser, cases were far more diverse - and consequently more challenging - than existing 
official responses suggested.  
13.2.19  Victims included not only those who were trafficked but also those abused in the context of 
forced marriages, ‘fostering’, holidays, organised trips, and Internet-initiated grooming and child sex 
abuser networks. Moreover, they comprised not only children coming into the UK but those going out
of the UK.  
13.2.20  Similarly, offenders included not only sex tourists but also those who abused in the context of 
working with children - whether in a paid, voluntary or religious capacity - those who entered a 
country on the basis of  being a holidaymaker, migrant or student, and members of the military. Again, 
this research identified offenders who not only went out of the UK but also those who came into the 
UK. Finally, this research highlighted the existence of a third major category of international CSA - 
that of internationally moved CAIs. 
Implication 
13.2.21  All those involved in, or concerned with, child protection should recognise that international 
CSA victim and child sex abuser cases are much more diverse than existing stereotypes suggest, and 
that the policy and practice response to them consequently needs to be much more extensive and 
sophisticated.  
13.2.22  If policy makers and practitioners, including NGOs, were to adopt this much broader 
approach,  and in doing so, drop the existing overly narrow one, then this should bring about a more 
effective and efficient response to international CSA. 
13.2.23  That the typology of international CSA victims and international child sex abusers is much 
broader than has previously been conceived, underlines the appropriateness of the broadening out, in 
recent years, of the conceptualisation of ‘trafficking’ and ‘child sex tourism’, on the part of policy and 
practice, as indicated, for example, in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sections 57 and 72) (Home 
Office, 2004a). 
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13.3  International CSA victims 
Children trafficked for sexual exploitation 
Finding 
13.3.1  Interviews with police officers and NGO workers revealed that the needs of children who had 
been trafficked into the UK, to be sexually exploited, could be especially acute. These children had 
often experienced serious and repeated sexual abuse by multiple perpetrators, physical abuse, 
abduction, false imprisonment, and were cut off from family and country. Some of them had also been 
maltreated within their own families, prior to being trafficked. Thus, victims felt, and were, very 
vulnerable - a feeling which was compounded by their fear of the traffickers. To make matters worse, 
tension sometimes arose between meeting the welfare needs of these victims (including their need to 
remain in the country) and meeting the ‘needs’ of the CJS. This tension was heightened, still further, 
by the on-going controversy surrounding immigration into the UK. 
Implication  
13.3.2  Cases involving the trafficking of children into the UK for the purposes of sexual exploitation 
have to be responded to in an appropriate and effective manner. If this is to be done then it will require 
the following: 
• All those who have responsibility for children trafficked for sexual exploitation should be fully 
aware of the profound abuse they are likely to have suffered and the impact this will have had upon 
them in terms of their vulnerability   
• They should be further aware that these victims will have acute needs and they must do all in their 
power to meet these needs, including providing victims with the opportunity to remain in the UK if 
they so wish 
• The police and CPS, but also the Government (through its policies and pronouncements), must 
ensure that that the demands of the CJS are not put before the needs of the child. (As part of this, 
victims should not be put under any pressure to take part in the criminal proceedings.) 
• The Government (and also political parties and the media) should be aware that the statements they 
make, and the approach they adopt, towards immigration into the UK, can have adverse effects 
upon child (and adult) victims of sexual exploitation 
The scope of sexual offences-related trafficking  
Finding 
13.3.3  This research found that the trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation (i.e. 
CSA with a financial motive - invariably undertaken in the context of (forced) prostitution) was only 
one of the many different contexts in which children moved, or were moved, across international 
borders and were subsequently sexually abused. While it is recognised that the former cases could be 
especially serious (see 13.3.1) other types of international CSA victim case could also possess grave 
aggravating factors, such as children being exposed to child sex abuser networks or being removed 
from their country of origin after having been ‘fostered’ by an offender.  
13.3.4  Although this diversity of sexual offences-related trafficking is recognised in section 57 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (see paragraph 257, Home Office, 2004a), this research suggested that 
some practitioners retain a very narrow, and traditional, understanding of this term - as it relates to 
CSA i.e. one restricted to prostitution. In addition, the Government has introduced, through the 
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Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, a much broader definition of the 
term ‘trafficking’ 
Implication 
13.3.5  The Government and agencies should ensure that all those involved in the CJS (i.e. police, CPS 
and judiciary) are fully conversant with, and ready to implement, the breadth of provision contained 
within section 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, as it relates to children trafficked for CSA. 
13.4  International movement of CAIs 
Extent 
 
Finding 
13.4.1  Contrary to earlier statements of some specialists (or ‘experts’), this research found that the 
availability of CAIs on the Internet has not led to a cessation in the international movement of CAIs. 
On the contrary, contacts initiated over the Internet, between offenders, led to new instances of this 
behaviour (see 7.3.5 - 7.3.6). Moreover, this activity involved not only the importation of CAIs (into 
the UK) but also the export of such images (see 7.1.1). Neither were these images confined to less 
serious abuse but reflected the full range of scenes found in Internet-based CAIs (see 7.4.7 - 7.4.8).
Implication 
13.4.2  All those involved in, or concerned with child protection, should appreciate that the 
international movement of CAIs, into and out of the UK, has not disappeared (with the rise of the 
Internet) but remains, and may well have increased in terms of both incidence and the seriousness of 
images.  
13.4.3  Following on from the above, it is vital that policy makers and practitioners ensure that the 
response to the international movement of CAIs is not allowed to decline in any way. Indeed, they 
should give serious consideration to strengthening this response (as indicated in 12.4 and 12.5). 
13.4.4  The creation of CAIs has undoubtedly become much easier with the wide availability of 
digital-type cameras. It would seem that controlling the use of these cameras, for such malign 
purposes, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. While it may not be feasible, then, to prevent the 
creation of CAIs, improvements in the policy and practice response to Internet CAIs (and Internet 
CSA in general) may deter some offenders from sending these CAIs - internationally - over the 
Internet. However, given the ease with which digital images may be moved, and concealed, 
physically, in the form of DVDs for example, policy and practice needs to be alert to the risk that 
offenders might opt instead to smuggle CAIs, into and out of countries, especially through the post.  
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13.5  Internet CSA 
New technology mindset 
Finding 
13.5.1  Much of this research focused upon computers and the fixed (Internet) connections between 
them - on account of the fact that these have, and still, account for the largest proportion of 
technology-related CSA. However, the research found that there was a wide, and increasing, range of 
other new technologies that could be used to facilitate CSA. These included digital recording and 
storage devices (such as cameras, web cams, CDs, DVDs), mobile phones (some of which 
incorporated cameras and Internet access) and covert cameras. Offenders were, in regards to 
computers and the Internet, also able to draw upon a considerable and expanding, array of software 
and communication protocols to assist their illegal activities. Developments in this new technology, 
including its effectiveness, seem, up until now at least, perpetual.  
13.5.2  In terms of child protection, this development appeared to be producing a number of distinct 
trends. In particular, offenders were finding it technically easier, and in some instances increasingly 
secure, to communicate with children, avoid being detected by parents/carers or other responsible 
persons, communicate with co-offenders, take and conceal CAIs, move CAIs (either electronically or 
physically), and conceal or destroy evidence in relation to their offending. 
Implication 
13.5.3  All those involved in, or concerned with, child protection, must recognise that computers and 
the Internet are only one of a number of new technologies that being used to facilitate CSA, and that 
they need to develop their response accordingly. This includes the development of a wider, ‘new 
technology’ mindset, as opposed to a narrow computer/Internet one. While the scale of known Internet, 
and other new technology-related, CSA, is relatively small, and might always remains so, it does seem 
clear that ‘new technology’ represents a growing, and increasingly effective, threat to children. 
Costs and benefits 
Finding 
13.5.4  Computers and the Internet, and other new technologies, have had a major, beneficial impact 
upon many different spheres of life, including business, communication, education and leisure. New 
technologies do, though, also carry with them serious ‘costs’ in terms of the facilitation of criminal 
offences, one of the most serious of which is CSA. 
Implication 
13.5.5  The Government decision to commit £25 million of ‘new’ money (Department of Health, 
2001), along with other initiatives, such as the Home Secretary’s Task Force on Child Protection on 
the Internet, in order to combat computer- and Internet-related crime have to be commended. That 
said, the Government - and indeed society in general - has to realise that new technology presents a 
serious, and growing, child protection risk. More particularly, the Government (and society) has to 
accept that, as well as enjoying the benefits of this new technology, it must also meets its costs - in this 
case, the need to protect children. The Government must, therefore, be prepared to make more new
resources available, especially to the police, if there is to be anything like an effective response to new 
technology-related CSA (see 11.4). 
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Suicide 
Finding 
13.5.6  Enquiries among a number of police services suggested that the suicide rate among suspects in 
Internet CSA cases, especially those involving the use of CAIs was, very approximately, 1-2%. In the 
cases presented in Table 14 (see 10.4.7), there were three suicides (and one ‘other death’) among 199 
suspects, equating to a suicide rate of 1.5%. 
13.5.7  The above, are higher rates of suicide than that which has been cited for Operation Ore - the 
major international law enforcement investigation into the worldwide sale of CAIs through the 
Internet. In this case, 32, out of a total of 7,272 suspects, or 0.4%, are reported to have committed 
suicide (The Register, 2005). (It is not known how or precisely when this figure was compiled. It may 
be that it should be seen as ‘the most recent figure to date’ and one which might well have increased as 
this particular investigation has progressed.)   
13.5.8  Based upon one of author’s (Gallagher) quite considerable experience in child protection 
research, it is believed that while the suicide rate among the users of CAIs is relatively low, it is higher 
than that for child sex offenders in general. Gallagher and Pease  (2000), for example, studied attrition 
in the criminal justice system in a random sample of approximately 1000 cases of child abuse and 
neglect reported to a largely random sample of six police services from across England and Wales. 
Roughly one-half of these cases concerned CSA. There was one (completed) suicide in these cases, 
producing a suicide rate, among these CSA suspects, of approximately 0.2%. There was one further 
attempted suicide  
13.5.9  While the police were generally well aware of this heightened risk, this may not have been the 
case for workers in other agencies, such as prisons, children’s services and health. 
Implication 
                            
13.5.10  It is important that all agencies are fully cognisant of the (heightened) risk of suicide among 
suspects in Internet CSA cases - especially those involving the use of CAIs. Whilst recognising that 
there are limits as to what agencies can do in respect of this issue, they need to take whatever steps 
they can to identify and monitor high risk cases, and prevent such outcomes. 
13.5.11  Research should be carried out to establish whether it is possible to identify risk factors, for 
suicide, among individuals in Internet CSA cases, and especially those involving the use of CAIs. 
Mock suicide attempts 
Finding 
13.5.12  Some offenders, on being detected, in Internet CSA cases, and in particular, it seemed, 
Internet grooming cases, went through mock suicide attempts. It appeared that the purpose of these 
mock suicide attempts was to manipulate people, be they persons known to the offender (especially 
family members), victims or agency workers. These offenders had shown a marked propensity 
towards, and adeptness in, manipulation, whereby they could perpetrate, and then conceal, the sexual 
abuse of children. The mock suicides seemed a further extension of this manipulative behaviour. 
Implication 
13.5.13  Notwithstanding the small numbers of cases studied in the course of this research, it would 
appear that agency workers do need to be aware that some offenders, in Internet CSA cases, will make 
mock suicide attempts, and that the primary purpose of these is probably to manipulate people around 
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them. Agency workers, themselves, should be careful to avoid being manipulated by these offenders 
either in this, or any other, way. 
13.5.14  At the same time, agency workers have to recognise that other of these Internet CSA 
offenders do make genuine (and sometimes completed) suicide attempts (see 13.5.6 - 13.5.11) and that 
they will, therefore, have to try and discriminate between these two phenomena.  
13.6  Internet-initiated grooming  
The needs of victims 
Finding 
13.6.1  While this research was not able to study the needs of victims in international and Internet 
CSA cases in any systematic or large scale manner, there were suggestions, in cases of Internet-
initiated grooming, at least, that these were not always addressed. There appeared to be three main 
reasons for this:  
• Virtually all of the victims in these cases were abused by strangers - a situation which the child 
protection system does not seem well-equipped to deal with - being geared far more towards 
intrafamilial CSA  
• Many victims did not have backgrounds which might have been thought to have rendered 
especially vulnerable to CSA - or, not at least, in any very conspicuous manner. Consequently, 
agency workers sometimes assumed - in the absence of any reliable assessment on their part - that 
victims did not need any therapeutic or other supportive intervention  
• Some victims came from backgrounds characterised by a higher SEC, and their parents/carers - 
wishing to avoid the stigma which they perceived as being attached to welfare services -  did not 
take up any support for the young person. (This echoes the findings of research into organised CSA 
(Gallagher, 1998a) which showed a similar reticence on the part of middle-class families to take up 
child protection, and especially welfare, services.)  
Implication 
13.6.2  Agency workers (but also parents/carers) should be careful not to make assumptions about the 
needs of victims in Internet grooming cases, and in particular as to whether they are any more or less 
acute, or indeed different in any other way, than those of other CSA victims. Rather, the needs of these 
young people should be assessed in the same manner as that of any other CSA victim, and services 
offered to them accordingly. 
  
Compliant victims 
Finding 
13.6.3  There has, in recent years, in the literature, been a growing emphasis upon the ‘role’ of victims 
in cases of Internet grooming (Wolak, Mitchell and Finkelhor, 2003; Berson and Berson, 2005;). In 
particular, it has been argued that victims have acceded, in varying degrees, firstly, to being groomed, 
and secondly, to being sexually abused - what Lanning (2002) has referred to as the ‘compliant 
victim’. Given that there are many young people who are ‘approached’ online (Finkelhor, Mitchell and 
Wolak, 2000) but only a very few who succumb to efforts to groom them, it does not seem 
unreasonable to examine the role or actions of this latter group. 
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Implication 
13.6.4  It is recognised that some people will not agree with the concept of ‘compliant victims’ in 
grooming cases, and will contend, instead, that victims have no responsibility for these situations. 
Whilst recognising that these arguments have a definite moral validity, they appear to be less valid on 
practical grounds (and possibly legal ones), and may indeed even be harmful to children.  
13.6.5  These authors maintain that public education/prevention campaigns around Internet grooming 
must devote sufficient attention to the issue of young people taking responsibility, themselves, for 
their protection on the Internet. This is becoming even more relevant as more children acquire access 
to devices offering mobile Internet access, such as Internet-enabled mobile phones - given that these 
are subject to less monitoring by parents/carers.  
13.6.6  Having made this argument, the authors would advise that any discussion of the role of victims 
in Internet grooming cases, be handled carefully. More specifically, they would, drawing upon their 
own research, highlight a series of considerations that should to be taken into account in discussing the 
concept of the ‘compliant victim’ and the issue of responsibility more generally:  
• Young people, by virtue of their age, are at a stage when acquiring, and being in, an 
emotional/sexual relationship is particularly important - but this may render them especially 
vulnerable to being exploited  
• Some, if not many, of the victims in these cases believed that the person they were communicating 
with, and subsequently agreed to meet was, very broadly, of a similar age  
• Given that young people may not be as able, as adults, to gauge the risk in meeting a stranger, they 
may not be as ‘thrill-seeking’ as has been suggested by some authors, such as O’Connell (2004) 
• The dynamics and interaction, between victims and offenders, may be very complex - and possibly 
much more complex than has been implied by some authors. Indeed, young people were often so 
effectively groomed and manipulated, if not harassed and brainwashed, that they were not acting of 
their own volition as much as might have appeared 
• Following on from the above, it should be recognised that in some instances victims were not at all 
‘compliant’. These included cases where the victim was sexually abused after the offender had 
travelled to their home or after they had been blackmailed 
• Irrespective of the circumstances of a case, young people should not be made to feel responsible, in 
any way, for their abuse  
• Offenders (and defence lawyers) should not be given any additional opportunity to plead mitigating 
circumstances in the sexual abuse of children which they [the offenders] have orchestrated  
• It should also be pointed out, that most of the discussion of compliant victims has been based upon 
samples of young people from North America. Owing to cultural differences, it may be that the 
results of these studies are not readily transferable to other countries, such as the UK and other       
European countries. North American young people may, for example, be more precocious and 
may, therefore, be more likely to place themselves in high risk situations 
Stranger abuse 
    
Finding 
13.6.7  All but one of the Internet-initiated grooming cases studied in the course of this research 
involved victims and offenders who were strangers to one another. (The one exception being a case in 
which the offender - who was the victim’s mother’s non-resident, boyfriend - contacted the victim and 
pretended to be a stranger - see 8.4.4.) 
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Implication 
13.6.8  While it is important that the extent of stranger abuse is kept in perspective (Gallagher, 
Bradford and Pease, 2002), it is also necessary to recognise that it does exist - both offline and 
increasingly online - and requires an effective and on-going, policy and practice response.  
13.6.9  The above finding also suggests that claims by some writers, such as  Furedi (2001), that 
society has a wholly excessive concern over stranger abuse - or is ‘paranoid’ - are not well-founded.
13.7  Internet-based (and internationally moved) CAIs 
13.7.1  Cases comprising Internet CAIs were found to be far more numerous than those involving the 
international movement of CAIs, and were subject, consequently, to a much greater policy and 
practice response. Given this, and in the interests of brevity, all the references in this section of the 
report are to Internet CAIs. However, it should be noted that most of the points set out below are 
equally applicable to internationally moved CAIs.  
The needs of victims 
Finding 
13.7.2  A number of agency workers suggested that children who had been made to feature in CAIs 
would have discrete and significant needs as a result of their being subject to this particular form of 
sexual abuse. This argument has also been put forward in the literature - see for example Palmer and 
Stacey (2004). Despite this, there appears to be little reliable evidence as to the nature or degree of 
impact that this particular form of maltreatment has upon children. 
Implication 
13.7.3  Notwithstanding this lack of evidence, it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that being 
made to feature in CAIs may have discrete and significant impacts upon children. (Certainly being 
photographed in an indecent context, and then having these images viewed by vast numbers of people, 
in perpetuity, might well raise unique issues for children and consequently therapeutic services.)  
13.7.4  While agency workers should, then, be ready and able to address the needs of these victims, 
they should, at the same time, be careful in making assumptions as to the nature or degree of these 
effects.  
13.7.5  Finally, it seems imperative that research be carried out to identify the effects which being 
made to feature in CAIs has upon children, and for services to be developed in accordance with the 
results of this research.  
The challenge of CAI use 
Finding 
13.7.6  It was not possible, within the remit of this research, to address the questions as to whether the 
Internet can be controlled, the extent to which it can be controlled or how best to control it - in relation 
to tackling the problem of CAI use. However, taking into account that there are likely to have been, 
worldwide, at a minimum, 100,000s of offenders, who have viewed - often with impunity - millions of 
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CAIs, featuring of 10,000s97 of children, the impression, at least, is created that the Internet is out of 
control. 
Implication 
13.7.7  This is not said to be alarmist nor sensational. Moreover, it is fully recognised that one of the 
fundamental attributes of the Internet is the absence of control.98 The point being made here is that no 
one should be under any illusion as to the scale of the Internet CAI problem, nor the amount that needs 
to be done, in terms of policy and practice, if there is to be an effective response to this phenomenon. 
The seriousness of CAIs 
  
Finding 
13.7.8  As stated in 10.4.13 - 10.4.18, while CAIs are quite diverse in their nature, many of them 
depict the sexual, and sometimes physical, abuse of children, and some of these scenes involve 
extremely serious assaults upon children.  It is likely that the majority of society - including agency 
workers outside of the police - have very little appreciation of the seriousness of CAIs. This is well 
illustrated by suggestions in the media, from across the political spectrum, that the law enforcement 
response to CAIs is excessive or, as they have more pointedly claimed, constitutes a ‘witch-hunt’ - see 
for example the Daily Mail (2003) and The Guardian (2003).  
Implication 
13.7.9  Professionals, and the public, should be under no illusion as to the gravity of many CAIs. It is 
for this reason, that robustness in the law enforcement response to CAIs is appropriate and necessary. 
This includes cases where offenders ‘only’ view CAIs.  
The risk of CSA by CAI users 
Finding 
                        
13.7.10  One of the key questions which has arisen in respect of CAI users is the degree of risk they 
pose to children. Previously it had been claimed - albeit in somewhat unquestioning manner, and on 
the basis of little evidence - that a relatively large proportion of these offenders were known to have 
sexually abused children. One of the most frequently quoted figures was that produced by the US 
Postal Inspections Service, which indicated that 36% of CAI users had sexually abused children (US 
Postal Inspection Service, 2002). 
  
13.7.11  More recently, it has began to be suggested that the known risk may, in fact, be much lower. 
This is borne out by this research - see Table 14 (see 10.4.7). It is possible that some of the non-
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 The authors recognise that it is difficult to estimate, with any reliability (and sometimes meaning), the full
extent of the problem of Internet-based CAIs. However, that information which does exist, indicates that, even at 
a minimum level, this is a very considerable challenge. For example, Hart (2003) reports that the US Postal 
Inspection Service investigation, known as Operation Avalanche (and Operation Ore in the UK), found that the 
main offenders in this case had sold CAIs to 150,000 individuals worldwide. Quayle et al (2006) report that the 
COPINE archive contained over 500,000 CAIs. Taylor and Quayle (2003), having collated images from only 
one Internet protocol (newsgroups - and then only a sample of these), estimated that these had featured 
approximately 2,400 children. Furthermore, and as far back as 2001, US Customs reckoned that there were 
roughly 100,000 web sites ‘involved in some way with child pornography’ (US Customs, 2001).   
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 That said, it is notable that major IT companies, namely Cisco, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo have bowed to 
the demands of the Chinese government and imposed limits on the use of the Internet, for political purposes, by 
the citizens of that country (Maitland, 2006; Watts, 2006). 
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convicted suspects, covered in Table 14, had committed CSA offences but had simply not been 
detected. This, however, has to be recognised for what it is; namely, speculation. In terms of what was
known - from this research at least - only a relatively small proportion of individuals who were 
suspected of using CAIs were known to have sexually abused children.  
13.7.12  It should also be pointed out that some of the above suspects (in Table 14) who were known 
to have sexually abused children, may have done so prior to using CAIs i.e. it could not be argued that 
the use of CAIs had led them to sexually abuse a child.  
Implication 
13.7.13  Agency workers have to recognise that it is likely that the known risk of CSA among CAI-
users is relatively low, and much lower than has been suggested previously. Whilst not abandoning the 
due amount of caution which must surround any child protection work, this finding is something 
which agency workers must take into account when carrying out assessments of the (on-going) risk 
which CAI users pose to children.  
Wider consequences of CAI use 
Finding 
13.7.14  Notwithstanding the debate which surrounds the risk which CAI users pose to children, and 
which were raised above, this research did find that the use of CAIs could have a number of serious 
consequences. These were as follows: 
• Individuals sexually abusing children very soon after - and seemingly as a direct result of - their 
starting to view CAIs - and where there was no concern of such behaviour previously    
• Individuals sexually abusing children, and photographing these acts, in order to secure CAIs which 
they could use, over the Internet, to trade for other CAIs - again, where there were no concern of 
such behaviour previously 
• Individuals who were already sexually abusing children but who then proceeded to abuse children 
in ways in which they had witnessed in CAIs obtained from the Internet  
• Individuals distributing CAIs who were further encouraged in this behaviour - whether they were 
carrying this out on a commercial or non-commercial basis 
• Related to the above, existing CAI victims suffered further sexual abuse and/or more severe sexual 
abuse through the production of subsequent CAIs, or additional (‘new’) children being sexually 
abused to produce further CAIs 
There are, moreover, two further fundamental effects of using CAIs that need to be highlighted: 
   
• That there was a demand for CAIs, was a major factor in there being a supply of CAIs (although 
having said this, the relationship between these two behaviours should not be over-simplified) 
• Those who viewed CAIs were, at least on a moral level, complicit in the production of those CAIs 
and the sexual abuse of children which they entailed   
Implication 
13.7.15  While the number of CAI-users who are known to have sexually abused children may be 
lower than was previously believed, this should not obscure nor minimise the fact that the use of CAIs 
can, and does, have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Moreover, every CAI can be thought of 
as an image of a child being abused.  
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13.7.16  These findings underline the need for a robust response to the use of CAIs - and one, above 
and beyond, that targeted at CAIs per se. 
The nature of CAI users 
Finding 
13.7.17  As shown in Table 14 (10.4.7) and 13.7.10 - 13.7.13, the proportion of CAI users who were 
known - at least within the confines of this research - to have sexually abused children was very small, 
and certainly smaller than has been suggested elsewhere. These authors would argue that this aspect of 
CAI users’ behaviour might indicate that they are different to child sex abusers, in terms of their 
psychological profile.99 100
13.7.18  There were a number of other features of the behaviour of CAI users which strengthens the 
view that they might, to some degree, be psychologically distinct from child sex abusers. These 
features include the number of offenders who either welcomed being detected, willingly surrendered 
evidence or did not dispose of it in the face of imminent investigation, readily admitted their offences, 
showed remorse or who committed suicide.  
13.7.19  This is not to say that the number of CAI users who exhibited any of these behaviours, was 
very high. In fact, it was not possible, within this research, to obtain a reliable measure of the 
incidence of these behaviours. The point being made here is that these responses are believed to be 
extremely rare among child sex abusers - even those convicted of particularly serious offences. It is 
this difference that leads to the view that these CAI users may be a somewhat discrete group of child 
sex offenders. 
Implication 
13.7.20  All those involved in, or concerned with, child protection should be aware that CAI users may 
be psychologically, and behaviourally, different to child sex abusers, and more particularly, may 
present less of a risk to children than has been suggested to date. The above finding reinforces the 
need, especially among practitioners, to be objective and cautious in assessing the risk that these 
offenders pose to children. Clearly, more research is needed on this subject, and especially that on the 
identification, if possible, of risk factors, for CSA, among CAI users.  
13.7.21  It should be stressed, that the above points are not put forward to mitigate or minimise, in any 
way, the behaviour of this group of offenders - behaviour which these authors believe to be both 
serious and reprehensible. Rather, the authors are simply seeking to further knowledge of CAI use, and 
help inform policy and practice, especially that around risk assessment - in circumstances where there 
is a paucity of reliable information, and a risk that decisions will be made on the basis of assumptions 
or misconceptions (see 13.1.11 - 13.1.13). 
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 It might be, for example, that, compared to child sex abusers, CAIs users have a lower motivation to sexually 
abuse children, lack the gall, or the techniques, to carry out these acts, or are prevented from doing this on the 
basis of - what remains of - their belief system. Alternatively, it may be that some CAIs do not sexually abuse 
children because they lack the opportunity.  
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 It should be stressed that this discussion is based upon CAI users/child sex abusers as a whole. The authors 
are well aware that some individual CAIs users are known to have sexually abused children. 
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Sexual interest in children  
Finding 
13.7.22  The scale of CAI use found by this (see 10.3) and other research (see 13.7.6), suggests that 
adult (and possibly juvenile) male sexual interest in children is more extensive, and possibly much 
more so, than was previously thought. This concurs with the arguments of other writers, such as 
Taylor and Quayle (2003).101
Implication 
13.7.23  Policy makers and practitioners - and indeed society in general - should be aware that sexual 
interest in children is more widespread than has been appreciated before. As to the full implications of 
this finding, these remain to be determined. However, what this finding does suggest is that 
explanations for sexual interest in, and abuse of, children, may lie less in psychological/medical type 
models - which have tended to dominate policy and practice to date - and more in social/cultural 
models.  
Police attitude to Internet-based CAIs 
Finding 
13.7.24  Previously, the police response to Internet CAIs tended to be belated, reticent and uneven, 
and did not begin in any concerted fashion until, very approximately, 2002, when these cases started to 
become the focus of widespread media and public, concern and attention. There appeared to be a 
number of reasons behind this response. These included, an insufficiency of resources, a failure to 
appreciate the seriousness of the problem and ambivalence, among some police officers, towards child 
protection work. Since 2002, however, the police have embarked upon an increasingly robust response 
to these cases, being willing to direct more resources towards their investigation, having a better 
appreciation of their seriousness and possessing a greater readiness towards tackling them. 
Implication 
13.7.25  The police do, then, have to be commended for their much improved response to Internet 
CAIs. That said, it is essential that they not only maintain these improvements but also build upon 
them, particularly in terms of resources, prioritisation and commitment. Within this, it is also 
important that the police continue to guard against and combat the ambivalence that exists within 
some sections of the police towards child protection. 
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 Indeed, a similar point was made by West (1987) - almost 20 years ago. 
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Chapter 14 
Other international and new technology-
related sexual offences 
14.1  Introduction 
14.1.1  This study was concerned primarily with CSA offences that had an international or Internet 
dimension. However, during the course of the research other types of international and new 
technology-related sexual offence were identified. While these offences do not fall within the main 
remit of the research, they are felt to be closely connected to international and Internet CSA, and also 
help reinforce or extend some of the arguments which have been made, above, in regards to these 
cases. It is for these reasons that it is felt worthwhile discussing these particular cases in this, specially 
dedicated, chapter of the report.  These offences can be grouped into three main categories: 
• The use of mobile phones to facilitate CSA 
• The use of covert cameras to take abusive images of children (and women)  
• Abusive images of women (AIW) which are moved internationally or which are Internet-based 
14.1.2  These offences were not studied in any extensive or systematic manner. Consequently, what 
follows should be taken as only a very preliminary discussion of the phenomena in question. It is 
hoped, though, that by recording here, these additional observations from the research, that this might 
contribute to knowledge and understanding of the wider problem of international and new technology-
related sexual offences, perpetrated against children - and women. 
14.2  Mobile phones 
Finding 
14.2.1  There is a significant and increasing amount of concern over the use of mobile phones in the 
initiation of CSA, and in particular grooming  (Childnet International, 2003). However, this research 
did not - for the period from the start of the NPQS (January 1999) until the end of the fieldwork 
(March 2004) - learn of a single case, in the UK, where a mobile phone had been used to initiate
contact with a child for the purposes of grooming and then sexually abusing that child. (This is based 
upon the NPQS, interviews, file and record searches, and informal contacts with agency workers.)  
14.2.2  Interestingly, and tellingly, the research did come across two (separate) cases where children 
(one boy in each case) had been sexually abused (by men) after they had rung a (solely telephone-
based) chatline and offered themselves for sex for payment. So, while it is possible that there may 
have been cases comprising mobile phone-initiated grooming, which this research missed, that these 
chatline cases existed, and were identified, underlines the sense that if there were any mobile phone 
cases, then these were not very numerous. 
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14.2.3  That said, in many of the Internet-initiated grooming cases, offenders were eager to, and 
invariably succeeded in, transferring their communication with children from the Internet to mobile 
phones. It is likely that they preferred mobile phones as these provided a more effective and 
surreptitious means of communicating with, and therefore grooming, children. 
14.2.4  The research did learn of cases where young people had sent indecent images of themselves to 
other persons, using a camera-enabled mobile phone, and also of instances where young people had 
received indecent images from offenders, via mobile phones. While these behaviours are obviously of 
concern, it is important to note (again) that they appeared to be uncommon - at least in terms of known 
cases. 
14.2.5  It is worth reiterating, that this research did not enquire into the use of mobile phones in 
initiating CSA offences in as thorough a manner as it did for the Internet, so it is possible that some 
cases were missed. That said, this is unlikely to drastically alter the overall impression from this 
research that mobile phone-initiated CSA cases were, and still are, in all likelihood, rare. 
Recommendation 
14.2.6  While agencies, and society more generally, have to be aware of the CSA-related risks which 
mobile phones present, it is important that these risks, as with those pertaining to the Internet, are kept 
in perspective.  
14.2.7  That said, it is likely that the risk to children, from the misuse of mobile phones, will grow, and 
possibly significantly - due, chiefly, to more phones acquiring Internet, but also camera, capability. 
There are, furthermore, relatively limited controls over how children purchase and obtain mobile 
phones. This being the case, it will become ever more pressing for Internet use by children, whether 
through computers or mobile phones, to be adequately monitored, controlled and regulated.
14.2.8  It is hoped that CEOP will take a national lead on developing the police response to the threat 
which all forms of new technology - including mobile phones - present to children. 
14.3  Covert cameras 
Finding 
14.3.1  A further technological development which is beginning to raise issues for child protection, 
and sex offending more generally, is that of covert cameras. Offenders now have the ability to conceal 
small cameras which can record images to a high quality and in some instances even transmit these to 
remote locations, without the knowledge of the victim. The cameras are designed to record images of 
victims, in a variety of situations, either partly or wholly undressed. Although these concerns are 
relatively recent, they are starting to be discussed in the literature (see Wolak, Finkelhor and Mitchell, 
2005). 
14.3.2  Based upon the small number of cases they studied in the course of this research, and their 
wider understanding of the Internet, the authors would make the following, very tentative, 
observations: 
• The number of known cases appears to be very small with a few police services having only 1-2 
cases reported to them over the 5+ years covered by the study, and the remainder not detecting any 
cases whatsoever 
• All, or virtually all of the victims, are children or women, and all the offenders are male. 
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• There are Internet sites dedicated to these activities - which may well be both inciting and 
facilitating this offending 
• As with the users of Internet CAIs, it may be that known offenders in these cases are a more 
representative cross-section of the (male) population than (known) child sex abusers in general. 
(Two of the cases reported to this study involved health professionals who were taking covert, 
indecent photographs of their patients)   
• The widespread availability of covert cameras, and awareness of the existence of this technology, 
are relatively new. This probably explains, in part, why the number of cases known to the police is 
very small. However, as awareness of this technology, and the nefarious uses to which it can be 
put, increases, along with the capabilities of the cameras themselves, this is likely to lead to an rise 
both in the incidence, and the reporting, of these cases 
Recommendation 
14.3.3  Legislation was recently introduced, under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (section 67, 
subsection 3), making this type of behaviour  i.e. ‘voyeurism’, a criminal offence.102 This legislation 
is, then, both appropriate and timely. Despite this, there is a need for some additional awareness of this 
issue among both agencies and society more generally. At the same time, and as with most other 
technology-related CSA featuring in this research, this phenomenon must be kept in perspective in 
terms of the number of known, and all, cases.  
14.3.4  Again, it is hoped that CEOP will take a national lead on responding to these cases, especially 
in terms of collating knowledge of reported cases and building up technical expertise, and sharing 
these with local police services as the need arises. 
14.4  Abusive images of women (AIW)  
Definition 
14.4.1  The remainder of this chapter of the report discusses research findings in relation to what the 
authors have termed, for the purposes of this study at least, abusive images of women (AIW). It should 
be stressed that this discussion is concerned, not with ‘pornographic’ images that are legal, but images 
which are illegal on one, or more, of the following grounds: 
• The women who featured in them did not consent to the activities which took place i.e. they were 
victims of sexual and/or physical assault 
• The images incited the user to assault women (either explicitly or implicitly) 
• The images were used in such a way - for example distributed - which constituted a criminal act  
• The images per se were illegal - on account of the scenes they depicted 
14.4.2  It is recognised that not everyone will support the above distinction between (legal) 
pornographic and (illegal) abusive images. In the light of this, the authors would like to point out that 
whilst they use it, they are not necessarily advocating it. Moreover, they also appreciate that 
pornographic/abusive images of women can be thought of existing along a continuum as opposed to 
comprising discrete categories (Itzin, 1993). That said, the authors did opt to focus upon AIW that 
were illegal at the time the research was carried out. This is on account both of the nature of the 
research - with its focus upon criminal offences and law enforcement - and the authors’ desire to 
highlight the existence of these ‘most serious’ images.  
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14.4.3  It should be pointed that there may also be in existence comparable images featuring men but 
these would appear to far less common than those featuring women. However, where such images do 
exist then all the points made in this section of the report would be equally applicable to them.   
Vignettes 
14.4.4  Given that the main focus of this research was children, the researchers did not carry out any 
case studies featuring AIW. The authors were aware, though, of a small number of cases which had 
been reported in the media, and which can be used to illustrate the basis for the concerns that this 
section of the report seeks to address.  
UK case 
              
14.4.5  The one UK case that has, perhaps, given rise to the greatest amount of concern, is that 
of Graham Coutts who was convicted, in February 2004, of the murder, by strangulation, of 
Jane Longhurst (The Guardian, 2004). The manner in which Coutts assaulted his victim was 
said to mirror the types of images he viewed over the Internet (and to which he was said to be 
‘addicted’) - namely, scenes depicting violence towards women, and in particular those 
concerned with sexual abuse, strangulation and necrophilia. 
Dutch case 
                  
14.4.6  This case involved two men and two women, from Belgium, and one Dutch man, who 
were, between them, charged with the kidnapping, rape and human smuggling, of three female 
North African asylum seekers (Expatica, 2005). The women were taken from Belgium to the 
Netherlands, where they were videoed, in a farm shed, being physically and sexually abused by 
men, and made to have sex with animals.    
Extent 
14.4.7  This research did not obtain any figures for the number of known cases comprising the use of 
Internet AIW. However, there are figures regarding the known extent of the international movement of 
AIWs - and which suggest that this is a quite sizeable problem. HMRC (2004), for example, reports 
that in the year ending 31st March 2004, it made 2,387 seizures of ‘adult pornographic material’ (this 
was against 13 seizures of ‘paedophile material’) 
14.4.8  A number of respondents stated that digital photography - and before it video recording - and 
the Internet, had had two significant effects in terms of the extent of AIW overall. Firstly, there had 
been a major increase, over the last ten years approximately, in the creation, distribution and 
possession of AIW, both still and moving, on a worldwide basis. Most of this has activity appears to 
have taken place via the Internet, although some of this has taken place in the form of internationally 
moved images. Secondly, images that depicted, specifically, scenes of women being sexually and/or 
physically abused - whether real or staged - were much more readily available than they were 
previously.  
Nature 
14.4.9  As explained above, this research did not involve any systematic study of AIW. However, it 
did highlight what may have been some key features of this material. These were as follows: 
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• Some of the scenes depicted in AIW found on the Internet were extremely serious, and included, 
for example, a beheading, the rape of women imprisoned in camps at the time of the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, women who had had nails and other sharp objects pushed through their breasts 
and genitalia, and scenes of bestiality 
• There appeared to be three types of scene which, through a combination of their extent and 
seriousness, caused most concern among agency workers: rapes (especially those which appeared 
authentic or which were made to look authentic), physical abuse and bestiality 
Policy and practice 
General policy and practice response 
Finding 
14.4.10  There has, in general, been only a modest policy or practice response to AIW on the part of 
Government, police, HMRC or ISPs. In fact, there appears to be relatively little awareness even - at 
least officially - within many of these spheres, as to the existence of AIW. 
Implication 
14.4.11  Policy makers and practitioners need to be much more aware of the extent and nature, and the 
policy and practice implications, of AIW. Following on from this, they need to identify and implement 
measures to ensure a much more effective response to AIW. This should include an examination of the 
adequacy of existing legislation in this area.     
Additional findings 
14.4.12  Further to the above findings and recommendations being drafted, the authors were informed 
that the Home Office had launched a consultation exercise surrounding its proposal to create an 
offence of possessing ‘extreme pornographic material [featuring adults]’ (Home Office, 2005b). This 
proposal represents an important practical, and symbolic, development in the response to AIW. 
However, this proposal should be seen as only one measure, and a relatively modest one at that, in the 
response to AIW. As this section of the report argues, more substantial measures are also needed, chief 
among which are - in the first instance - the need on the part of policy to a) ensure the police and 
HMRC respond to the challenge of AIW with the seriousness its merits, and b) establish (and fund - 
from new resources) a dedicated law enforcement agency to deal with these offences. 
Police and HMRC response 
Finding 
14.4.13  The response on the part of the police and HMRC towards AIW - specifically, their 
prevention, detection and investigation - has, historically, been a modest one. With the major growth 
in the number of reported CAI cases, especially those involving the Internet, the problem of AIW 
appeared to be receiving even less attention, especially within the police.103 This, though, is at the 
same time as what appears to be a significant increase in the use of AIW.  
Implication 
14.4.14  The police - and to a lesser extent HMRC - should embark upon a much more robust response 
to the problem of AIW, especially those on the Internet. In respect of Internet-based AIW, it might be 
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appropriate for CEOP to be given a national lead for this, particularly in terms of the proactive 
response to these cases. However, there should, at a minimum, be a separate and dedicated unit within 
CEOP for undertaking this work. Otherwise, there is a risk that this area of work would be in 
competition with, and undermined by, that concerning CAIs. To this end, the Government should 
ensure that CEOP - or any other unit chosen to undertaken this role - has sufficient resources for 
undertaking this work. More resources must also be made available to local police services and 
HMRC to enable them to better respond to these cases. 
14.4.15  Alternatively, it might well be preferable for a wholly separate national agency to be set up, 
dedicated to dealing with AIW - in the same way that responsibility for child protection and domestic 
violence are separated within local police services. That said, and again following the police child 
protection-domestic violence model, it would be vital to have close links between CEOP and the 
proposed agency, given that there would be important overlaps in their areas of work, especially where 
the ages of teenager girls and young women can not be determined. 
Agency worker’ assessments 
                                                              
Finding 
14.4.16  In the course of interviews with the police and HMRC, it appeared that female staff were 
more likely than their male counterparts, to assess AIW - whether internationally moved or Internet-
based - which depicted the sexual and/or physical assault of women, as being non-consensual and/or 
otherwise illegal.  
14.4.17  Given that the large majority of workers in these two law enforcement agencies are male, it 
may be that these cases were being responded in a very particular way and that this may not have been 
the  most appropriate one.  
Implication 
14.4.18  Police and HMRC should ensure that their response to AIW cases is an appropriate one. In 
particular, they should judge AIW on the basis of an objective assessment of the evidence, as opposed 
to their (own) attitudes, values or preconceived ideas - all of which may be significantly influenced by 
their gender.  
14.4.19  In addition, organisations should ensure the following: that the training they provide to staff 
addresses this issue, a professional culture is promoted which encourages an appropriate response to 
these cases, there is a greater gender balance between staff, and staff are fully aware that the images 
they are seeking to detect and investigate (and prevent) may depict criminal assaults. 
14.4.20  Although other organisations, in particular CPS and Government, will have much less direct 
involvement in the response to AIW, it is important that all those who are responsible for, or 
concerned with, this area, have a proper understanding of the problem - and that this is, likewise, not 
unduly influenced by their gender.  
Ratcheting-up legislation  
  
Finding 
14.4.21  There are difference between countries in the legislation surrounding AIW. As one 
interviewee pointed out, for example, the creation of ‘rape videos’ in which pain is inflicted, or 
weapons used, on adult subjects (invariably women), are legal in the Netherlands but not so in the UK.  
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Implication 
14.4.22  While some interviewees called for a harmonisation of legislation between countries, 
concerning AIW, in order to make the organisational response more straightforward and/or effective, 
these authors would argue that it might be more appropriate to talk in terms of ratcheting-up 
legislation, where necessary, such that all countries are operating according to the same strict 
standards. 
Societal response 
Finding 
  
14.4.23  Over the period of time that this research was carried out, intense concern arose (and persists) 
over CAIs. In stark contrast, concern over AIW was barely perceptible - except, perhaps, for a single 
case that appeared in the UK media and which is discussed above (see 14.4.5). It is accepted that part
of this difference results from the (legal) issue of consent, and the clarity/ambiguity, for practitioners, 
which follows on from this i.e. children can not give consent to appearing in pornographic images 
whilst adults can.  It is also recognised that there was much less awareness of the number and nature of 
AIW that were in existence, and were being used. However, some of the reason for the contrasting 
response to these cases appeared to lie in the fact that society is generally much more inclined to 
respond to the abuse of children than it is of women.  
Implication 
14.4.24  Society needs to be much more aware of, and take more seriously, the existence, and use of, 
AIW, both those that are moved internationally and those which are Internet-based. Following on from 
this, there needs to be a major public debate as to the implications and effects of AIW, and the way in 
which society should respond to them (see also 12.2.16 - 12.2.25). 
Links with CAI use 
Finding 
                               
14.4.25  Some offenders claimed that they started using ‘less serious’ adult pornographic images but 
subsequently found themselves drawn to increasingly serious forms of adult pornography and 
subsequently AIW, and then CAIs and ultimately ever more serious forms of these images. While 
these accounts or explanations could be interpreted as attempts by offenders to shift responsibility for 
their behaviour and/or attempts to excuse it, it is possible that they are not entirely without validity i.e. 
there may be a causal link, or chain, in the use of different, and increasingly serious, forms of 
‘pornographic’ images - or, what might more colloquially be thought of as a ‘slippery slope’. 
Implication 
14.4.26  Although the researchers are unaware of any research which provides reliable evidence of a 
link between the use of AIW and CAI, the above claims, by offenders, do not seem to be implausible, 
and could be thought to constitute anecdotal evidence at least. Clearly, research needs to be carried out 
to establish whether this link exists. In the meantime, however, that this link is a possibility, 
underlines, still further, the need to take AIW seriously in terms of policy and practice. 
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Chapter 15 
Future research 
A research agenda 
15.1  This research project set out to identify the extent and nature of (known) cases of international 
and Internet CSA, and their implications for policy and practice. The authors feel that the research has 
been successful in meeting these broad aims. Given its modest funding base, though, the study has 
been able to address only a minority of the numerous, more detailed research questions concerning 
international and Internet CSA.  That said, what is has been able to do - in addition to addressing the 
original study aims - is to identify many of needs, challenges and issues which exist in relation to 
research in this area and put forward suggestions as to how these can be addressed. 
The need for research 
15.2  Although research into international and Internet CSA is increasing (along with policy and 
practice experience), knowledge of these phenomena remains quite rudimentary. This has contributed 
to the degree to which thinking around international and Internet CSA has been influenced by 
assumptions and misconceptions (see 13.1.11 - 13.1.13). It also helps explain why ‘experts’ have had a 
sometimes disproportionate and misleading influence upon those working in this area (see 12.7.6 - 
12.7.10). There is, then, a pressing need for a great deal more research to be carried out on 
international and Internet CSA. This is particularly important if there is to be a properly informed 
policy and practice response to these cases.  
Challenges to research  
15.3  The lack of knowledge concerning international and Internet CSA is, in part, a function of the 
general sensitivity, and consequent difficulty, of conducting research into any area of child protection 
and especially CSA. There are, though, additional challenges in respect of researching international 
and Internet CSA, and establishing a reliable knowledge base. These challenges are as follows: 
• Ultimately, researching international and Internet CSA, is logistically very challenging, requiring 
as it does, work to be carried out in many different countries  
• Many of the countries which are of greatest concern, particularly in terms of international CSA, are 
developing ones, where there is much less of a research structure or tradition  
• International CSA victim and child sex abuser cases, as this research has shown, are very diverse              
• The Internet, and mobile communications technology, and the way in which offenders use these, 
are constantly evolving. Similarly, offenders involved in international CSA may adapt their 
behaviour (though perhaps to a lesser extent) in order to exploit opportunities - as they arise - 
which facilitate the abuse of children 
• Official awareness of international and Internet CSA is relatively new, with the result that the 
impetus towards carrying out research in these areas has been less than it would otherwise have 
been 
Research funding 
15.4  Responding to international and Internet CSA is the responsibility of, and raises major issues for, 
a wide range of government departments. These include (in alphabetical order) the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, Department for Education and Skills, the Department for International 
Development, the Department for Trade and Industry, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
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Home Office and the Treasury. Thus, while funding councils and charitable bodies might finance part 
of the programme of research that needs to be carried out in these areas, some of it should be initiated 
and funded by Government. 
International and Internet CSA research unit 
15.5  As stated above, while there is a dearth of research and knowledge on international and Internet 
CSA, carrying out studies in these areas is, very challenging. At the same time, it is very likely that 
these cases are increasing. Taking into account these factors, it is recommended that a unit be set up to 
conduct, and otherwise promote, research (and develop knowledge) regarding international and 
Internet CSA. This unit would research all aspects of the problem, including prevention, detection, 
reporting, investigation, victim’ needs, offender’ management and public education.  
15.6  Given the international nature of many of these cases, it would seem be appropriate for 
consideration to be given for this unit to be funded, and operate, on an international basis.  
15.7  Many of the studies that have been, and will be, carried out, in different countries, on 
international and Internet CSA, are likely to be directly relevant to one another, and be capable of 
making an important contribution to the understanding of these phenomena. However, much of this 
work will remain dispersed, if not ‘lost’, unless steps are taken to the contrary. Thus, one of the 
specific tasks of the proposed unit would be synthesise research from around the world on 
international and Internet CSA.  
Specific research needs 
15.8  Following on from their own research, and their reading of the existing literature, the authors 
believe that research needs to be carried out in the following areas: 
International and Internet CSA 
• General studies, along the lines of the present research, but more comprehensive and detailed, into 
each of the major categories of international and Internet CSA identified in this report i.e. 
international CSA victims, international child sex abusers, international movement of CAIs, 
Internet-initiated grooming of children for sexual abuse, Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy 
to commit CSA, and Internet-based CAIs 
Individual types of international and Internet CSA case 
• The extent and nature of individual types of international CSA victim case, and the implications of 
these cases for policy and practice. Included within this would be an examination of how and why 
this problem varies between different countries 
• The extent and nature, and policy and practice implications, of the national and international
trafficking of children for sexual exploitation within, and between, developing countries 
• The extent and nature of individual types of international child sex abuser case, and the 
implications of these cases for policy and practice. Included within this would be an examination of 
how and why this problem varies between different countries 
Specific issues concerning international and Internet CSA 
• The effect of international and Internet CSA upon victims, and their consequent needs 
• The relationship between the use of indicative material104, CAIs and CSA. This would include a 
study of the effect of CAI use upon offenders, the identification of risk factors for CSA among CAI 
                                                
104
 For example, drawings, cartoons, and texts relating to CSA, and rape and bestiality videos featuring adults. 
Future research  
137 
users, and an examination of the notion that some offenders are drawn into the use of increasingly 
serious pornography (see 14.4.25 - 14.4.26). To further understanding in this area, it would be 
important to incorporate within this work, an examination of child sex abusers who have not used 
CAIs 
• The extent, nature and impact of Internet-based contact between those who have a sexual interest in 
children. This would include those who incite, or conspire with others, to commit CSA - including 
the grooming of children - and those who distribute or download CAIs or other CSA 
communications, or who promote CSA more generally 
• Whether there are characteristics among children and young people that indicate a higher 
propensity for being successfully groomed over the Internet and the nature of those characteristics. 
Also, whether are there any successful defence strategies, in respect of grooming, which can be 
identified and then passed on to children and young people  
• Trends in child sex offenders use of computers, the Internet and other new technology, such as 
mobile phones and covert cameras 
• The impact of the Internet upon the international movement of CAIs 
• The experiences of children who enter the UK and report abuse which occurred either in their 
country of origin, or in the UK, to see whether they are being handled appropriately in relation to, 
for example, their receipt of support as victims and child witnesses, and whether they are allowed 
to remain in the UK 
• The use of CAIs, and other illegal and legal pornography (Internet and non-Internet sourced), 
among a representative cross-section of UK young people and adults 
Agencies and their responses 
• The extent and nature of international and Internet CSA cases known to statutory, non-law 
enforcement agencies and NGOs, and the implication of these cases for policy and practice. 
Statutory agencies would include children’s services, CPS, probation, health and education. 
Specific issues which need to be examined include the care of children who have featured in CAIs, 
risk assessment in cases where individuals suspected of having used CAIs have access to children 
and the management of offenders  
• The degree and types of effect which viewing CAIs (and other abusive images) has upon agency 
workers, and the nature of intervening variables, for example, type of image, frequency and 
duration of exposure, and worker characteristics (see 12.5.9 - 12.5.14)  
• The needs of agency workers who view CAIs and other abusive images, the extent, nature and 
quality of support and counselling which exists for them, including the identification of good 
practice 
• The criminal justice processing of offences involving CAIs and in particular the attitudes and 
behaviour of the CPS, defence barristers and judges, and variations in these between different areas 
• Variations in criminal justice decision-making (by police, CPS, defence barristers and judges) and 
outcomes in cases of Internet CSA, and especially cases involving the use of CAI 
• The attitude and response of the police, CPS, defence barristers and judiciary to cases of Internet-
initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA, especially where there are claims that suspects 
were (‘only’) fantasising about carrying out such offences
• The extent and nature of the impact which ‘civil liberties’ legislation, such as the Data Protection 
Act 1998, Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, has upon 
the investigation, by the police and HMRC, of international and Internet CSA 
• The use and efficacy of extra-territorial jurisdiction as contained originally in the Sex Offenders 
Act 1997, and the general criminal justice processing of UK citizens, abroad, for CSA-related 
offences 
• Whether analysis of the CAIs possessed by an offender can assist agency work in, for example, 
assessing the risk which offenders pose to children in terms of CSA 
                                                                                                                                                        
International and Internet CSA 
138 
Other 
• The number, background and destination, and care and protection of unaccompanied children 
coming into (and leaving) the UK  
In addition to the above specific questions, this study also highlighted a number of broader, more 
organisationally oriented research needs. These were as follows:   
HM Revenue and Customs 
15.9  There is little or no reliable or systematic information concerning the work which HMRC carries 
out in relation to internationally moved CAIs. (Indeed, this - albeit modest - report is believed to be the 
UK’s first ever, certainly published, work on the topic.) This means that policy and practice in relation 
to the work of HMRC, in this area, may not be as well informed, and consequently effective, as it 
might be.   
15.10  HMRC should, therefore, commission a major, dedicated and authoritative study of its work in 
regards to internationally moved CAIs. Such a study would identify ways in which policy and practice 
could be improved, provide a comprehensive and substantial record of cases which HMRC staff have 
worked on (which would be a useful training source), and highlight and promote the work of HMRC 
in this area more generally. 
15.11  This research should include an examination of current search practice (i.e. which passengers 
are parcels are searched), set against all detection’s of CAIs (i.e. those made by both HMRC and the 
police), to determine the appropriateness of the former. 
Internet Watch Foundation 
  
15.12  The Internet Watch Foundation describes itself as an independent regulatory authority. It exists 
to receive, assess and - where appropriate - refer on, reports of ‘online illegal content, particularly 
child abuse images’ (IWF, 2005). It receives these reports primarily from the public and makes many 
of its referrals to ISPs or the police.) 
15.13  During the course of the research a number of contrasting perspectives were given on the IWF 
and the work it carried out. These were as follows: that the IWF was - or was not - sufficiently 
independent of industry (chiefly ISPs); the IWF should - or should not - remain on a voluntary basis; 
and the IWF was - or was not - sufficiently well known. This research study, however, had too little 
information on the IWF to address these issues in any reliable manner. 
15.14  What was clear, though, was that the IWF played a major role in the response to Internet CSA, 
especially that relating to Internet CAIs. For example, in 2004 the IWF received 17,255 reports of 
potentially illegal content, of which 82% concerned ‘child abuse’ (IWF, 2005). In 1997, the UK 
accounted for 18% of illegal content. By 2005, this had dropped to less than 1%. Part of this decline, 
said the IWF, was due to the work in which it had been involved. The organisation drew particular 
attention to the partnership approach that existed between all the relevant agencies (including police 
and ISPs) - one which, it was said, the rest of the world could do with following. In addition, the IWF 
stated that they were very supportive of the police’s work and as part of this, ensured that when they 
made reports to them that they were always of the required quality. 
15.15  In view of the importance of its role, it would seem appropriate and important for a specific 
research project to be carried out on the role and work of the IWF. This research should include an 
examination of the way in which the public uses the organisation, how industry responds to reports 
that are passed to it and the impact that the work of the IWF has upon law enforcement and child 
protection. 
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Seizure of computers and recording media  
15.16  The research suggested that there was varying practice among the police as to when, and the 
grounds upon which, they seized computers, other equipment (for example, mobile phones, digital and 
video cameras) and recording media (for example, DVDs, CDs, floppy discs and video tapes) in CSA 
cases. Some police officers seized such material only when there was a specific allegation or concern 
that it had been used to facilitate CSA in some way. Others, however, seized it as a matter of routine in 
all CSA-related investigations In some CSA-related investigations, where equipment had been seized - 
including those where there were specific concerns over CAIs - relevant evidence was not found. 
15.17  Research should be carried out on police practice in respect of the seizure of the above 
equipment, with specific regards to the following: the frequency of these seizures, the circumstances 
under which they are carried out, whether they are within the law, and the number of times, and 
circumstances in which, evidence of illegal activity is obtained. These findings should then be used to 
determine whether existing policy (including legislation) and practice, surrounding such seizures, 
needs to altered or clarified, or whether it is quite satisfactory.  
Deportation and extradition 
15.18  Some interviewees criticised countries for deporting individuals suspected of sexually abusing 
children rather than submitting them to the criminal justice process. Other interviewees complained 
either about the inability to extradite suspects from particular countries, or the delay and difficulty in 
achieving this. These problems appeared to vary from country to country. It was difficult, though, to 
ascertain, within this research project, their extent or seriousness. 
15.19  Research should be carried out within the proposed more general studies of international child 
sex abusers (see 15.8) to determine the extent to which issues around deportation and extradition 
create problems in terms of child protection. 
Other research needs identified in this report 
15.20  Some research needs were discussed in earlier chapters of the report, as they followed on, very 
closely, from points that were being made at that time. These additional research needs are as follows: 
• The identification of risk factors, for suicide, among suspected CAI users (13.5.6 - 13.5.11) 
• The role of Interpol in child protection (12.1.1 - 12.1.3) 
• The sexual abuse of children in the UK by offenders from overseas (12.2.8 - 12.2.15) 
• The role of ChildBase (12.3.27 - 12.3.30) 
• The work of ISPs in respect of child protection (12.6.3 - 12.6.10) 
• The response of domain name registry’s regards child protection (12.6.18 - 12.6.19) 
• The link between the use of AIW and the use of CAIs (14.4.25 - 14.4.26) 
Abusive images of women (AIW)  
15.21  It is likely that, over the last ten years approximately, there has been a major increase in the 
creation, distribution, availability and accessing of internationally  moved and Internet-based AIW. As 
a result, these images are not only much more numerous, they are also much more wide-ranging i.e. 
they include more extreme depiction’s of the sexual and physical abuse of women. Despite these 
changes, and the impact that they may have had upon offending, this remains a subject about which 
there is little or no reliable knowledge. 
15.22  Systematic and large scale research should be carried out into the extent and nature, and policy 
and practice implications, of internationally moved and Internet-based AIW. It is only through this, 
that there can be a properly informed debate over, and the response to, this issue. The research should 
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include a thorough examination of what the police, HMRC, and other relevant organisations, are, and 
should be, doing in this area.
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APPENDIX A:   ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
Abbreviations 
ABTA   Association of British Travel Agents 
ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers [England, Wales and Northern Ireland] 
ACPOS  Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland 
CAI    child abuse images 
CEOP   Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre 
CHIS   Children’s Charities Coalition on Internet Safety 
CJS   Criminal Justice System 
COPINE  Combating Paedophile Information Networks in Europe 
CPS   Crown Prosecution Service 
CSA   child sexual abuse 
ECPAT  End Child Prostitution, Pornography and Trafficking 
HMRC  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (formerly Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise) 
IND   Immigration and Nationality Directorate 
ISP   Internet service provider 
IWF   Internet Watch Foundation 
LSCB   Local Safeguarding Children Board 
NCH   (formerly) National Children’s Homes 
NCIS   National Criminal Intelligence Service 
NCS   National Crime Squad  
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation (this term is used in place of voluntary organisation) 
NHTCU  National High-Tech Crime Unit 
NPQS   national postal questionnaire survey 
NSPCC  National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
POLIT  Paedophile On-line Investigation Team 
SEC   Socio-economic classification 
SOCA   Serious and Organised Crime Agency  
SSD   social services department (see point 13 below) 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
Terminology 
                    
Terminology can vary between different disciplines and over time, and is sometimes contentious. This is, 
perhaps, especially true in relation to child protection give its multi-disciplinary nature. In view of this, the 
following explanation of the terminology used in this report is provided:    
1. Case  
                           
The term ‘case’ is frequently used in this report. This term is used to refer to the individual, or group of, 
victim(s) and perpetrator(s) involved in an incident or episode of CSA, and the subsequent attempts by agencies 
to respond to the associated reports.  
2. Child abuse images 
                                 
The term ‘child abuse images’ (CAIs) is used in place of ‘child pornography’ as it is felt, by an increasing 
number of people working in this area, that the latter and more traditional term does not adequately describe the 
content, and in particular the seriousness, of some images. 
Having said this, it is should be noted that the images incorporated within the term ‘CAIs’ cover a very broad 
spectrum in term of their content. At the least serious end of this spectrum, are, for example, (indecent) 
photographs of children taken without their being aware - such as naked children covertly photographed on a 
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beach. While the taking of these images is reprehensible, and indeed illegal, it is questionable as to whether it is 
appropriate to describe the child in question as being ‘abused’. 
3. Children and young people   
                                             
In the interests of brevity, the term ‘children’ is used to refer to both children and young people. 
4. Children 
                
The term ‘children’ is used to refer to all persons under the age of 18 years. That said, it is recognised that the 
law, particularly in relation to sexual offences and sexual relationships, does make distinctions within this age 
group - distinctions that may be significant to the subject matter of this research.  
5. Child sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and CAIs 
             
In general, the term ‘child sexual abuse’ is used in this report in a collective sense to refer to all the sexual 
maltreatment children experienced, irrespective of the particular form it took or circumstances in which it 
occurred. However, other terms are also sometimes used to denote specific CSA situations. In particular, the 
term ‘sexual exploitation’ is used to describe situations where CSA is driven, in part at least, by a financial 
motive. Similarly, the term CAI is used to indicate situations where the child is the subject of a pornographic 
image.   
6. Child sex offender or abuser 
This report has sought, as much as possible, to avoid use of the term ‘paedophile’, preferring instead the terms 
(child sex) ‘offender’ or ‘abuser’. The reasons for this have been set out elsewhere (Gallagher, 1998b) but, in 
short, it is felt that this term is very misleading as to the nature, and in particular the causes, of CSA. In common 
with other workers in this field, for example, Kelly (1996), it is felt that society needs to move away from its 
preoccupation with the psychological or individual characteristics of abusers, and focus much more upon the 
social or cultural factors - especially the socialisation of males - that explain CSA. 
  
7. Grooming 
This refers to the manipulation of a child by an offender for the purposes of both facilitating the sexual abuse of 
that child, and then inhibiting the detection, or more specifically the disclosure, of that abuse. It is sometimes 
referred to, particularly in the North American literature, by the terms ‘solicitation’ or ‘seduction’. 
8. Known case 
                       
The bulk of this research, and in particular the NPQS’s and the cases studies, was based upon what might 
generally be referred to as ‘known’ cases. In the interests of brevity, this term is not always used in this report, 
but the reader is asked to bear in mind the difference between known cases, and all cases - i.e. known and 
unknown cases combined. ‘Unknown’ refers to those cases - of which there may be many - which take place, but 
which never come to the notice of agencies.  
9. Internet 
              
There are, in existence, a number of quite distinct forms of new technology. These include computers, the 
Internet, mobile phones and digital cameras. Although, the divides between these various forms of technology 
appear to be diminishing quite rapidly - with, for example, the emergence of Internet- and camera-enabled 
mobile phones - they are still quite relevant and important. These differences could not, however, be addressed 
very fully in this study. This was largely on account of the fact that the research was already quite broad ranging 
whereby it would have been very problematic to add any additional elements. That said, as the research 
progressed the authors did become more aware of these differences and have tried to be more specific and 
explicit about these in this report. This is a process that will continue with future outputs from the study.        
10. Reported and recorded (CSA) offences 
In certain parts of the report, reference is made to ‘reported’ and ‘recorded’ (CSA) offences. These were the 
official terms under which the police categorised cases, and each has a particular meaning. The term reported has 
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traditionally had a more administrative connotation, being used to refer to the receipt by the police of a 
complaint concerning a criminal offence. By contrast, the term recorded has traditionally had a more operational 
connotation whereby the police have concluded that an offence has taken place.  
11. Suspected or alleged CSA 
While references are made to cases, this does not necessarily mean that the suspected abuse has taken place. 
Strictly speaking, all of the cases referred to in this report should more properly be referred to as ‘suspected’ or 
‘alleged’ cases. However, in practice it transpired that the large majority of cases reported to this study either 
resulted in a conviction or - if they did not - contained (some) clear evidence that international or Internet CSA 
had taken place. In view of this, and in the interests of brevity, the terms suspected and alleged are not routinely 
used in this report, although their significance should not be overlooked. If comments are made on any aspect of 
a specific case, or cases in general, on the basis of speculation, then this is indicated accordingly. Otherwise, all 
comments regarding cases should be taken as having been substantiated in some way through the research.  
12. Victim and suspect 
                                   
The children who are the subjects of investigations are referred to as victims. This is not considered to be an 
ideal term as it presupposes that all such children reported to agencies have been the subject of abuse when, in 
some instances, investigations may conclude that they have not been. Despite this, it is still felt to be most useful 
term currently available. 
Owing to the multi-disciplinary nature of child protection work, there are a number of different terms that can be 
used to refer to individuals who commit sexual offences against children, such as, ‘offender’, ‘suspect’, 
‘perpetrator’, ‘paedophile’ and ‘abuser’. In general, the preferred terms for the purposes of this report, at least, 
are ‘offender’ and ‘abuser’.  
13. Children’s services 
Since this research was conceived and carried out, social services departments have been restructured into adult, 
and children’s, services – the latter also incorporating local education departments. In the light of this, the report 
uses the term social services departments when referring to the fieldwork, and the time before this, but the term 
children’s services when discussing recommendations.   
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APPENDIX B:   FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE 
       RESEARCH 
1. UK remit 
                
As its official title indicates, this research was concerned primarily with cases of international and Internet CSA 
‘which have a link to the UK’. The reason for this was both to ensure the research was relevant to its immediate 
audience (i.e. a UK readership) and also to impose some limits on what might otherwise be an enormous piece of 
work. Thus, for example, the NPQS’s (and subsequent record searches) measured the extent of international and 
Internet CSA cases known to UK authorities (specifically, police and HMRC). Similarly, the police cases studies 
were largely concerned with victims or abusers who were linked to the UK in some way.  
That said, it would of course be very much counter to the spirit of this study if it was wholly confined to a very 
narrow, UK perspective. Therefore, and as this report has sought to show, while individual countries (including 
the UK) have to take some of their own measures, ultimately, international and Internet CSA have to be tackled 
on a worldwide basis. With this in mind, the report raises issues not only for UK Government and agencies, but 
for all governments and agencies. 
2. International and Internet CSA 
                                                                     
When drafting the original research proposal for this study, the research director (Gallagher) was eager to 
explore a relatively wide range of international and Internet CSA cases. (In the event, the research proved to be 
even more extensive - and considerably so - than had been anticipated.) This broad remit was felt to be justified 
on a number of grounds.  
Firstly, earlier studies had tended to restrict themselves to specific types or categories of international or Internet 
CSA case, for example, child trafficking, child sex tourism, Internet-initiated grooming of children or Internet-
based CAIs. However, not only did these different cases share a common international or Internet dimension, but 
many Internet-related cases were reported to have an international dimension, and some (primarily) international 
cases involved use of the Internet. It was felt that a particularly important contribution might be made to 
knowledge and understanding of these cases, and how they should be responded to, by taking a broad overview 
of cases rather than continuing with a case-specific one.  
Secondly, it was perceived that policy and practice were increasingly taking an holistic approach to different 
international and Internet CSA cases, as witnessed, for example, through numerous Government, statutory 
agency and NGO initiatives (see, for instance, Home Office, 1996; Department of Health, 2001; and ECPAT, 
2001). It was felt that the research should mirror this more comprehensive and integrated approach.  
Thirdly, it was felt that this inclusive attitude might be more in line with the increasingly widely held and 
influential view, that different forms of abuse should be seen as part of a continuum rather than discrete and 
somehow unconnected phenomena (Kelly, 1988; Itzin, 1993). Thus, while this research proved to be very 
challenging and at times unwieldy, due to being so extensive, it is hoped that this has been worthwhile in terms 
of the innovative perspective it has been able to provide.  
3. Known cases 
It is important to emphasise that this research was based, almost exclusively, upon cases known to law 
enforcement (or other) agencies. It was not based upon all cases or even a representative cross-section of all 
cases, as might be obtained through an incidence or prevalence survey. Ideally, one would carry out such a 
survey, but in an area, such as CSA, that is already very challenging, such a methodology would face formidable 
obstacles, which were certainly beyond the scope and resources of this project.  
That being the case, it has to be recognised that this study does not provide a measure of the extent of all cases of 
international or Internet CSA. Moreover, the cases it has identified may not be representative of all cases. In 
addition, the study was largely restricted - as stated above - to cases that had a link to the UK. It is fairly certain 
that the UK - being a developed country - is not representative of developing countries, in terms of international 
and Internet CSA.  For example, the UK, compared to many developing countries, is likely to have more of a 
problem in respect of Internet-related cases, but less of a problem with child trafficking and child sex tourism.  
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Therefore, caution has to be exercised in generalising from these (known) cases, to all cases of international or 
Internet CSA. Having said this, the cases that have been studied in this research, constitute an important and 
eminently practical basis upon which knowledge and understanding of these phenomena, and the responses to 
them, can be developed. Also, because these are the cases which are coming to the attention of agencies, and are, 
consequently, the ones to which they have to respond, they are obviously a highly relevant group of cases in 
respect of policy and practice.  
4. Policy and practice (1) 
As can be seen in the Methodology and Findings chapters, and indeed the official title of the research, there is a 
good deal of reference in this report to both ‘policy’ and ‘practice’. Clearly, these are quite discrete arenas and 
they were treated as such throughout the course of most of this research and the subsequent report. However, it is 
also recognised that there is fundamental connection between policy and practice. So, while the large majority of 
interviews in this research were designed to have either a policy or practice focus, many of the policy 
interviewees wished to comment on practice, and many of the practitioners on policy.  
5. Policy and practice (2) 
                                     
Although the research set out to study both the policy and practice implications of international and Internet 
CSA, it had been the authors’ intention - as reflected in the official title of the research - to prioritise the latter.  
This is on account of the fact that the funding body - The Nuffield Foundation - aspires to fund research that 
stands to have a practical application and benefit. In the event, though, it is felt that this research has as much to 
say about policy as it does practice.  
There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it did not appear that law enforcement agencies found 
international and Internet CSA as challenging to investigate, as might have been predicted from work that has 
been carried out on, what could be thought of, as equivalent cases, such as those involving organised CSA 
(Gallagher, 1998a).  
Secondly, international and Internet CSA incorporated such a diverse range of cases - many of which were 
relatively rare - that it was difficult to generate and study a sufficient number of these, whereby practice issues 
could be identified with any reliability.  
Thirdly, it must also be said that awareness of, and the response to, some, if not many, types of international and 
Internet CSA, was still, very much, in a process of development. Consequently, practice did not encounter as 
many cases, or did not encounter them as ‘fully’ as it might, had awareness and responses been more advanced.     
  
6. Research focus 
As stated in the Introduction, this research largely set out to identify the implications of international and Internet 
CSA for policy and practice in the criminal justice system, particularly that relating to law enforcement. This 
focus reflected the nature of the professional debate at the time the proposal was drafted - between late 2000 to 
early 2001. However, during the course of the (main) study, additional issues, relating to other spheres, were 
identified. These spheres included Government policy, more generally, at both a national and international level, 
other statutory agencies, industry, the media and public attitudes. While these issues were not covered in as 
systematic a way as those relating to law enforcement and criminal justice, it is hoped that by raising them in this 
report, this study will have a value in addition to, and beyond that, which was originally envisaged. 
As well as this, though, and in view of some of these emerging themes, the project director approached The 
Nuffield Foundation for a small supplementary grant to enable research to be carried out with some of these 
other relevant agencies. This was awarded in January 2003. These agencies were all the social services 
departments, probation services and Trading Standards, and military welfare and policing bodies in the UK. The 
purpose of this supplementary stage - like the main stage - was to establish the extent and nature, of international 
and Internet cases known to these agencies, and the implications of these for policy and practice.  
This stage of the research met with only very limited success. However, what it tried to show, and did to some 
(small) extent succeed in showing, is that these cases do impact upon, and raise issues, for a wide range of 
statutory agencies and NGOs, relating to, for example, the needs of victims, the management and treatment of 
offenders, and the involvement of the commercial sector in the prevention, detection and reporting of cases.  
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Furthermore, these impacts and issues are becoming increasingly significant. This is yet another area in need of 
major, systematic research. 
7. Remit 
When drafting the research proposal, the research director requested a modest grant (approximately £35,000). 
This was largely in view of the fact that international and Internet CSA did not, at that time (late 2000-early 
2001), have a very high profile, and certainly not as high a profile as it subsequently came to achieve. Shortly 
after its official start, in February 2002, international, and especially Internet, CSA, began to be the focus of a 
great deal of attention and concern, no more so than with the launch of ‘Operation Ore’ - the UK arm of an 
international investigation into the worldwide sale of CAIs (BBC, 2003; Wilding, 2003). Moreover, as the 
research progressed, it became increasingly clear that international and Internet CSA was far more diverse, and 
therefore challenging to study, than had been anticipated.  
Given these circumstances, the authors have concluded, that they were not able to study international and 
Internet CSA, in as comprehensive or detailed way as they would have liked. It would, for instance, have been 
valuable to interview a range of representatives from ISPs, and other computer and Internet organisations, to 
establish the extent to which ISPs did, could and should combat Internet CSA. Similarly, it would have been 
extremely useful to have undertaken more cases studies (involving, for example, child trafficking, and Internet-
initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA), and to have conducted a more systematic enquiry into the 
work of HMRC and Interpol. In summary, this research is something of an overview of the issues relating to a 
large number and wide range of categories and types of international and Internet CSA. Having said this, it is felt 
that this research should still be of some considerable value, and to a wide range of audiences. 
8. Participation 
  
In the main, the large majority of organisations and individuals who were approached to take part in this study 
were very well disposed to it. Although, they faced many other demands, they were co-operative and generous 
with their time, and were able to make invaluable contributions to the research. On occasions some individuals 
did not feel that they could be as forthcoming with the researchers as they might have wished. This appeared to 
be related to one or more of the following: operational considerations, concerns over the sensitivity of specific 
data, anxiety over the reaction of their superiors/employers, and a reluctance to upset ‘sister’ organisations (by 
criticising them.) Overall, though, this did not appear to be a major issue in the research, and it was the 
researchers’ impression that respondents spoke, and gave access to various types of information, quite freely.  
Only two organisations refused outright to take part in the research. These were Fair Trials Abroad and Prisoners 
Abroad. Their absence was unfortunate as it was felt that their presence could bring some additional ‘balance’ to 
the research. It was unclear as to why these organisations did not wish to participate in the research. It could 
simply have been that they did not think that their work was relevant, or it may have been that they thought (not 
unreasonably) that this was too ‘political’ an area of research in which to become involved.   
9. Report remit 
This report draws upon data collected at all stages of the fieldwork. However, given the amount of data at their 
disposal, the researchers had to be somewhat selective, to prevent the report - which is planned to be only the 
first of many outputs - from being overly long. Thus, the report has tended to draw particularly heavily from the 
search of police recorded and reported crimes (for the extent of known cases), and the policy- and practice-
focused interviews (for the policy and practice implications and recommendations).  This largely reflects what 
the researcher’s feel should be the priorities in the initial publication from the research. The report does, though, 
also present typologies of international and Internet CSA and discusses - albeit, at this time, in a rather 
superficial and general manner - the nature of cases. Eventually, all the data from this research will be very fully 
exploited (see below).   
10. Dissemination 
  
Though modest in its resources, this project has yielded a quite formidable amount and range of data. In view of 
this, and the importance of the subject matter, it is intended that the results of this research should be exploited 
and disseminated as fully as possible. After publication of this report - which is the first major output from the 
study - work will begin on papers, for a range of academic journals, which will focus upon each of the six major 
categories of international and Internet CSA. The function of these papers will be to allow for a more detailed 
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discussion of the extent, nature, and policy and practice implications, of these individual categories. Copies of 
these will be sent to all individuals who, and organisations which, participated in the research. They will, in 
addition, be posted on the research director’s website [www.hud.ac.uk/hhs/research/acs/staff/bg.htm], and be 
accompanied by summary articles in professional journals. Following this, it is hoped that one or two books can 
be published from this study, possibly one on international CSA and the other on Internet CSA. These books 
would, in part, seek to examine and place the findings from this research in the context of other work that has 
been published on international and Internet CSA.  
11. Confidentiality and anonymity 
In the interests of confidentiality (of research informants and organisations) and anonymity (principally of 
victims and their families), it is worth stressing, further, here, that details of all the cases quoted in the report 
have been changed. This has been done, though, without altering the substantive issues that these cases were 
chosen to reflect. 
12. The abuse of women 
As stated earlier, this research is concerned almost exclusively with sexually abused children (or adult survivors 
of CSA). However, it became apparent in the course of this research, that women also featured in some of the 
categories of abuse featured in this study (in particular, trafficking, the international movement of abusive 
images and Internet-based abusive images). This research has been able to make some comments on these cases 
from a policy and practice perspective, and also a wider societal one, but this remains an area which the authors 
believe is in need of much more research, public awareness and ultimately official action. 
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APPENDIX C:   FURTHER INFORMATION ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Main study 
Police NPQS 
Case-specific questionnaire  
1.  The questionnaire, covering individual cases of international or Internet CSA, comprised the following eleven 
sections: 
• Report details and case summary 
• General features of case and suspect’s modus operandi 
• Abusive acts, and the recording or distribution of CAIs 
• International or Internet features of case 
• Suspect’ details 
• Victim’ details 
• Police action 
• Outcomes 
• Non-international or non-Internet aspects of case 
• Questionnaire completion details 
• Other information on international or Internet CSA 
   
2.  As Table 1 indicates, the police NPQS was only partly successful with 46.2% of the 52 police services in the 
UK participating. The chief reason for this appeared to be that the survey was being carried out at a time when 
police services throughout the UK - all of whom were already dealing with rapidly expanding numbers of 
Internet CSA investigations - were struggling with Operation Ore. (This was the US Postal Inspection Service-
initiated investigation into a massive, worldwide, Internet-based, CAI-selling operation which involved 7,272 
suspects in the UK alone (The Register, 2005.) Whilst a number of police services did not wish to take part in the 
survey, some of them did participate in other - what they perceived to be less demanding - stages of the research, 
in part in some stage of the research was 69.3%. 
Table 1   Response rate among UK police services to the NPQS and other research stages 
Response N % 
Took part in the NPQS and participated in other stages of the research 20 38.5 
Did not take part in the NPQS but participated in other stages of the research 12 23.1 
Took part in the NPQS (only) 4 7.7 
Did not take part in any stage of the research 16 30.8 
Total 52 100.1* 
*Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
3.  Initially, the police were asked to complete one questionnaire for each international or Internet CSA case that 
had become known to them between January 1999 and the date at which the survey was administered (August 
2002). Once it was learnt that many police services had scores, if not hundreds, of such cases (especially those 
involving Internet CAIs), it was realised that the proposed task was not feasible. In light of this, and the above 
factors, police services were subsequently invited to complete questionnaires for a random sample of cases - with 
ten soon becoming the standard suggested number.  
4.  One of the primary purposes of the survey was to provide a measure of the extent of international and Internet 
CSA cases known to police services in the UK. Due to the above logistical difficulties, though, the purpose of 
the survey had to be restricted to describing the basic characteristics of a sample of cases (which, in all 
likelihood, had not been selected at random). A total of 113 questionnaires were returned by police services in 
the UK. (It was as a result of this experience, that a small number of police services were approached for 
permission to search their crime reporting and recording systems (described below), to provide an alternative 
(and more reliable) means of establishing the extent of known cases.) 
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5.  Although not as many questionnaires were completed as would have been wished for, those that were 
returned were still of much value, providing as they did, an insight into the nature and investigation of a not 
inconsiderable number of cases drawn from almost one half of police services (N=24) from across the UK. 
General policing questionnaire 
                                                       
6.  During the course of piloting the case-specific questionnaire, it became apparent that it would be worthwhile 
asking the police, across the country, about their experience of, and response to, international and Internet CSA, 
in general, from a more managerial and strategic position. A questionnaire was designed for this purpose and 
sent - one per police service - with the main questionnaire, with a request that it be completed by an officer in an 
appropriately senior position. The response rate was, at 30.8% (N=16), disappointing but this exercise did 
provide some useful additional information at relatively little cost in terms of resources expended.  
7.  The General Policing Questionnaire comprised the following seven sections: 
• Respondent’ details 
• Respondent’s recent experience of international or Internet CSA  
• Special measures provided or needed in response to international and Internet CSA 
• Practice difficulties, and achievements, in relation to, international and Internet CSA 
• Policy problems and achievements 
• Other comments on the response to international and Internet CSA 
• Process by which cases were identified for the case-specific survey 
  
HMRC NPQS 
8.  The main relevance of HMRC to this study was in relation to its work concerning the international movement 
(i.e. smuggling) of CAIs - chiefly into the UK, but in theory, at least, out of the UK also. All cases that become 
known to HMRC are logged with its headquarters office in London. HMRC reported that they had a database of 
approximately 150 cases and it was agreed that questionnaires would be completed for a random sample of 
these. A copy of the questionnaire used in the police NPQS was sent to HMRC headquarters office in September 
2002. 35 completed questionnaires were returned to the research office between February and March 2003. In 
many respects, the HMRC NPQS was much more straightforward methodologically and practically-speaking, 
than that of its police equivalent - largely owing to the fact that it was completed by a single (and commendable) 
member of HMRC staff. This should not, though, be taken to imply that it was not time-consuming nor 
demanding for that individual in question - as it surely was.   
  
Police case studies 
Interviews 
                     
9.  Interviews were conducted with 51 police officers in connection with 56 separate investigations. As Table 2 
shows, these officers were drawn from a wide variety of departments (This is based upon an officer’s position at 
the time of the interview, as opposed to the time when s/he investigated the case in question.)  
10.  The police interview schedule comprised the following nine sections: 
• Interviewee’ background and experience 
• Case summary 
• Work undertaken by police 
• Work undertaken by other agencies (in the UK) 
• Work undertaken by agencies (outside the UK) 
• General police response to international and Internet CSA 
• Practice issues, in general, surrounding the response to international and Internet CSA 
• Policy issues, in general, surrounding the response to international and Internet CSA 
• Other comments concerning international and Internet CSA  
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Table 2  The departments of police officers taking part in case-specific interviews  
Department N % 
Child Protection Unit 22 43.1 
Computer Examination Unit 7 13.7 
Criminal Investigation Department 7 13.7 
Paedophile Unit 4 7.8 
Vice Unit 4 7.8 
Other* 7 13.7 
TOTAL 51 99.8** 
*2 Homicide and/or Major Crime, 1 Professional Standards Unit, 1 Scientific Support, 1 Uniformed, 2 not recorded 
**Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
File searches 
11.  Searches were made of files in relation to 40 investigations. The data extraction form used in this stage of 
the research consisted of the following nine sections: 
• Administrative details concerning the search and file 
• Case summary 
• Details of the alleged offence(s) 
• Victim’ details 
• Suspect’ details 
• Police intervention 
• Other agency intervention 
• Outcomes 
• General policy and practice issues raised by the case 
12.  The intention had been to interview an officer and search the file in every ‘case study’. In some instances, 
though, owing to issues of availability, only the police officer or file was accessed. Overall, information was 
obtained for a total of 72 different investigations. A breakdown of the sources of information for these 72 
investigations is given in Table 3. The international and Internet CSA categories covered by these 72 
investigations are given in Table 4.  
13.  Due to practical problems - chiefly the difficulty of identifying and accessing cases, and resource 
considerations - case studies were not selected on a random basis. Rather, selection took place according to a 
series of ad hoc factors, including cases being identified through the police NPQS or other communications with 
the police, the incidence of a particular category of case and convenience.  
Table 3  Information sources for case studies 
Source N % 
Interview only 32 44.4 
Interview and file 24 33.3 
File only 16 22.2 
TOTAL 72 99.9* 
*Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
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Table 4  Categories of international  and Internet CSA covered by police interviews and file searches 
                                                                                                  
CSA category Interviews File searches 
N % N % 
International CSA victim 13 12.9 11 15.7 
International child sex abuser 22 21.8 15 21.4 
International movement of CAIs 9 8.9 5 7.1 
Internet-initiated grooming 10 9.9 4 5.7 
Internet-initiated incitement or conspiracy to commit CSA 11 10.9 7 10.0 
Internet-based CAIs 36 35.6 28 40.0 
TOTAL 101* 100.0 70* 99.9** 
* These totals exceed the number of interviews and file searches indicated in Table 3 as some cases incorporated more than 
one category of international or Internet CSA 
**Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
Additional searches of police files relating to Internet CSA offences 
                                                                                                                   
14.  During the course of this study, the researchers were given access to the files of three units (in different 
police services - one metropolitan and two shire county) that had a specialist or support role in the investigation 
of Internet CSA. The number of files searched in the metropolitan and the two shire county police services were 
21, 196 and 7 respectively. All of these files related to cases that had become known to the police in the period 
covered by the NPQS. Given the preponderance of Internet CSA cases - particularly those involving Internet 
CAIs - and the fact that access to this data source was available, it was considered very worthwhile carrying out 
this additional fieldwork. 
HMRC (practice-focused) interviews 
15.  Interviews with (the 17) HMRC officers were more wide-ranging than those with the police and used an 
unstructured schedule. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, in addition to studying practice issues in relation 
to this agency, and the international movement of CAIs specifically, it was necessary for the researchers to 
establish - in broad terms at least - the role of HMRC more generally in respect both of child protection and their 
other areas of responsibility. (The work of HMRC was an area that the researchers - probably like many others 
involved in child protection - were unfamiliar with.) Secondly, the posts held by interviewees were quite diverse, 
incorporating a number of distinct sections (policy, intelligence, detection and investigation) and settings 
(airports, docks and postal depots).  
16.  Some of the interviewees had special responsibility for work concerned with indecent and obscene material, 
either currently or previously. However, all interviewees had at least some experience beyond this specific area, 
which meant they were able to provide the researchers with the broader appreciation of HMRC that they wanted.  
17.  Only limited efforts were made to search HMRC files. This was due largely to resource issues but also the 
fact that the ones that were available contained only a very modest amount of information. A total of three files 
were searched.  Owing to practical considerations, it was not possible to select interviewees on a random basis. 
However, those that were selected did at least cover all the major sections and settings within HMRC. 
Policy-focused interviews 
Police  
                            
18.  As Table 5 shows, these individuals were drawn from a wide range of police units and organisations. These 
comprised 31 separate units and organisations in total. 
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Table 5  The departments of police officers taking part in policy interviews 
Department N % 
Computer Examination Unit 12 30.0 
Sex Offender Unit 5 12.5 
Interpol 5 12.5 
Child Protection Unit 3 7.5 
Paedophile Unit 3 7.5 
Vice Unit 3 7.5 
Major Crime Unit 2 5.0 
Telecommunications Unit 2 5.0 
Crime Management 1 2.5 
Criminal Investigation Department 1 2.5 
National Criminal Intelligence Service 1 2.5 
National High Tech Crime Unit 1 2.5 
Ports Police 1 2.5 
TOTAL 40 100.0 
Specialist organisations 
19.  Table 6 shows the broad type of specialist organisations from which interviewees were drawn. Although, the 
number of these interviews was not large, they did cover many of the key organisations working in, or concerned 
with, international and Internet CSA. 
Table 6  Specialist organisations featuring in policy-focused interviews  
Interviewee’s organisation N % 
NGO* 7 43.7 
Academic 4 25.0 
Government department 3 18.7 
Industry 2 12.5 
TOTAL 16 99.9** 
*NGOs comprised: UNICEF (2 interviewees), World Vision (1), NSPCC (1), ECPAT (1), Internet Watch Foundation (2). 
The four academic interviewees were from COPINE. The governmental interviewees were from the Home Office (2) and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1). The industry interviewees were from AOL (America On-Line - Internet service 
provider) and from an organisation ‘representing’ the travel industry (Association of British Travel Agents) 
**Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding 
Search of police crime recording and reporting systems  
20.  Owing to its shortcomings, the police NPQS could not be relied upon to produce a reliable measure of the 
number of known international and Internet CSA cases. This problem was rectified, in part at least, by carrying 
out a search of police crime recording, and reporting, systems. Although the number of records and reports 
searched were relatively large, the number of police services involved in this stage of the research was small - 
being two and three respectively. Consequently, some caution has to be exercised in generalising from these 
results to the rest of the UK. That said, one of the key findings of this research - that known cases of 
international and Internet CSA, with the exception of Internet CAIs, are relatively rare - was supported in other 
stages of the study, principally the police NPQS and the police practice-focused interviews.     
Recorded CSA offences 
21.  While the crime recording systems in both police services were computer-based, there was no automatic 
means of highlighting international CSA cases. What the researchers could, and had to do, was to select all the 
cases where the HOC (Home Office Classification) code indicated that they did or might involve a sexual 
offence against a child. Each of these records was then studied to see whether it involved a) a child victim and b) 
an international dimension. This was a slow and painstaking exercise but ultimately a very important one in 
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terms of producing a reliable measure of the extent of known international CSA victim and child sex abuser 
cases. 
Reported Internet-related criminal offences 
                                                                                                   
22.  The reports of Internet-related criminal offences were computerised in one Computer Examination Unit and 
in paper form in the other two. The process for identifying Internet CSA cases was the same whether the reports 
were in a computerised or paper form, and comprised reading the report to determine whether the case involved 
a) a sexual offence, b) a child victim and c) the Internet. Again, this was a demanding exercise but a valuable one 
in terms of producing a reliable measure of the number of known Internet CSA cases. 
Supplementary study 
Aim and methodology 
23.  The supplementary study was designed to establish the extent and nature of cases of international and 
Internet CSA, that were known to social services departments, Probation, Trading Standards, and military 
welfare and policing organisations, in the UK, and the implications of these cases for policy and practice. It was 
to comprise two main stages: a NPQS carried out among these organisations, and interviews with workers.  
NPQS administration 
                                        
24.  The NPQS was administered in March 2004, among all social services departments, Probation services and 
Trading Standards in the UK. (There was insufficient time to arrange the participation of the military in this 
stage of the research.) Respondents (one from each organisation) were asked to complete a single questionnaire 
relating to the number and types of case (for each of the categories in Figure 1) that had become known to their 
organisation (over a period which they determined and identified), and the policy and practice issues to which 
they gave rise.   
Outcome of NPQS and interviews 
25.  In the event, the supplementary study met with only very limited success. The response rate from agencies 
was disappointing, with 24 of the 223 social services departments, 20 of the 207 Trading Standards offices and 4 
of the 112 Probation services making any reply on the survey. There appeared to be a number of explanations for 
this poor response. These included the following: the fact that some agencies had had no involvement in 
international or Internet CSA (especially some Trading Standards offices), other agencies (namely social 
services departments) not wishing to participate without the approval of the relevant ADSS (Association of 
Directors of Social Services) committee, and the not uncommon reluctance on the part of individuals to complete 
questionnaires. Unfortunately, the research team did not have enough time to chase-up agencies over outstanding 
questionnaires or embark upon the interview stage. Despite these difficulties, the survey did provide some 
insight into the extent and nature, and practice and policy implications, of international and Internet CSA beyond 
those of law enforcement - which had been the primary focus of the main study. 
Ethical issues 
26.  The Research Director, the School Research Ethics Panel (School of Human and Health Sciences) and the 
University Ethics Committee (University of Huddersfield), recognised that this was a very sensitive research 
project. This being the case, the Research Director drafted an extensive Research Protocol that set out all the 
measures that would be taken to ensure the research was conducted in an ethical manner. The Research Protocol 
dealt with a wide range of issues, including the anonymity of research participants, confidentiality of 
information, obtaining informed consent and the setting up of an advisory committee to oversee the conduct of 
the research.  
27.  In addition to these relatively standard undertakings, there were a series of more special measures that were 
adopted in view of the nature of the research. These comprised the storage of the data at a local police station 
(for added security), making arrangements for counselling, should members of the research team wish to receive 
this, and establishing recording and reporting arrangements in the event of CAIs being (accidentally) accessed 
over the Internet (which did not occur). Of particular importance, was the Research Director’s stipulation (to the 
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University and the Advisory Committee, and recorded in the Research Protocol) that the research would not be 
directly accessing any CAIs. In the event, the research project did not lead to any problems of an ethical, or for 
that matter legal, nature.  
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APPENDIX D:   INTERNET CAIs - ADDITIONAL CASE STUDY 
Case 5: network of offenders distributing CAIs using file sharing software 
D.1  The eventual detection and investigation of this case was, in some respects, relatively 
straightforward. However, the case did raise a number of significant issues surrounding the policy and 
practice response to CAIs. 
D.2  The case was first detected by an NGO, in a foreign country, that was concerned with the protection 
children using the Internet. Soon after being set up, this organisation began to receive reports of 
individuals distributing CAIs over the Internet, using various file sharing software. This organisation had 
approached different authorities in its own country to have these offenders investigated but no action was 
taken. They then approached a renowned law enforcement agency in a neighbouring country, which 
began an inquiry. However, as an increasing number of UK suspects began to be uncovered, this agency 
approached a specialist police unit in the UK and asked whether it would assume responsibility for the 
investigation.       
  
D.3  This unit then began to investigate the network, and as the police officer interviewee explained, from 
a single, speculative and indefinite report, the case soon mushroomed to huge proportions: 
‘One of the first suspects we traced was to Harrogate. So we decided Harrogate was close enough, we 
executed a search warrant, went in there and the information appeared to be very accurate as to what 
was going on, on the Internet. So as a result of that we took two or three more suspects, sent those to 
outside forces, saying this is what it is and they came back, and again said, very accurate information. 
Since that point, up until about Easter, we’ve been involved in the tracing of ……[approximately 1000] 
suspects within the UK, all engaged in the distribution of indecent images of children, predominantly via 
the Morpheus network.’ 
D.4  As with many other cases involving the use of CAIs, many of these offenders were not found to have 
sexually abused children. However, some were, and their detection underlined how critical this 
investigation was: 
‘…but there has certainly been four that we know of so far, males, of no previous convictions, no previous 
allegations, who have been involved in indecently assaulting their children and taking photographs and 
distributing them on the Internet.’ 
‘The spectacular ones have been John Smith in East Anglia who was the baby rapist……he will certainly 
get ten years……we’ve had another one in Southampton that got ten years because of the offences that 
came to light. We’ve got another one awaiting trial for the long-term abuse of his 11 year old niece. 
We’ve got one in Scotland videoing and sexually abusing his daughter for nine years, since she was four 
years old up to the age of 13, and the pictures literally show her growing up - it is absolutely sickening.  
‘We’ve hit one in Kent, and when we did the research, the child protection team said there had been 
previous allegations of abuse by the father before, and one of the children was raped, they thought, but 
they couldn’t actually prove it. It [the previous allegation] went all the way to social services, all the way 
to hearings, and in the end they said that they couldn’t prove whether it is or isn’t…… So in the end he 
got access back and he is back with the mother and the children…… Of course we have turned up to 
arrest him for the distribution of indecent images of children, and while we are investigating him, the 
niece has come forward and said “he has been abusing me for years”.’ 
D.5  Given its scale, the case also usefully illustrated the diversity of offenders involved in this activity: 
‘…we have actually done quite a wide spectrum of 14-15 year olds up to 70 years olds…we’ve hit 
doctors, we’ve hit police officers, we’ve hit magistrates, teachers and kids. 
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D.6  Interestingly, of the approximately 100 suspects this officer had had more direct contact with, all had 
been male, although he did point out that one case was currently being investigated which might involve a 
female offender.  
D.7  Besides the refusal of authorities, in the country where the original report was made, to investigate 
this case, another policy and practice concern identified was the unwillingness and/or inability of some 
ISPs to assist police with their investigations, or, more specifically, to provide them with information 
identifying Internet users: 
‘Some of the other problems have been ISPs giving us wrong results. We’ve got ISPs who constantly give 
us negative results, saying they’ve got nothing…… Some of the ISPs, I mean most of the ISPs, have been 
very, very helpful, and I genuinely think they were all trying to be helpful. Just one or two of them were 
being a bit …… I don’t know …… I don’t know what went on, on their side, so whether they genuinely 
couldn’t find the information or whether they just didn’t find the information, I don’t know…… there are 
one or two companies who repeatedly send back ‘no trace’ and when you get the graphs out, we are 
looking at a 20-40% return rate from them. So, either they’re not keeping records or somebody is not 
doing their job. We can’t work out what is going on there but y’know they are private companies, they 
have got money to make. I think it comes down to money at the end of the day. Because we are trying to 
get information out of them for free and it is costing them money.’
D.8  This same police officer believed that his own police service, along with other local and national 
police organisations, had been overwhelmed both by this particular case and by Internet CAI cases 
generally: 
‘…we were offered information on worldwide suspects and it became clear that we couldn’t cope…so we 
ended up setting up a scheme with ________ [a national policing organisation] where they would deal 
with it, but they couldn’t cope with it. So what we ended up doing was getting contacts in various 
countries and getting the information provided direct to those countries…… So worldwide, I think it is 
something like twenty countries that we are currently involved with… 
‘…and the volume that has gone out to some forces, we accept has been……you know, if they have got 
only two people doing it and they are doing the analysis [forensic analysis of computing equipment], then 
it is going to take forever and a day to get round to doing them. 
‘But you know, it takes us up to, and sometimes over, a year to get a computer package back and then 
you’ve got to re-interview somebody. By the time you get the package back, on something that happened 
a year, eighteen months ago, and they [the offenders] say ‘Don’t know what you’re talking about, can’t 
remember.   
‘…when this was running and they [the police Telecommunications Unit, which was responsible for 
obtaining the details of suspects from ISPs] were getting 20-30 suspects a day, they were just drowning 
…… they just couldn’t cope. Y’know literally. 
‘Some forces have continued it, some forces have just said, again, that they couldn’t cope with the volume 
of work that was flying around.’ 
D.9  So preoccupied had this specialist unit been with this and other similar cases, that any attempt at 
proactive working appeared to have been shelved - indefinitely: 
‘We haven’t done proactive jobs ourselves for two and half years……just because of the sheer volume of 
stuff we’ve been receiving from other people. What we are now trying to do is to get our volume down or 
get it dealt with by other people and then we can start the monitoring to see whether there is a big box 
that we have never actually found before.’ 
D.10  Asked how well the police were responding to the problem of Internet CAIs, the officer identified 
one of the most fundamental issues in the response to Internet CSA: that there is, in all likelihood, a major 
undetected problem, or ‘box’ and one that the police were not yet tackling: 
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‘I don’t know how well we respond to it. I don’t know. I don’t know whether they [the police in general] 
have ever opened the box to find out how big the box is! …… I mean they can say we’ve arrested x 
amount of people, we’ve put x amount of people on the Sex Offenders Register, we’ve saved x amount of 
children from abuse, but do we ever actually open the box to find out how many we haven’t found. So we 
can have all the performance indicators they want, but the bottom line is I don’t think anyone ever knows 
how many victims there actually are out there. There are obviously new victims occurring everyday 
because there are new photographs going on the Internet……So I think, we’ve got to be a bit realistic and 
say we do what we get reported. What gets reported to us, we deal with. But the problem is we don’t do 
what doesn’t get reported, and how do we get into the stuff that doesn’t get reported?’
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APPENDIX E:   POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES - CSA IN GENERAL 
Introduction 
1.  One of the central aims of this research was to highlight the policy and practice issues specific to international 
and Internet CSA. However, during the course of the research, and in particular through the interviews with 
agency representatives, an attempt was made to highlight the policy and practice issues that existed in relation to 
CSA in general. These issues are listed below. The purpose of this exercise was to enable both the researchers 
and the readers of this work, to place the findings concerning international and Internet CSA in a broader, and 
therefore more meaningful and accurate context.  
2.  Although many of these issues will be familiar to those involved in, or concerned with, child protection, the 
authors believe it is important to reiterate them here, given that they reflect serious deficiencies in the child 
protection system. If a truly effective child protection system and society, is to be realised, whether in relation to 
international or Internet CSA, or CSA in general, then these deficiencies have to be addressed. In the interests of 
brevity, these issues are expressed in summary form. As this list indicates, there is still much which needs to be 
done to improve the response to CSA - including that which involves international or Internet elements. 
Victims 
3.  Needs of victims 
Provision for victims (and their family members) such as therapy, continues to be scarce. (The media, political 
and subsequent societal furore over, and preoccupation with, offenders, in recent years, have done nothing to 
remedy this problem, and may even have exacerbated it.) 
Awareness 
4.  Public   
         
The public need to have more information on how and when it should report child protection concerns. The 
public also require more opportunities to discuss and report such concerns. In addition, there needs to be moves 
to address both the indifference, and the over-reaction, which exists in different sections of society towards CSA. 
(It would seem that there is a need for a public awareness/education campaign, led by the Government, but 
involving, possibly, statutory agencies and/or NGOs.)  
Policy  
5.  Resources 
                
There is a marked lack of resources within all areas of child protection work One of the clearest manifestations 
of this lack of resources is the marked dearth of preventative and proactive child protection work. It is 
understandable, but also very worrying, that society in general, and possibly even agency workers, are becoming 
resigned - if not immune - to this situation.  
6.  Legislation - managing offenders 
                                                   
Courts need to have greater powers in order to exert more control, where required, over sex offenders, especially 
those deemed high risk, when they are in the community. This would include restrictions upon their moving 
home and changing their names.   
7.  Legislation - suspected offenders 
                                                   
The courts should have the ability to take action against suspects who have not been convicted following a court 
case but against whom there is a strong suspicion. 
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Police 
8.  Culture  
            
Some police officers pointed out that there was still a problem among their colleagues, both senior and junior, in 
their (negative) attitude towards police involvement in child protection work. 
9.  Tenure 
            
Many police services operate a policy of tenure whereby staff are in a department or position for a maximum 
period, and are moved on when, or before, this point is reached. While there seems to have been some relaxation 
in this policy, it is still in use in some police services and is a cause of significant disquiet.  As a number of 
police officers, especially those in child protection units, pointed out the removal of such staff, led to a loss of 
expertise - which had taken much time and effort to attain - stability within units and working relationships with 
other agencies.  
10.  Victim support 
                        
The police often perform an invaluable role in supporting child witnesses (i.e. alleged victims) (and their 
families) in the traumatic and lengthy periods before criminal cases come to court. While this work tends to be 
carried out on something of an unofficial or informal basis, it is time-consuming and one not without its 
challenges. (The challenges are not only logistical. Officers also have to contend with establishing, and 
maintaining, appropriate relationships with children and family members in the run-up to trials, and then have to 
manage the process of terminating these relationships post-trial.) The importance and necessity of this work 
needs to be fully appreciated, and above all supported, by the wider police service, and even more so by the 
Home Office and Government. 
  
11.  Interviewing children 
  
Girls, especially those of secondary school age (11 years and over) should have the option of being interviewed 
by female police officers (or social workers), with whom they are likely to be more forthcoming than if 
interviewed by male police officers (or social workers). 
Criminal Justice System 
12.  Victims not giving evidence 
                                            
A problem that persists in the criminal justice system is that some victims are prepared to make a disclosure, to 
the police, but are not, for a variety of reasons, prepared to act as a witness in any criminal trial.
13.  CPS 
        
The CPS should have more confidence in the likelihood of being able to secure convictions and should, on this 
basis, prosecute a higher proportion of cases.  
14.  Delays in cases coming to trial 
                                                
Delays in cases coming to trial remain the norm, as opposed to the exception. 
15.  Trials 
         
There was a widespread feeling that the criminal justice system, and the judicial process in particular, strongly 
favours the defendant, at the expense of the victim.   
16.  Victims experiences in court 
                                             
Victims - even quite young ones - can still be subject to hostile treatment by defence barristers in court, and 
sometimes with the acquiescence of judges. Not surprisingly, experienced, aggressive, adult barristers do not 
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find it difficult to intimidate small, young and possibly traumatised children, to such an extent that they, and their 
evidence, are seriously undermined. 
17.  Judiciary 
               
The practice of some judges is inadequate and their attitudes inappropriate. 
18.  Sentencing 
                  
Sentencing in at least some cases was felt to be too lenient. 
19.  Therapy for victims 
                               
Victims are still experiencing problems in receiving therapy, or more specifically are being delayed in receiving 
it, due to concerns that such provision might have an adverse effect upon the prosecution case. 
Children’s services 
20.  Capability          
                 
The police continue to question practice on the part of SSDs. This includes whether they share information and 
concerns with them as often and as readily as they should. 
Offenders 
21.  Treatment  
                 
There remains a paucity of treatment provision for offenders - both those in prison and those in the community.  
Non-abusing parents 
22.  Hostility to victims  
                              
Agencies face problems with some parents/carers who, while they have not been involved in the sexual abuse of 
children, take the abuser’s side and dismiss the disclosures their children have made. 
Media 
23.  Influence 
                
The influence of the media, especially the less responsible elements of it, upon policy, and public perceptions (or 
misperceptions), is considerable and has grown significantly in recent years. Much of this is seen as unhelpful. 
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